Bowdoin College
Bowdoin Digital Commons

Honors Projects | Student Scholarship and Creative Work

2022

"Proud Flesh and Blood": Phineas Fletcher, Gabriel Daniel, and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Embodiment

Micaela Elanor Simeone
Bowdoin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/honorsprojects

Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Simeone, Micaela Elanor, ""Proud Flesh and Blood": Phineas Fletcher, Gabriel Daniel, and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Embodiment" (2022). *Honors Projects*. 372.
https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/honorsprojects/372

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship and Creative Work at Bowdoin Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdoyle@bowdoin.edu.

“Proud Flesh and Blood”:

Phineas Fletcher, Gabriel Daniel, and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Embodiment

An Honors Paper for the Department of English

By Micaela Elanor Simeone

Bowdoin College, 2022

© 2022 Micaela Elanor Simeone

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: The Anatomy of Embodiment in *The Purple Island* 8

Autology Via Poetic Anatomy and Dissection 13

The Need for Autology and the Body's Importance 21

Fletcher's Beautiful, Ordered Body 24

Body-Mind Harmony Established Via Dissection of the Mind 26

Chapter Two: The Anatomy of Disembodiment in *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius* 34

Pineal Gland Controversy and the Cartesians' Unsteady, Defensive Anatomy 41

The Cartesians' Confused Disembodiment 49

Transcending the Body and Evading Death 51

Epilogue 58

Works Cited 61

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my advisor Aaron Kitch for his kindness, support, and guidance during this year. I am also grateful to Professor Kitch for inspiring my fascination with seventeenth-century philosophy and literature, and for giving me the opportunity to create the project of my interdisciplinary dreams. Four years ago, I would not have believed that writing my English honors thesis could involve reading nearly 500-year old anatomy textbooks. Professor Kitch's enthusiasm for and expertise on the "arts of science" greatly contributed to my development as an English major and thinker.

Sincere thanks are also due to my readers Emma Maggie Solberg, Morten Hansen, and Fernando Nascimento for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement throughout the drafting process. Their comments continually prompted me to ask new questions, investigate new possibilities, and push myself and my writing.

Finally, I would also like to thank my family and friends for having endless faith in me and for reminding me to come up for air every once in a while. I felt your love during every late-night writing session in the stacks.

Introduction

Early modern Europe was a landscape of unprecedented scientific and philosophical discovery, as thinkers across the continent were redefining what it meant to study the natural world and themselves. The human body was at the forefront of this discovery and redefinition. This was largely due to the early science of anatomy and dissection, which underwent profound growth in the early modern period and began to "transform entirely people's understanding … of themselves and their sense of identity or 'selfhood,'" as cultural historian Jonathan Sawday puts it (*Body* viii). Once human dissection and the intensive study of the body became standard in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, long-held convictions about humans' embodiment were shaken. This is because early modern knowledge production had long been bound by theology and cosmology, and thus did not "admit the possibility of thinking about the body as a discrete entity" (Sawday 16). Instead, any analysis of the body needed to be informed by an analysis of the much more exalted thinking entity of the human—the rational soul, or, the mind. However, dissection changed this, and anatomists across Europe began to see the body as a site of value in and of itself for discovery about nature, God, and the self.

The seventeenth century is an especially fascinating period in which to study this process—interest in human anatomy had already been increasing greatly since the early sixteenth century and the publication of landmark anatomical texts as well as the construction of Europe's first anatomy theaters—places of public dissection—in the late sixteenth century (Principe 99-100). Thinkers in the early part of the century had to navigate a kind of pivotal period straddling older, more holistic understandings of the body, and emerging models which increasingly extracted the body from its ties to the Heavens, the soul, and the self. By the late seventeenth century, the dominant philosophies of famous French philosopher René Descartes

(1596-1650) had solidified this extraction—accepted thought no longer looked to our embodiment as a critical component of what defines the human, instead focusing on the immaterial thinking faculty of the mind. So, the mid-seventeenth century is arguably well-defined as a period of overlap and transition between a culture which explored the body as a distinct window into the wonder of humanity, and the gradual turn towards a culture that framed the body as entirely distinct from the mind and as ultimately insignificant to defining the self and what it means to be human. This project traces the implications of this gradual arc towards Cartesian ideas in the later part of the century through two seventeenth century fictions: Phineas Fletcher (1582-1650)'s *The Purple Island* (1633) and Gabriel Daniel (1649-1728)'s *Voyage du Monde de Descartes* (1690). This project views these two largely-overlooked texts as important literary works that represent the seventeenth century's transformative debates about and explorations of the human body.

Poets, fiction writers, and satirists intervened in the production of early modern anatomical and natural philosophical knowledge which negotiated and shaped these transformations. Phineas Fletcher wrote during the pivotal mid-century point when anatomical science experiments and demonstrations were seen as facilitating crucial self-knowledge, and his work benefited from the principles of anatomical discovery to shape his literary exploration of the body. The key requirements of early modern experimental anatomical science—observation and demonstration—were imitated by numerous literary anatomies. Figures such as English poets Edmund Spenser (1552-1599) and John Donne (1572-1631) wrote famous poetic works—*The Faerie Queene* (1590) and *Of the Progress of the Soul* (1612) respectively—which explored nascent anatomical principles imaginatively, traveling into the body's interior through poetry. Fletcher's *The Purple Island* exemplifies this possibility of literary anatomical

experiment. Phineas Fletcher was an English poet and theologian whose work included religious prose, drama, hymns, psalms, and pastoral, devotional, and epic poetry. His magnum opus, *The Purple Island*, is a twelve-canto poem blending epic, pastoral, and utopic genres and describing in allegory the physiological structure of the human body and mind, where the human body becomes a fictional island. His poem embraces the possibilities of anatomical discovery, celebrating the body as a conduit for self-knowledge, while at the same time anticipating the century's turn toward the singular elevation of the mind.

Gabriel Daniel's *Voyage du Monde de Descartes* (1690)—published in English as *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius* in 1692—writes decades after this turn, and provides a window into the anxieties that facilitated it. Gabriel Daniel was a French Jesuit theologian, historian, and occasional satirist who gained fame during his lifetime as the historiographer of France, appointed by Louis XIV (Smith 792). Daniel's *Voyage to the World of Cartesius* is a satirical travel fiction aimed in part at critiquing the anatomical beliefs held by Descartes, which had become dominant by 1692. *Voyage* attempts to do this by imagining a world where Cartesian philosophies on the mind and body are fully realized in fantastical and exaggerated ways.

The legacies of these two works are not very significant—*Purple Island* has mostly been viewed as a cumbersome mess of painstaking allegory, and *Voyage* did not manage to do any real damage to Descartes's legacy. However, this project will attempt to show that these two texts deserve to be read in detail and read together as important contributions to the transformative early modern culture of anatomy and philosophies of the body. Both texts represent the convergence of the emerging science of anatomy, changing philosophies about the body and mind, and imaginative fiction in the seventeenth century. In addition, both texts embody the changing notions of self-discovery and the human in the seventeenth century.

In Chapter One, I explore how *The Purple Island* embodies the mid-century period between when anatomy encouraged people to learn about themselves through the body and the late-century shift when, thanks in large part to Descartes, the body is no longer seen as a meaningful location of the self. I argue that Fletcher employs a dissective mode that continually reminds the reader of the mind's embodiment, and that in doing so, the poem represents a pivotal moment when the culture of dissection accomplished a dual anatomy where humans could understand themselves as both fragmented and whole. This is because *The Purple Island* does not ultimately reduce the human to parts, but instead paradoxically demonstrates the unity of mind and body by studying it as a dissected, partitioned thing. In Chapter Two, I explore how *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius* responds to an altogether different culture in the late seventeenth century, within which the soul/mind became so thoroughly "dissected" from the body that the body was no longer seen as being relevant for selfhood. I argue that Gabriel Daniel's *Voyage* ultimately reveals—through a captivating satirical fiction—how understanding Cartesian anatomy as the product of anxiety, uncertainty, and novelty helps us better see how we became motivated to transcend our bodies and the mechanistic view of ourselves. These reflections culminate in an epilogue section that asks what we may be able to learn from these early modern discourses about the body and mind in our age of artificial intelligence.

It is worth saying a bit more about the significance of *Voyage* and *Purple Island* as fictional works that intervene in anatomical and philosophical knowledge of the body. Firstly, both *Purple Island* and *Voyage* are travel fictions. As Jonathan Sawday tells us, the natural philosophers of the earlier seventeenth century, "as they embarked upon the project of unravelling the body's recesses …, found themselves wandering within an (as yet) undiscovered" territory (23). Fletcher's decision to turn the body into an undiscovered fictional island helps to

solidify his project as one dedicated to self-knowledge, and to exploring the undiscovered self via the body. On the other hand, Daniel writes at the end of the seventeenth century, when the body had been thoroughly explored and dissected; fittingly, then, he takes us to an entirely fictional world that indirectly represents the anxieties and tensions that these explorations had engendered. The two texts' status as travel fictions helps to place them within the seventeenth century's period of overlap mentioned earlier—it is fitting that Fletcher's fictional island is undiscovered, since in 1633 anatomy was in some ways a still-emerging science; on the other hand, it makes sense that *Voyage*'s world is an interpretation of a world that already exists (Descartes's), since by 1692, the fully-emerged culture of anatomy began to draw new lines—particularly, lines bisecting the human, and separating our minds from our bodies.

Ultimately, both Fletcher and Daniel employ imaginative, literary tools to intervene in the seventeenth century's philosophical and anatomical debates about the body-mind relationship and the body's relationship to selfhood. As we will see, with *Purple Island*, Fletcher's dissective mode takes us into the body's interior in ways that the real practice of anatomical science could only come close to. In *The Body Emblazoned* (1995), Jonathan Sawday explains that "the sense of interiority is inescapably central to the experience of the body within history. Yet, a feature of our sense of interiority is that it can never be experienced other than at second-hand. We may look into other bodies, but very rarely are we allowed to pry into our own" (7). Though *Purple Island*'s "dissected" allegorical body does not possess marks of individuality, because Fletcher frames the poem as a work of "autology"—meaning, as I will explain, a work capable of transmitting new self-knowledge to each of its readers—the poem does seem to provide, for the reader, the illusion of the dissected self, or, of the interior of each individual reader's body. In this way, Fletcher's use of fiction to create his anatomy is what allows *Purple Island* to intervene

in anatomical discovery, as it enables the reader to "peer" into the body's interior in the name of self-knowledge, a form of knowledge normally beyond the reach or outside the bounds of dissection. Daniel's fictional satire in *Voyage* also allows his text to go beyond the bounds of physical anatomical discovery or real ways of exploring convictions about the body and mind. Just over twenty years before the publication of *Voyage*, English natural philosopher Margaret Cavendish wrote the following in her preface to her famous science fiction, *The Blazing World* (1666): "the reason why I added this piece of fancy to my philosophical observations [was] … to delight the reader with variety, which is always pleasing" (124). Similarly, in the opening pages of *Voyage*, Daniel explains that his fiction is an attempt to "diversify and enliven a Subject naturally dry and melancholy"—philosophy (x). Both *Voyage* and *Purple Island* join a tradition of early modern fictions that sought to animate philosophical and scientific ideas and imbue them with imaginative life. Ultimately, this animating power of fiction is what enables Fletcher and Daniel to make their mark on the history of ideas about body, mind, and selfhood.

It is worth noting that *Voyage*'s particular status as a *satirical* fiction contributes to the impact of Daniel's fiction—specifically, it helps him frame Cartesianism as a contrived and anxiously maintained fantasy, as Chapter Two will show. Notably, *Voyage* joins an important historical network of satirical science fiction—in his preface, Daniel names Greek satirist Lucian of Samosata (AD 125?-200?), author of *A True Story*, which is regarded by many as the earliest known work of science fiction. *A True Story* is also considered to be the source of the science fiction voyage/travel genre, which influenced numerous famous works including French writer Cyrano de Bergerac (1619-1655)'s *The Comical History of the States and Empires of the Moon* (1657), and Cavendish's *Blazing World*, only a few decades before Daniel's contribution to the genre with *Voyage*. Just like these works that preceded it, *Voyage* contains no shortage of

absurdities and fantastical scenarios. Though, as I will discuss, Daniel sees *Voyage* as in part a serious work, the second chapter will show how the text's distinctively satirical moments create the consequential framing of Cartesian anatomy as a contrived fantasy. The fact that Daniel's satire imagines Cartesian notions of the body as part of a contrived fantasy perfectly situates it at the end of the seventeenth-century arc of ideas about the body. While Fletcher's literary, disective mode allows him to create an anatomy of the body that reinforces body-mind harmony at a pivotal moment in time when this harmony was under scrutiny, Daniel's satire allows him to reveal the anxieties underlying the Cartesian views which dominated after the pivot and long after—views that attempted to create a new anatomy of the human that broke previous harmony, shunned embodiment, and dislodged our selves from our bodies.

Chapter One: The Anatomy of Embodiment in *The Purple Island*

Phineas Fletcher's 1633 poem *The Purple Island, Or The Isle of Man* offers a unique and expansive view into the early modern pursuit of self-knowledge. The poem—a twelve-canto theological work blending epic, pastoral, and utopic genres—uses allegory to describe the physiological structure of the human body, which it imagines as a fictional island. While Fletcher was not the only early modern poet to "look to anatomy for poetic invention," *The Purple Island* has been cited by some, such as Renaissance scholar Peter Mitchell, as the most "persistent poetic anatomy of the period," exceeding any other comparable English text of the period in describing the details of the body's anatomy according to the emerging anatomical science of the time (Mitchell 18). What sets Fletcher's *Purple Island* apart, other than its scale, is its direct employment of medical discourses of anatomy beyond those found in the works of Spenser or Donne, thus shifting "from the language of poetry shaping science to the language of science shaping poetry," as scholar Thomas Healy puts it in a 1991 essay on the poem (Healy 342). *The Purple Island* blurs lines delineating the often-distinct perspectives of poetry and anatomy as well as theology and dissection. In doing so, Fletcher crafts a vast and complicated world that straddles boundaries between old and new ideas about the body and mind, just before transformative body-mind narratives appeared in the late seventeenth century.

Over many years, early modern philosophical thought slowly severed the body from the mind, destabilizing a centuries-old view of the body and mind as inextricably linked. By the late seventeenth century, the Cartesian notion that the mind and body are entirely distinct and separable—introduced just four years after *Purple Island*'s publication with Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) and later expanded on in *Meditations* (1641)—had become dominant; with its dominance, the self along with the significance of being human became

located entirely in the mind. In both philosophy and literature, the remarkability of the body is often overshadowed by the brilliance of the mind, and *The Purple Island* appears to be an attempt to complicate this relationship. What is significant about the poem's particular attempt is that it came in the midst of transformations in the early modern period when the body first began to be treated as a discrete entity—worthy of exploration on its own (detached from its correspondences with the soul and the heavens), such as on the dissection tables of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In other words, Fletcher's *Purple Island* registers the philosophical transformations of this transitional period before Cartesian philosophy established the view of the body as not only discrete but actually discardable in a search for meaning and the self.

A close reading of *Purple Island* reveals that Fletcher simultaneously adapts to and wrestles with the period's emerging view of the body as a discrete entity: on one hand, he engages in the period's "culture of dissection,"[1] writing a poem that appears to value partitioning the world and body into parts and becoming a pseudo-anatomist as his stanzas "cut into" and divide up the body in a persistent, systematic way. On the other hand, the poem consistently emphasizes older models that pictured the body more as existing in a unified, harmonious whole with the universe and heavenly correspondences. In this way, the poem becomes an important embodiment of the struggle between old and emerging ideas about the body in early modern Europe. It is significant that Fletcher, a theologian, becomes a pseudo-anatomist in his authorship of the poem, because he is writing amidst an emerging philosophical and scientific climate that began to study the body as a discrete entity, not necessarily binding its analysis to an analysis of the cosmos, Heaven, and the soul/the mind. Importantly, however, the anatomic seat of the

[1] "Culture of dissection" is a phrase borrowed from cultural historian Jonathan Sawday, who uses it to suggest "a network of practices, social structures, and rituals surrounding [the] production of fragmented bodies" in the European Renaissance (2). This culture was devoted to the "gathering of information and the dissemination of knowledge of the 'mystery' of the human body" (5).

human soul was a long-standing and controversial topic of discussion for natural philosophers and theologians as far back as antiquity and throughout the early modern period. Though dissection began to treat the body as discrete, there remained a significant motivation to develop an anatomical science that marked out bodily structures that facilitate thought and reason. As neuroscience historian Francisco López-Muñoz and coauthors point out in a 2011 essay, "for [the] harmonious relationship between the mind and body to be successful, it was necessary for the human soul to have a physical and corporeal seat from where it would carry out that mysterious communication" (López-Muñoz et al., 166). Ultimately, in *Purple Island*, Fletcher opens up and displays that seat.

Importantly, Fletcher's dissective venture into the corporeal seat of the soul/the immaterial mind is markedly different from how Cartesian philosophy would later describe this aspect of the body. Drawing heavily on work by Galen, physician and philosopher of the Roman Empire, Descartes established the soul in the innermost part of the brain, or, the pineal gland (López-Muñoz et al., 166). In his model, the soul directs the human body from its seat in the pineal gland; the image is one of a kind of human machine springing to life through the mechanics of the soul's signaling. Though *Purple Island* does include sections that similarly describe the choroid plexus and other parts of the brain described by medieval and early modern anatomists—including Italian anatomist Berengario da Carpi (1460-1530) and Belgian anatomist Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564)—as the origin sites of motion, sensation, and human thought, the poem uses its dissective exploration to take us into a whole other world besides the anatomical one. For instance, in the fifth canto, which is dedicated to the head and brain, the poem's narrator describes the choroid plexus as the mainspring of the animal spirits—considered by many early modern anatomists to be the instruments of the soul. The narrator's account of the choroid plexus

undergoes an allegorical transformation as the stanzas explain that a "hundred nimble workmen stand, / These noble spirits readily preparing … / With never ended work, / and sleeplesse caring" (5.15.1-4). Here, what Descartes would later describe in more mechanical terms is elevated—the choroid plexus's "workmen" are themselves agents, laboring on behalf of the animal spirits of the soul; arguably, they present an image of a much more active body than the Cartesian human machine which is essentially useless until it is animated into being and importance by the spirits.

I argue that the most important way in which Fletcher's description of the body-soul/body-mind relationship sets itself apart from Platonic, Cartesian, and other traditions is by cutting into and opening up even the most immaterial aspects of the human mind, despite its periodical (and more conformist) insistence that these elements are profoundly incomprehensible. Importantly, the poem's descriptions of anatomical parts like the choroid plexus do not ultimately participate deeply or integrally in the overall allegory of the poem. What do appear more integral for Fletcher, are the poem's six cantos dedicated mostly to meeting the personified faculties of the mind as well as the Christian virtues and sins. Before the sixth canto, the poem's narrator had not ventured to open up the truly immaterial elements of the human to our view; even in the above description of the spirits, the narrator tells us that these these spirits are made of matter "almost immateriall" (5.14.5-6). So, when we get to these later six cantos, the poem's dissective mode engages with a much more surprising and metaphysical body-mind exploration than the descriptions of the choroid plexus and its corporeal service to the soul. In other words, the poem fully embraces the mind's immateriality through, paradoxically, a systematic investigation of personified mental faculties that is inspired by dissection, a method meant for exploration of the physical, material body. By doing this, Fletcher embraces the body

as a conduit to crucial knowledge even of the immaterial, ultimately superior mind. With Fletcher's poem, we can vividly imagine faculties such as the personified Will or Conscience as counselors sitting in the Prince (the mind)'s court. Soon after *Purple Island*'s publication, Descartes would insist that the immaterial mind is entirely distinct from the body, but Fletcher's poem firmly houses the mind's most immaterial components in the body, and as the poem's narrator explores these components using a kind of dissective mode, I argue that *Purple Island* gives the body-mind relationship physicality.

It is important that the poem uses an exploration of the body as a channel for explicating the majesty of the human mind precisely because Fletcher utilizes a dissective mode to do this. By doing this, he hinges *The Purple Island* at the turning point between older viewpoints that saw the body as a relatively lowly "corporeal prison" compared to the mind for the pursuit of self-knowledge, and newer methods like dissection which saw the body as an opportunity for expanded knowledge of the self, incorporating both in his poem. Ultimately, the poem's careful, somewhat dissective journey into the immaterial mind resists a Cartesian view of the body by suggesting that the body itself, as well as the study of it, can be conduits towards an understanding of the most immaterial, most acutely human faculties. Fletcher's poem should be seen as a particular kind of response to the early modern period's emerging culture of dissection—it is a perfect representation of how this culture provided a new way not just to better understand nature's design, but also to know our *selves* more intimately; Fletcher's particular fashioning of himself into a kind of literary anatomist combined with, as I will show, his conviction that he writes an "autology," enable him to particularly strongly create a harmony of mind and body, and frame this harmony as part of the self. In this way, *The Purple Island* marks itself as an important pre-Cartesian literary exploration of the body that encapsulates the

philosophical complexities of the short transitional period between long-standing and newly emerging perspectives on the body.

Autology Via Poetic Anatomy and Dissection

Importantly, Fletcher's mark on seventeenth-century discourse regarding the body's role in defining the self is made through a poem that tells a fictional story about the body, which is imagined as an island nation. However, *Purple Island* is not presented as a fiction—instead, the poem is framed as an educational, theological text written in the name of self-knowledge. In an opening address to the poem's readers, theologian Daniel Featly (1582-1645) writes, "He that would learn Theology, must first study Autology. The Way to God is by ourselves." He continues, writing that *The Purple Island* "will make [the reader] understand that Way" (ix). The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines autology as "self-knowledge; study of oneself," and marks Featly's address as the first case of the word's use. A search for "autology" anywhere in the *Early English Books Online* database returns no examples of the word being used prior to the poem's publication in 1633—only numerous mid-century dictionaries purporting to define "difficult terms" or "such hard words as are derived from other languages" and containing "autology" in these lists (OED Online). This strange word and the meaning behind it forms the basis of the intuition behind Fletcher's project: the human body is a valuable site of self-knowledge. It is worthwhile to note that autology as simply self-knowledge was not by any means a new concept in 1633; the motto "Nosce te Ipsum" ("Know Thyself") was a familiar one in early modern culture (Sawday 9). However, Fletcher's particular combining of autology through anatomy together with theological knowledge treads relatively new ground, as I explain below. As mentioned above, Cartesian philosophies that discard the body to privilege the mind as the primary site of meaning grew dominant soon after *Purple Island*'s publication; in contrast,

the poem—at least in part—presents knowledge of the body as a conduit towards the highest possible meaning. For Fletcher, understanding anatomy provides direct access to streams of spiritual and theological meaning that coexist with the body. This notion that knowledge of the body is linked to knowledge of God was, by 1633, a very old one; early modern anatomists were guided by the belief, which stretches back as far as antiquity, that "the human body expressed in miniature the divine workmanship of God"—that it was a microcosm of the greater universe (Sawday 23). *The Purple Island*'s careful and imaginative allegory bestows dignity on even the lowliest bodily functions, connecting even these to God.

One example of this is the poem's description of defecation. The poem describes the entrails, or, intestines as a port city in the lower region of the island which is composed of a system of pipes that regulate the proper flow and disposal of "passengers." Notably, in his marginal notes, Fletcher explains that the pipes (entrails) are themselves part of a hierarchy between the thin and the thick, and that "the thinne have the more noble office" (34), also repeating this sentiment in one of the section's stanzas: "whereof three noble are, and thinne; three thick, & vile" (2.39.7). When the poem's narrator gets to the description of the rectum, called "port *Esquiline*," its "vile" or baser nature is made clear, but at the same time the stanza retains the sense that God's perfect handiwork is evident in its design:

> The last down-right falls to port *Esquiline*
> More strait above, beneath still broader growing;
> Soon as the gate opes by the Kings assigne[2],
> Empties it self, farre thence the filth out-throwing:
> This gate endow'd with many properties,
> Yet for his office sight and naming flies;
> Therefore between two hills, in darkest valley lies (2.43.1-7).

In the marginal notes, Fletcher explains that the fact that the rectum is "straight … short, [and] larger toward the end [enables] … the excrement … [to] more easily be ejected, and retained also

[2] The poem seems to use "King" and "Prince" interchangeably throughout the poem to describe the human intellect.

upon occasion" (35). Thus, Fletcher ascribes a certain dignity to the design of the rectum, indicating that its shape perfectly enables it to perform its function. In other words, he gives the impression that even this lowliest bodily function is evidence of God's thoughtful, highly functional design of the body. There is also a certain level of autonomy suggested by this description, which further dignifies the function of defecation. In his marginal note, Fletcher highlights the rectum's ability to "retain" excrement voluntarily. In *Intimacy and Sexuality in the Age of Shakespeare* (2012), James M. Bromley writes that Fletcher describes the "rectum's voluntary control over evacuation as a form of political authority," and that Fletcher's emphasis on the body's ability to "hold back" or to evacuate excrement "figures a person's relationship to his or her body in terms of domination" (52-3). Though Fletcher's stanza describes the rectum as being necessarily far from the King's sight, relegated to this "darkest valley," and though the process of excretion is initiated by mandate of the King, the stanza and Fletcher's margins together indicate that the rectum possesses some capability of voluntary control, framing the function of defecation as ultimately the result of a thoughtful, highly functional grand design, however ignoble. Here we can see how Fletcher's poem embraces detailed, intimate knowledge of the body, its interior, and all of its functions as a conduit towards higher meaning and knowledge of God and of the self.

Arguably, *Purple Island* enacts its particular autology via stanzas that, together, mimic the work of dissection as the narrator allegorically reveals the inner-workings of the body down to its finest details—the instruments of swallowing or the knitting of cartilage—with systematic order and precision. As mentioned above, many early modern thinkers viewed gaining knowledge of the body as a way to learn more about God's divine workmanship in nature; using the same rationale, the emerging sixteenth and seventeenth-century anatomical science and

practice of dissection were similarly theologically justified. The publication of a poetic anatomy as comprehensive as *Purple Island* inserts Fletcher neatly into this tradition of Christianity-approved dissective practice. However, it is worthwhile to note that there was some controversy and anxiety surrounding the early development of the science of dissection which complicates Fletcher's use of this knowledge; however, his particular dissective mode ultimately satisfies longstanding Christian conceptualizations of the nobility of the body.

In the seventeenth century, European culture and society underwent a shift away from the emphasis of the universal in favor of the particular, a transition which can also be seen as fitting within the broader context of the period's "scientific revolution," which encouraged knowledge-making through an "endless partitioning of the world and all that it contained" (Sawday 3). This new way of making sense of the world was part of what cultural historian Jonathan Sawday calls "the culture of dissection" (Sawday 2). Alongside this rise of anatomical science and dissection, the older models of microcosmic-macrocosmic correspondence and symmetry were shaken, and many European early modern anatomies thus became characterized by anxiety about unity versus partition, often defensively insisting "that the part is by definition a part only in relation to the whole" (Hillman and Mazzio xv). Echoes of similar sentiments show up in numerous places in *The Purple Island*, such as one moment when Fletcher describes how the Creator composed the body "with curious art; / Which like an Index briefly shou'd impart / The summe of all; the whole, yet of the whole a part" (1.43.5-7). Overall, fragmentation and unity meet in *Purple Island* as Fletcher holds on to older models of correspondence and harmony, while simultaneously engaging in this new culture of dissection as he attempts to make both anatomical and theological sense of the body. What results is a kind of defense of the microcosmic, cosmological, harmonious view of the body through a "dissection" that balances

partition with unity—the poem's first five cantos carefully, methodically describe regions of the body and its many ingeniously crafted parts in extreme detail, while the last seven cantos are mostly dedicated to the mind, its link to Heaven and moral virtues. Importantly, it is the mind, which is described as the island's "Prince," that is revealed as the chief mediator of heavenly influence for the body: the Prince is "replenisht with celestial light," and, using this light, "All coming evils could foresee and flie" (83). Using both the language of monarchy and of Heaven, Fletcher is able to reconcile the uncomfortable reality of the body's many parts with theology by emphasizing the mind's role of fundamentally linking the body to God.

Similarly to the struggle over partition, the emerging early modern science of dissection had to overcome the taboo surrounding the "voyeuristic manipulation" of dead human bodies which had necessarily been denied a Christian burial; to cut into the body's interior meant entering the "corrupt world of mortality, … decay, … [and] spiritual dissolution" (Sawday 21). The fact that Fletcher chose to investigate the body in such detail in his poem thus made his project somewhat of a difficult one—*Purple Island* had to somehow "peer into" the body in a way that joined it with Christian moral structures. We can start to see the significance of *Purple Island* being published in 1633: Fletcher and his theologian contemporaries were adapting to this expanding culture of dissection. Evidently, there were elements of this emerging dissective practice that made bodies seem less noble; in particular, Descartes shaped a distinctly Cartesian culture of dissection which not only could consider the body as a discrete entity, but also turned the body into a kind of inanimate object or machine, given significance and animation only by the immaterial soul which is able to exist entirely separate from its corporeal vessel. However, Fletcher's *Purple Island* "dissects" the body using a chronology that helps it reaffirm the links between body and immaterial mind/soul.

Arguably, the practice of dissection fundamentally requires the performance of a particular chronology when moving through the body's parts, and the establishment of a certain hierarchy or organization. Rationales for anatomical organization rested on the Early Modern ideological foundation that "nature is the primary form of beauty," a notion that can be traced back to Galen and, before him, to Aristotle (Garrison, lxx). This conviction was aligned with the centuries-old teleological view of the body as being inherently endowed with divine purpose. Historian Vivian Nutton, in a 2014 edition of Vesalius's landmark anatomical texts *On the Fabric of the Human Body* (1543), writes that Vesalius chose to focus Book I of the *Fabrica* on the bones, which he emphasized as being crucially important for the body by supporting and controlling movement. Nutton explains that Vesalius claimed that in anatomy courses taught by his contemporaries, the study of bones was often left to the end, so these courses thereby "missed the opportunity to reveal the wondrous workings of Creator" (Nutton, XC). Notably, Fletcher also begins his poem focused on the bones, which are described as the island's foundation; this choice suggests that Fletcher may have been following the precedent laid out by Vesalius's extremely influential work, and therefore indicates that Fletcher was at least somewhat preoccupied with chronology in his poetic anatomy. Given this, it seems even more significant that Fletcher's narrator, like Vesalius again, ends his survey of the island with an exploration of the brain, the undisputed top of the anatomical hierarchy. It is clear then that for Fletcher, writing a poetic anatomy that drew upon real conventions of anatomical science and dissection would be key to the poem's facilitation of self-knowledge.

In addition, Fletcher goes beyond inspiration from anatomical texts in a sense, at one point transcending the physical brain to take us into the immaterial mind in order to describe the positions, functions, and organization of the intellectual faculties as well as moral virtues and

vices. As *Purple Island* completes its dissection-esque progression through the "Isle," it proceeds closer to those components of the human that perhaps most intensely help to shape the self. That the poem places its exploration of the immaterial mind at the end of a chronology mimicking those followed by anatomists further reveals how Fletcher is able to seamlessly join body and mind rather than separate them. Fletcher's dissective mode thus serves his autological purpose—it follows early modern conventions predicated on the belief that study of the body provides an opportunity for expanded knowledge of the self and of God, and suggests even in its chronology that knowledge of the body can lead to crucial knowledge of the immaterial mind.

There is a caveat—*Purple Island* does distance mind from body when it affirms the notion that the body is the mind/soul's "corporeal prison." At one point, Fletcher imagines that the mind is "prest down in captive chains, and pent in [the] earthly mold" of the body (6.65.7). However, because the poem is framed under the banner of autology and spends its first five cantos focused entirely on a detailed poetic anatomy of the body, the poem still ultimately manages to position knowledge of the body as a conduit to knowledge of the mind. As a later section of this chapter will show, Fletcher's poem at many points emphasizes the body's mortality and susceptibility, better positioning the mind as the body's saving grace. As we will see, *Purple Island* echoes the longstanding notion that it is simply the fate of the mind—"Who th'deitie inflesht, and mans flesh deifi'd" (6.72.7)—to be encased in the flesh and bone of the body, for better or for worse, while the body is *gifted* Heaven's influence only because of the mind. Prior to the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, understanding the body's interior had to coincide with analyzing the soul/the mind which gave it its significance; many thinkers established that the body's reason for being is to serve as the temporary lodging and instrument of the immaterial, immortal soul. In this model, which can be partially attributed to Plato and is

seen in the works of many other authors from Augustine of Hippo to Donne, the body was often seen as the “close prison which perpetually sought to constrain the expansionary desire” of the mind (Sawday 20). This view, which was dominant within western culture prior to the fifteenth century, held that the body confines the mind to a punishing corporeal existence.

As demonstrated above, echoes of this older view of this body-mind struggle are strong in *Purple Island*. So, while *The Purple Island* does not sever body from mind, the poem does negotiate this tradition of valorizing the mind far above the body as a site of meaning and purpose. By including lines that keep the body subordinate to the mind, Fletcher anticipates the Cartesian perspective to some extent, which built upon the corporeal prison idea to further subordinate the body to the point where it is viewed as entirely separate from the mind/soul, and no more significant for selfhood than if it were an inanimate object. However, even the poem’s emphases on the mortality (and therefore relative inferiority) of the body, because they are a part of Fletcher’s autological poetic anatomy, indicate that the poem views study of the body as crucial for truly grasping the expansive power and function of the mind. In its mimesis of an anatomist’s work, the poem often details how different body parts work to defend against disease and are fashioned with protective properties—for example, the flow of animal spirits are “guarded with double trenches” (vein pairs) (2.12.4), and stomach muscles are “guards” who “with constant watch compasse” the Isle’s lower region (2.21.1-2). The poem’s emphasis on the body as a defensive system highlights its mortality and fragility, contrasting the mind/immortal soul. However, perhaps part of Fletcher’s autology suggests that had *Purple Island* not constructed such a careful poetic anatomy and “dissection,” we would not have arrived at such a clear and tangible understanding of the mind’s capability. In another stanza, the narrator describes the eyelashes who defend the “castle” of the brain; they are imagined as “spearmen”

sitting atop the eyelids “their pikes intending, / Watch[ing] both night and day, the castles port defending” (5.27.6-7). Here, as in the other passages, the poem ultimately manages to strengthen the reader’s understanding of the ties binding body to mind, because we are able to visualize these ties in a tangible way through this kind of dissective mode he uses. As always, the poem positions knowledge of the body as a conduit towards advanced knowledge of the mind.

The Need for Autology and the Body’s Importance

The Purple Island’s opening pages seem to frame knowledge of the body as a desperately needed and even threatened form of knowledge. Poet Francis Quarles (1592-1644) writes in a commendatory verse included with the poem about the “Isle” (the body) that it is “A place too seldom view’d, yet still in view; / Near as ourselves, yet farthest from our care; / … A foreign home, a strange, tho’ native coast; / Most obvious to all, yet most unknown to most” (1.34.3-7). Here, Quarles uses the language of travel to lament at how the body is at once native and foreign; it is almost as if knowledge of the body is, for Fletcher and his supporters, in jeopardy—“still in view,” but not enough in our care. This kind of sentiment may be a reaction to an inherited history of shifting attitudes towards anatomical knowledge. Plato saw the soul/the mind as by far the most important component of the human, “the body being merely its workhouse in this world. [Thus], investigation into the body would have been an investigation into mere matter” (Mitchell, 48). It is evident from *The Purple Island* that Fletcher does not share this conviction—for him, the body clearly merits investigation. An influx of Aristotelian ideas about the body and soul beginning in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries shifted perceptions about the body and dissection away from Platonic ideas; these ideas continued to be influential, and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw another return to Aristotle, this time to the anatomical projects of Aristotle and Galen which, as they were revived, led to the development of the

practice of dissection and the period's "renewed intellectual interest in the human body" (Mitchell, 18). Perhaps then we can read Fletcher and his supporters' eagerness to instate the body as the location of "autology" as a part of this renewal, which signals that intellectual interest in the human body was not a fixed and unshakeable one in the seventeenth century, but rather one requiring regenerating effort from investigators like Fletcher.

Importantly, the island-nation seems to be framed by the beginning of the poem as a still-emerging one. One section appears to allegorically describe the fall of Adam and Eve from grace by imagining that the Serpent "allures … [the Isle] from the peacefull shore, … / And … Drench[es] [it] in dead seas … / [and] sulphur waves" (1.54.3-6), plunging the Isle in "curelesse grief and endlesse errour" until Christ rescues the Isle from the lake (1.57.2). Now that the Isle has been saved, the narrator describes "this Islands new recover'd seat," and begins his extensive narration of the island's current terrain (1.60.2). That the body is described here as a new, potentially still-emerging structure mirrors the body's emergence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a subject capable of being examined for its own significance as a discrete entity. As the poem continues, the "land" of the body is specifically characterized as *undiscovered* territory. In this view, there is so much that is unknown to us about our bodies, and exploration beyond this native land is fruitless: "while your selves and native home forgetting, / You search farre distant worlds with needlesse sweating, / You never finde yourselves; so lose ye more by getting" (1.38.5-7). Here, it seems as though the body could hardly be more important for Fletcher—it is seemingly the primary site of valuable self-knowledge, as there is nothing worthwhile to be discovered in the "distant worlds."

However, there are other moments in the poem that suggest a different motivation behind this expressed need for readers to "finde [themselves]." In another one of his opening remarks, Francis Quarles writes that the metaphorical "house" that is the body is

> the likeliest building sometimes known
> To fall by oblivious chances; overthrown
> Ofttimes by tempests, by the full-mouth'd blasts
> Of heav'n; sometimes by fire; sometimes it wastes
> Through unadvis'd neglect: put case the stuffe
> Were ruine-proofe, by nature strong enough
> To conquer time, and age; …
> What hast thou then, proud flesh and blood, to boast?
> Thy dayes are evil, at best; but few, at most;
> But sad, at merriest; and but weak, at strongest;
> Unsure, at surest; and but short, at longest (11).

The urgency of *The Purple Island*'s autology is clear here in a new sense—the body itself is vulnerable and prone to many threats; instead of revering the body in this passage, Quarles suggests that the body—"flesh and blood"—is in reality rather ignoble. The weakness of flesh is highlighted here—Quarles is pointing to the fact that as the body decays ("wastes") over time, it also faces continuous threats. So, the perceived need for autology suggested by Quarles and Fletcher can perhaps be paraphrased as a need also to answer Quarles' question, "What hast thou then, proud flesh and blood, to boast?" In other words, the poem must determine and express the worth of the body and knowledge of it despite its mortality, at the same time as real cadavers of the early seventeenth century were being laid out on the dissection tables of Europe. As discussed in the prior section, this idea of the susceptible body shows up throughout Fletcher's poem; here, there is a strong sense that *The Purple Island*'s autology is urgent in part because the body is weak and base when compared to the mind. It seems, then, that a framing goal of the poem is to delineate what it is about the body that is dignified and valuable; in the end, the poem largely enables us to see vividly how the mind/the soul give the body much of its dignity, raising

it above its baser station. Here, we again see a tension in *Purple Island* between Fletcher's apparent reverence for the body and all its workmanship and his view of the body's deference to the mind, but ultimately the poem reveals that this deference may be better and more effectively served via detailed knowledge of the body and its inner-workings.

Fletcher's Beautiful, Ordered Body

Language of beauty and grandeur in *Purple Island* both strengthens the poem's admiration of the body as well as sets up its stronger admiration of the mind ahead of cantos focused on the mind-body relationship. As discussed, for much of his poem, Fletcher elevates the body as a wondrous creation. As he does this, he demonstrates the beauty of the body in parts while at the same time gradually re-establishing the body's link to the unified whole of christological correspondences and the mind. In lieu of a prefacing statement by Fletcher himself, we can read Featly and the other contributors' opening remarks as representative of Fletcher's aims for the poem as a vehicle for self-knowledge. In addition to his mention of autology in his opening address, Daniel Featly writes, "here are no blocks for the purblinde; no snares for the timerous; no dangers for the bold: I invite all sorts to be readers; all readers to be understanders; all understanders to be happie" (4). Writings on anatomy gained an expanded readership in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in part because authors employed new mediums for describing the body—Fletcher inherits and adds to this history of innovative writing about the body. Nearly a century before *The Purple Island*'s publication, Vesalius's *On the Fabric of the Human Body* (1543) transformed Europeans' knowledge of themselves in part because he accompanied his descriptions with unprecedented illustrations—both drawings of the body and other supplemental drawings such as those of cherubs playing in and out of the letters and mimicking the work of the anatomist (Nutton, xciii). Vesalius was driven, like many others

in his time, to "picture nature in new ways" and sought to display the body in a way that fully captured the reverence he felt it deserved (Garrison, lxvi); with his books, the "noblest work of the Creator is given appropriate homage in words and pictures" (Nutton, xcii). Vivian Nutton has discussed how anatomy had long been viewed as a lesser art exercised by "lower class, monoglot surgeons, masters of the knife and human butchers" via the growing practice of dissection (Nutton, ciii). With the *Fabrica*'s 1543 publication alongside elaborate illustrations ripe with significations and allusions, "the human body is transferred from the sordid dissection display to … the pure white of the printed page," and anatomy is elevated to an art fit for educated gentlemen (Nutton, xcii).

In addition to meeting a perceived need for bodily autology with *Purple Island* as previously discussed, it seems that Fletcher also viewed poetic modes—including the pastoral, the epic, and the allegorical—as important filters for the particular anatomical knowledge he hoped to impart. Similarly to the works of Vesalius and other early modern anatomists, Fletcher's poetic anatomy helps to further elevate the body as a beautiful and wondrous creation. As the poem continues its dissective journey through the island, it arrives at the head in the fifth canto, which harbors both the brain and the face. The face is imagined to be a "precinct" of this region, and is described as the "best and chief of all, / … therefore fram'd like heaven, sphericall, / … [and] of loveliest grace" (5.4.1-4). Here, Fletcher once again aligns his dissective mode to those practices of dissection which were theologically justified, as he imagines and visualizes the face's link to Heaven and to God. Furthermore, the face is then described as "th'Isle's Epitomie, Where ev'n the Princes thoughts are often read: / For … / Fair on the face wrote the Index of the minde" (5.8.3-7). Here, Fletcher, even within the poem's dissective process of breaking the head region into parts, establishes a link between the body (the face) and the mind;

dissection/fragmentation and harmony/unity work together in *Purple Island* to express the beauty of the body and its parts.

As this passage also suggests by emphasizing the Heaven-like beauty of the face, as much as it elevates the body as a beautiful creation, Fletcher's aesthetic language about beauty in the body also helps to clarify the *mind*'s eminence. The majority of Fletcher's language of grandeur, beauty, and regality is found in the poem's depictions of the mind. Early Modern anatomists believed that there is an "esthetic dimension in the human fabric" and that the anatomist should be no less committed than the artist to "illustrating the beauty of the human form" (Garrison, lxx). Seemingly motivated by the same drive, Fletcher ensures that *The Purple Island*'s Isle is "fram'd with wondrous sense and art" at every turn (2.32.1), and continually emphasizes the purpose and design of each body part rather than simply the overall structure of the body. In describing the body's design, Fletcher at times even uses language of ornamentation; notably, he appears to save these blatantly aesthetic descriptions for those body parts which hold particularly prominent office in the body's hierarchy. For instance, in the poem's section on the body's lower region, Fletcher clarifies in an endnote that "Of all this lower region, the Hepar, or liver, is the principal" (38). He then writes that "in this fair town the Isle's great steward dwells; / … [and] glitters in purple dye" (3.8.1-2) that is like a "rubies sheen" (3.6.5). With this language of a glittering, ruby-colored appearance, Fletcher strengthens his depiction of the liver as an eminent figure in the body. It soon becomes clear how Fletcher's language of beauty and grandeur helps the poem's mind-body hierarchy to emerge.

Body-Mind Harmony Established Via Dissection of the Mind

The fact that Fletcher uses this language of grandeur and regality to help the reader picture the body's hierarchy ultimately helps us see that the mind is considered to be the most

beautiful element of the island of all. In the whole of *The Purple Island*, the body is depicted as a hierarchy made up of "three metropolis's jointly sway'd; / Ord'ring in peace and war their governments, / With loving concord, and with mutual aid" (2.14.2-4). Though these three regions are very much connected, linked through "loving concord" and "mutual aid," there is very clearly a hierarchy organizing them; this is made especially apparent through the language of government and politics, which is highly suggestive of order and rank. As Fletcher explains in a marginal note, the Isle's three regions are the lowest (the belly), the middle (the breast) and the highest (the head). In the lowest, as we have seen, the liver is sovereign, in the middle, "the heart reigns, most necessary," and finally, the brain "obtains the highest place, and is … the greatest in dignity" (21). Distinguished "characters" populate the Island—the teeth "are twice sixteen porters" (2.30.1) and the tongue a "Groom with wondrous volubilitie" (2.31.1), for instance—but ultimately, it is the liver, the heart, and the brain that hold the highest offices, with the brain being the most grand and regal figure of them all. In the poem's final cantos, Fletcher focuses on the mind—the Island's "Prince." Fletcher writes that the mind is

> of frame more than celestial,
> [and] Is rightly call'd th'all seeing Intellect;
> All glorious bright, such nothing is terrestrial;
> Whose Sun-like face, and most divine aspect
> No humane sight may ever hope describe:
> For when himself on's self reflects his eye,
> Dull and amaz'd he stands at so bright majestie (6.28.1-7).

For Fletcher, then, the mind exists far above the Isle's terrestrial bounds—it is so significant that it exists more in the heavens than on the same plane as the body; Fletcher even writes that the Prince's "strangest body is not bodily, / But matter without matter" (6.30.1-2). Here, in addition to this emphasis on the immateriality of the mind, Fletcher's language in the above stanza very much emphasizes inexpressibility—the mind shines too bright to be perceived or described. It is

interesting then that Fletcher so strongly highlights the mind's inexpressibility and unreachability here, because in the next few cantos the poem lets us into the interiority of the mind in a way that not only seems to be an attempt at a true description of the mind but that also gives the mind a certain materiality.

As alluded to earlier with the reflections on the poem's description of the choroid plexus, *Purple Island* often makes mind-body communication visible, making clear the ways in which corporeality serves the mind/soul. Throughout the poem, the mind is continually in correspondence with the body; the brain is always sending "mandate[s]" to body parts, such as to the nerves carrying sense and motion from the brain (20). Fletcher writes that "no nook or corner flies [the Prince's] piercing sight" (6.29.3) and "while his weary kingdome safely sleeps, / All restless night he watch and warding keeps" (6.31.5-7). The mind is continually in communication with the body—sending it commands and acting as its ultimate defense. The mind and body even work together to heal: in one passage, personified Repentance "pricks the heart in tender vein" (6.63.3) before releasing tears—"these cordiall drops, these spirit-healing balms / [that] Cure all her sinful bruises" (6.64.1-2). Here, an entity of the mind signals to the body to aid its work—in this case, tears are called to cure the body of sin on behalf of Repentance.

However, the poem does not always describe the body-mind relationship as a symbiotic one; although, because the poem continually forces us to consider the anatomical, corporeal relationship between mind and body, ultimately it is arguably the mind-body union that is stressed. Fletcher at times indicates that the mind and body are at odds, and simultaneously stresses the eminence of the mind. For example, he writes that the Prince "is Shut in a Tower where thousand enemies / Assault the fort … / [and] by diverse spies / Searches into his foes and

friends designs: / For most he fears his subjects wavering minds. / This Tower then onley falls, when treason undermines" (6.38.2-7). Here, the body is depicted as being capable of acting separately from the mind and even against it, which contradicts much of the body-mind harmony established by the rest of the poem. So, the poem's narrator asks, "what are those warlike Knights" that protect the mind against the body's attackers (9.5.4) both within and without. In the poem's later cantos, many stanzas are dedicated to answering this question; the first answer is "Heaven," and then the narrator lists many personified virtues as "Commanders," including Knowledge, Contemplation, Humility, Obedience, Faith, Penance, Amendment, Gratitude, Patience, Fortitude, Temperance, Chastity, and Modesty (6-41). Fletcher thus completes his autological project—Christian virtues protect the mind against the body's threats. Because these cantos focus on how the body's treason is stopped by external, divine forces channeled through the mind, what emerges from the poem is in part Fletcher's unwillingness to detach from the old model of the body as a prison, loathsome in comparison to the mind. However, though in many ways this emphasis on the body's treason seems to separate mind from body, it also seems that by taking the reader on a journey through the body, where we can visualize the body's physical relationship to the mind as both a defender and a threat, the reader is ultimately better equipped to understand the virtues of the mind, which act as conduits for heavenly influence. In other words, the immaterial, moral processes of the mind are rendered visible as the poem "materializes" the body's treasonous subjects as well as the mind's warlike knights.

The poem's exploration in the sixth canto enters a very metaphysical space that allows us detailed access to the mind. The poem's narrator informs us that while the mind (the Prince) is "shut in a Tower" which is the head (6.38.2), we will now try to "view his glories wonderment, / And get a sight of what we so admire" (6.39.3-4). Already, the poem is inviting us into the

interiority of the mind, like it took us into the interiority of the body, in a way that it has claimed should be impossible. Interestingly, the poem seems to indicate that it is *because* the mind is trapped in the body that it can be in our view: the narrator tells us that while the Prince "lurks in earthly tent," we must try to "view his glories," because "when away from this sad place he flies, / And in the skies abides, … / Too glorious is his sight for our dimme mortall eyes" (6.39.1-7). Here, though the body is what imprisons the mind, it is also what allows us to gain knowledge of the mind's most "unknowable" qualities.

As Thomas Healy remarks in his 1991 essay on the poem, the final cantos' description of these qualities is "given the appearance of the dissection continued," as if we are still to some extent engaged in a tour of the physical body (348). Up to this point in the poem, the poem's narrator had been "dissecting" the island region by region, mostly describing its physical properties as well as the many defenders that populate it and the distribution of labor among parts. When the poem focuses in on the mind, the approach is not all that different—we are introduced to the mind's eight counselors: "Within the Castle sit eight Counsellors, / That help him in this tent to govern well" (6.41.1-2). The narrator tells us that the Prince/the King has three "inmost private counsel"—the understanding, the will, and the Church or elect. The other counselors, the "five senses," are described as "five of less dignitie" who "have outward Courts, and in all actions prie," but refer certain tasks to "Courts more fit and high" (6.41.2-7). This systematic description of the Castle's "inhabitants," where they reside, and what their organization is very much mirrors the dissective mode used throughout the poem to explore the body. In other words, in this new venture into the Castle, there is not immediately that much of an indication that the poem is entering a new, non-dissective space. In this way, the language of the poem itself seems to register a struggle over the extent to which the mind can be described as

in part a corporeal entity. As the canto continues, there is similar imagery of functional and orderly collaboration between moving "parts" in the mind to the imagery that the poem previously used to gain knowledge of bodily functions and organization. One example of this is when the narrator explains the duty of personified common sense to take in all of the five senses' informings in order to act as a "Judge and Arbiter" of every thing (6.42.6). Describing how this "Judge" disseminates his rulings, the narrator tells us: "through strait waies the nimble Post ascends / Unto his hall; there up his message sends, / Which to the next well scann'd he straightway recommends" (6.45.1-7). The canto continues in a similar vein—another stanza describes how the fancy, "*Phantastes*," sends his messages to the Prince who scrutinizes them before "commit[ting] them to his Treasurie, / Which old *Eumnestes* keeps, Father of memorie" (6.48.1-7). In these stanzas, Fletcher leverages a similarly dissective mode as was used in earlier cantos to let us into the interiority of the mind, despite the poem's insistence on the inexpressibility of the immaterial mind.

These cantos appear as an attempt to demystify the mind's workings using an approach meant for exploring physicality; in this sixth canto, the poem paradoxically explores the mind as if we can know it like we can know the body. So much of his poem is about knowledge of the body, but Fletcher clearly distinguishes the mind as the most crucial component of the human and in some ways frames knowledge of the mind as the ultimate goal of the poem. Given this, it appears that Fletcher saw extensive exploration of the body as a prerequisite to gaining intimate knowledge of the mind. *Purple Island* indicates that the value of the body is partially in its ability to be dissected—to open itself up to our autology, or, our endeavors in self-knowledge. The poem facilitates a similar process with exploration of the mind, and in doing so materializes the body-mind relationship, giving it a certain tangibility that is familiar in study of the material

body but not in the study of the immaterial mind. Though Fletcher's allegiance to the "corporeal prison" model (which in some ways distances body from mind) is evident in his poem, *The Purple Island* ultimately indicates that it is precisely the mind's close relationship to the body that enables us to understand it and its incredible faculties.

Conclusion

Jonathan Sawday has argued that Fletcher's *Purple Island* "looked back to the harmony of body and soul which the older metaphors of correspondence had once traced. In this sense, *The Purple Island* was the very last gasp of the old mentality," before the narrative that the body is entirely distinct from the soul took over (172). I have argued that, though Fletcher's poem navigates tensions between the value of the body versus the value of the mind, it ultimately frames bodily knowledge as crucial for understanding the mind and for understanding the self; this creates one kind of harmony between body and mind—knowledge about both can be served by an exploration of the body's functions, structures, and hierarchies. Fletcher's literary anatomy also creates another kind of mind-body unity: Fletcher uses his dissective mode to challenge even the distinction of immaterial and material, observing and describing the mind in a very similar way to how the body is dissected, thereby emphasizing the embodiment of the mind in a way that becomes rare at the end of the seventeenth century. Whether for better or worse, *Purple Island*'s dissective mode continually reminds us of and encourages us to consider the embodiment of the mind. In this way, *Purple Island* is an important manifestation of a pivotal moment in the seventeenth century when the culture of dissection accomplished a dual anatomy where humans could understand themselves as both fragmented and whole beings. *The Purple Island* does not ultimately reduce the wholeness of the human, paradoxically demonstrating the unity of mind and body by studying it as a dissected, partitioned thing. The next chapter explores

a text that is an altogether different response to the seventeenth-century culture of dissection, this time at the end of the century, when Cartesian philosophy had largely solidified the human as a bifurcated being that is, in the end, truly defined only by the mind.

Chapter Two: The Anatomy of Disembodiment in *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius*

The Purple Island intervenes in anatomical knowledge by embracing the traditional holistic view of the body while creating an autology that benefits from the way a dissective mode can open up and make visible the strong link between mind and body. In contrast, Gabriel Daniel's *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius*, published nearly sixty years later, for the most part no longer attempts to delineate anatomy's relationship to harmony—perhaps because by 1690, early modern philosophy had largely moved on to a new model that appeared to disrupt this anatomical harmony in profound ways: the machine metaphor of the body. This model defined the body as a purely mechanistic entity which was ultimately no different than a man-made automaton, and in this way was easily severed from the mind, and was no longer seen as a nearly equal determinant of selfhood and of what makes us human.

The machine metaphor of the seventeenth century is largely attributed to Descartes, and can be seen as the result of a Cartesian anatomical and philosophical culture that in some ways *anxiously* solidified the distinction of the body amidst the growing presence of lifelike automata in European culture. In his lifetime, Descartes visited the royal gardens of St. Germain-en-Laye, built in the 1550s for Henri II, which made a deep impact on him; he was particularly affected by its animated statues—added to the garden's grottoes and fountains in the early seventeenth century—which, according to his descriptions in *Treatise on Man* (1662),[3] could even appear to play certain instruments or utter words depending on the movement of the pipes (Maisano, "Infinite Gesture," 73-4). A famous passage from *Meditations* (1641) reveals how Descartes's experience with automata influenced how he began to see the human body: in it, he asks, "if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, … do I see any more than hats and

[3] *Treatise on Man* is an unfinished treatise that Descartes wrote in the years 1629-33, but that was first published posthumously in 1662. So, Descartes' reflections in *Treatise* about the St. Germain-en-Laye gardens, in reality, preceded his reflections in *Meditations*.

coats which could conceal automatons?" (68). By 1641, then, it was clear that Descartes felt that the human body was essentially indistinguishable from the many automata—mechanical birds, animated clocks, moving statues—which populated both the real world and the literary imagination of seventeenth-century Europe.[4]

Since his visits to the royal gardens, much of Descartes's philosophical writing attempted to illustrate that animation in human beings, just like in the lifelike statues, did not require the presence of a rational soul; it is as if, in the presence of such uncanny imitations of human physicality, the body no longer seemed like something that separates us from either animals or man-made objects. Though the culture of dissection that gave rise to *Purple Island* revealed the body's more automatic processes—Fletcher certainly created an anatomy that was ordered, systematic, and to some extent self-sustaining—the poem's depiction of the body is not ultimately a mechanistic one, but rather a vitalistic, harmonious one. As I have discussed, this is perhaps partly reflective of the fact that Fletcher wrote his poem at a time of indeterminacy—the lines between partition and unity, and mind and body were not yet drawn. By 1690 and Daniel's *Voyage*, there were bolder lines, and a general consensus regarding the mechanistic view of the body, which continued to be informed by Descartes's legacy. While Daniel does try to resist elements of this view, assert the importance of the body in defining the self, and generally critique Cartesian anatomy, he does so much too late. Despite this, what ends up standing out is the way his satire inadvertently calls attention to what the impetus behind the machine metaphor was in the first place: an anxious need to assert humans' transcendence of mechanism as a growing number of automata and other artificial creations challenged our previously-held conceptions of the body-soul relationship and the category of the human.

---

[4] For a comprehensive collection of essays on literary representations of automata in the early modern period, see Hyman, Wendy Beth., editor. *The Automaton in English Renaissance Literature*, Ashgate, 2011.

It is worth noting that it is, at first, difficult to see *Voyage* as anything other than a failed project—it is a satire aimed at Cartesianism which does not ultimately have any tangible impact on the legacy of the ideas it attacks, including Cartesian dualism and anatomy, at least beyond that of adding support to already-existing critiques. As philosopher Justin E.H. Smith points out in a 2019 essay on the fiction, it is not entirely clear why Daniel decided to "take on Cartesianism" when he did, especially seeing as the "doctrine he attacks in 1690 [was] hardly new" at that point (793). Furthermore, as Smith writes, the Cartesians of Daniel's time were, for the most part, not defenders of the orthodox Cartesian views Daniel attacks, and instead subscribed to a philosophy that had undergone fairly significant evolution away from the standard version of Cartesianism in the years since Descartes's death in 1650 (793). It is therefore unclear how Daniel's attack could have provoked its intended audience, and indeed the fiction received little attention upon publication, and notably was not responded to by Cartesian theologian Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), who was the intended target of Daniel's effort (Smith 794). If Daniel was in fact less focused on a tangible impact and simply more interested in the more superficial aim of provoking an adversary, it seems that this would have aligned with the reputation given to him by some of his contemporaries. Smith quotes French theologian Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719), who wrote in 1693 about Daniel that "there is in the world a certain personality who … is a sort of adventure-seeker, who wishes at whatever price, by means of dazzling combat, to cause people to talk about him" (2); according to Quesnel, Smith notes, Daniel was simply so disappointed at having failed to elicit a response from Arnauld to his previous works that he decided to "try [Arnauld] out in a different spot"—Cartesianism (2). A close-reading of *Voyage* to some extent supports Quesnel's evaluation. As I will show throughout this chapter, there are numerous places where Daniel's attacks arguably miss the mark, and

where they do not appear to be useful besides being echoes of already-circulated critiques against Descartes which, by 1690, felt like too-late additions.

However, passages from *Voyage*'s opening pages indicate that, in writing the text, Daniel was not just interested in provoking Arnauld and gaining attention, but also or instead was driven by a sincere desire to have *Voyage* function as a work of serious philosophy that would reveal the "truth." Importantly, as author of this fiction, Daniel is a kind of outsider—he did not have the social identity of "philosopher," and, prior to the story's publication, had previously been known only for religious writings that implicated him in contemporaneous theological debates (Smith 791). We can begin to see how the import of *Voyage*, then, as a sort of outsider text, is as an attempt to *make sense* of philosophical convictions, rather than *uproot* them; instead of being read as a treatise that actively creates its own anatomy (or even successfully discredits the structures it attacks), *Voyage* is perhaps better read as an inadvertent invitation to readers to navigate the often comically competing fictional characters' perspectives in order to ultimately arrive at their own conclusions about the truth of notions about the body, humanity, and selfhood. As it does this, regardless of whether *Voyage* successfully asserts any "truths" or lands any critiques, I argue in this chapter that the most "successful" critique of *Voyage*'s is in its satirical framing of Cartesian anatomy as a contrived fantasy, but that ultimately its impact seems more usefully interpreted less as a critique and more as a lively reminder of the machine metaphor's fixation on transcendence.

It is worth elaborating on how *Voyage* can be understood as a landscape of competing "observations" and perspectives that the reader must navigate. Importantly, as I have mentioned, Daniel sees *Voyage* as a model of true philosophy—an exploration that is based on clarity and evidence, features which he feels Descartes's treatises lack. In his preface, Daniel writes that "no

one will deny but that some of [Descartes's] Principles … [are] meer Suppositions without Proof" (xi). Here, Daniel's critique seems to be, in part, one about demonstration—this is a concern that, arguably, reflects the growing importance of tangible demonstrations and proofs for early modern thinkers thanks to emergent forms of experiment-based science, including but not limited to, anatomy and dissection. Passages from Descartes's *Meditations* suggest that Daniel was far from the first philosopher to express this concern about a lack of proof or demonstration in Descartes's thinking: Descartes's laments that many of those people who refuse to believe his claim that the human mind is wholly distinct from the body[5]—the claim which the majority of this chapter focuses on—do so "for no other reason than their claim that … no one has been able to demonstrate … [this]" (48).

It is worth considering that this idea of demonstration characterizes the particular notion of proof utilized by early modern anatomists. Lawrence Principe, in *The Scientific Revolution* (2011), reminds us that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "witnessed striking shifts in thinking about the natural world and humanity's place in it" (Principe). As I have discussed in other parts of this project, new methods, priorities, and philosophies of knowledge production were some of the most significant of these shifts—early modern natural philosophers increasingly defined experiment, empiricism, observation, and demonstration as the methodology requirements for discovery about the natural world. Medical historian Daniel H. Garrison has noted that "Europe's classical heritage had been knowledge based upon assertion, argument, and (sometimes) description," before discovery in the early modern period came to rely more upon direct observation and hands-on investigation and instruction (LXVII). The powerful influence of the notion of *anatomia sensibilis*—"anatomy you can see rather than what you read" (Garrison LXVII)—a term coined in 1522 by Berengario da Carpi, reflects how

[5] In Descartes's *Meditations*, as in this project, "soul" and "mind" are used fairly interchangeably.

important these principles were to early modern anatomy. The appearance of anatomical texts augmented by illustrations—beginning with Berengario's publications and later, the publication of Vesalius's *Fabrica*—directly manifested the notion of *anatomia sensibilis*. Such visual explorations—which became the standard for early modern representation of anatomical knowledge—were of course informed by direct observation of the body and demonstration of its workings via dissection; arguably, these illustrations themselves constituted printed dissections. In fact, they can even be seen as constituting "nothing less than a demand for an anatomical understanding of the human body based on observation and dissection of human bodies," as historian Vivian Nutton has argued (LXXXV).

It seems then that when Descartes's critics dismissed his claims about the distinction of mind and body due to a lack of demonstration, they reflected this early modern conviction that proper anatomy demands direct observation of the body. Notably, Descartes vehemently disagrees with the criticism that his anatomy is not properly demonstrated, and frames *Meditations* as a collection of arguments which will achieve "such a level of lucidity that … [they] ought to be regarded as the most precise of demonstrations" (49). Here, instead of alluding to the possible validation of his theories via experiment (Descartes was in many ways an experimental philosopher, including in anatomical science), Descartes explicitly claims that his writing alone will suffice as a demonstration. However, as neurobiology researcher André Parent puts it in a 2019 article, the systematic dissection method *anatomia sensibilis* "emphasizes … sensory over textual versions of the truth" ("Berengario" 1). In some ways, Descartes's insistence that the body is wholly distinct and separable from the mind—as it exists only in his writing and can not be demonstrated on a dissection table—feels like a textual rather than sensory anatomy. By opening *Voyage* with an insinuation that the ensuing text will include more

proof than can be found in Descartes's work, it feels implied that the fiction's explorations of and assertions about the mind and body will better meet the period's standards for anatomical knowledge by providing a level of evidence—perhaps even *anatomia sensibilis*—that cannot be found in a philosophical treatise alone.

Through its imaginative depiction of disembodied souls, *Voyage* does transcend the possibilities available in reality for the demonstration of dualism; it is worth briefly noting that the fact that the fiction imagines what Cartesian dualism would look like in action by creating Cartesian characters who can detach their souls from their bodies starts to make Daniel's creative "demonstration" of dualism seem more like tribute than criticism.[6] However, as I will show, the narrator's direct interactions with disembodied souls (including his own) reveal flaws in the fictional Cartesians' assertions about the soul-body relationship, including the assertion that the Cartesians's selves can be fully constituted without their bodies. Nevertheless, because, with *Voyage*, Daniel himself uses text as a vehicle for his explorations of and convictions about the soul and body through the experiences of a fictional narrator—he does not, for instance, carry out a real-life, physical experiment that attempts to debunk Cartesian claims—his project is in this sense no more proof-based than Descartes's *Meditations*.

But, it soon becomes clear that *Voyage*'s narrator is determined to measure the fictional Cartesians' claims against the standards of proof, and it is through his eyes that the reader must attempt to make sense of *Voyage*'s version of Cartesian anatomy, and it is largely because of his first-person perspective that *Voyage* ultimately accomplishes a critique of Cartesianism, fictional and real, that does seem useful—this critique frames Cartesianism as contrived and anxiously

---

[6] Justin E.H. Smith makes a similar claim in his 2019 essay, "Gabriel Daniel: Descartes Through the Mirror of Fiction." Smith argues that because events that take place in *Voyage* depend to an extent on models that were a "part of Descartes's great legacy," and because the text contains "accurate reflection[s] of some of the most important implications of Descartes's thought …, the satire … seems at times indistinguishable from homage" (801).

preoccupied with the need to assert itself. Throughout different passages in the story, the reader is forced to themself be critical, and to pay attention to the competing "observations" made by both the narrator and the Cartesians, often through direct experience, about the soul's separation from the body. It is ultimately the satirical dialogue the narrator has with the reader about these problems and the Cartesians' reactions to his questions that I argue is what makes *Voyage*'s satire effective—it becomes clear that the Cartesians are not receptive to debate, which helps the text frame Cartesian anatomy as a convenient, contrived construction that is fragilely maintained, and the Cartesians as needing to anxiously assert their beliefs (even at the expense of productive discourse). This reading should remind us of the real anxious underpinnings of Cartesian dualism and the machine metaphor which emerged in part out of an urgent need to establish humanity's transcendence of mechanism at a time when lifelike automata threatened our self-image. We are reminded, through reading *Voyage*, that the machine metaphor was to some degree the product of anxiety and uncertainty; once we see this, we can see how it prompts us to imagine and enact fantasies of transcendence. In a way, *Voyage* embodies the takeover of Cartesian anatomy, reminding us of its appeal even as it struggles to resist it.

Pineal Gland Controversy and the Cartesians' Unsteady, Defensive Anatomy

In order to figure out how to manually detach his soul from his body, the fictional Descartes performs a series of anatomical experiments designed to demonstrate and prove his convictions about the nature of the soul-body relationship. Notably, as discussed in the previous chapter, Descartes's real work in anatomy and dissection was largely focused on determining "in what place the Soul was seated," which he determined to be the pineal gland (12). According to one of the fictional Descartes's disciples, described simply as "the old Gentleman," Descartes does the same thing—confirms via anatomical experiment that the soul is "not extended through

the whole Body," and in fact "[keeps] her Court no where but in the Brain"—specifically, in the pineal gland (10). The real Descartes's theories about the pineal gland contributed greatly to the broader Cartesian view of the body as a a machine. In his final philosophical treatise, *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), Descartes designates the pineal gland as the anatomical/material seat of the rational soul, and the interface between it and the body (Lokhorst). As neuroscience historians Francisco López-Muñoz and Cecilio Alamo put it in a 2010 essay, Descartes believed that from its position in the pineal gland, the soul "supervised the communication between the human machine and its surroundings and acted as an internal influence that exerted control over the precise functioning of the human body" (López-Muñoz and Alamo, 449). It is clear that this pineal gland theory, then, contributed greatly to the machine metaphor, and to the conceptualization of the body as a kind of static mechanism until activated into motion by the volition of the soul and the subsequent movement of the gland.

Moments in *Voyage* quickly begin to suggest that the Cartesian pineal gland theory is part of a contrived and false anatomy of the body. In one section, the narrator tells the reader that he agrees with the perspective of an anatomist who views the fictional Descartes as "the ingenious Contriver of a Novel Man" (52). This is, arguably, a label befitting a kind of inventor; it is as if the fictional Descartes has imagined and then constructed a new and unfamiliar image of man—not unlike the architects of the moving statues at the St. Germain-en-Laye gardens. Like these statues, the fictional Descartes's "Novel Man" is also framed as a strange imposter, or false imitator of nature: the narrator explains that the anatomist he refers to also "shew'd and prov'd by ocular Demonstration, this Man of [Descartes's] a quite Different Creature from that which God Created" (52). The implications of this declaration are manifold—it further conceives of the Cartesian "Man" as contrived and unnatural, and is also the first of numerous times the

text inadvertently requires the reader to weigh the merits of conflicting observations by characters about the body, which are all presented as definitive proof or demonstration. For the fictional Descartes's part, it appears at first that he has arrived at his conclusions about the pineal gland in an authoritative, precise, and ultimately irrefutable manner. The old Gentleman explains to the narrator that

> M. Descartes thoroughly examin'd the different Opinions of Philosophers and Physicians thereupon, and after having solidly confuted the greatest part of their Sentiments, that were founded upon but weak and unsound Principles, evidently concludes, The set of the Soul must have three Conditions: First, it must be one; … Secondly, it must be very near the Source of the Animal Spirits; … And in the third Place, it must be Moveable; … Conditions no where to be met but in a little Gland call'd Pineale or Conarium (12-13).

Here, the fictional Descartes's anatomical knowledge seems to meet the conditions of the creation of a credible early modern anatomy—he determines his anatomical structure procedurally, by empirically determining whether the pineal gland can physically serve the soul's functions, as well as precisely, by detailing the parts surrounding and supporting the pineal gland. These are the markers of a conclusive demonstration of anatomical theory. It seems all the more damning for the fictional Cartesians then, when the narrator recalls (not aloud, but to the reader), the conclusions of a "M. Stenon the great Anatomist," telling us that has become convinced of the truth of Stenon's experiments, which demonstrated that

> the pineal Gland has not the Situation, much less is capable of those Motions attributed to it, upon [Descartes's] Hypothesis, [and] that the Vessels with which it is encompassed, are not Arteries, which might supply it with the Matter of the Animal Spirits, as M. Descartes supposes; but only Veins, [and] that by consequence the Honour and Privilege it has given it, of being the Closet of the Soul, is without Foundation; and that perhaps it deserves not to be advanced … above the other Glands (52-3).

At this point, we may begin to wonder how the fictional Cartesians have managed to escape such damning evidence and build such a powerful influence despite it. The narrator tells us that he purposefully decides not to challenge the opinions of the Cartesians out loud, saying, "These

were my Thoughts, though I kept them to my self; and I was desirous, as much as possible, to accompany them in their Sentiments" (54). Here, we get the sense that the narrator, in order to remain trusted by the Cartesians so that he can—as he says in the opening passages in the story—"dive to the bottom of Descartes's Philosophy" (7), passively goes along with the assertions and beliefs of the Cartesians. It is, arguably, also implied by the fact that our narrator chooses to stay silent that these fictional Cartesians may not react well to the suggestion that they and Descartes are wrong about the pineal gland. Here, then, there seems to be an indication that the success of the Cartesian anatomy is upheld through stubborn conviction rather than through open dialogue.

It is worth clarifying that the fact that *Voyage*'s narrator calls Descartes's pineal gland theory into question is not particularly consequential in and of itself. Only a small number of thinkers accepted Descartes's notions about the pineal gland during his lifetime, and his theories were almost universally rejected after his death (Lokhorst). Notably, it seems likely that the anatomist character that the narrator cites, "M. Stenon," refers to Danish anatomist and Catholic bishop Niels Steensen (1638-1686), given that he is cited by multiple seventeenth-century anatomical texts in the *Early English Books Online* database as "Stenon" or "Nicholas Stenon."[7] Steensen was one of the main anatomists in the seventeenth century to criticize and ultimately disprove Descartes's assertions about the pineal gland. Since Cartesian views about the pineal gland were already generally invalidated by Steensen and others prior to *Voyage*'s publication in 1690, the fact that Daniel's character creates doubt about these views does not make for particularly interesting or successful satire. Nevertheless, it is the comic way the narrator informs

[7] Citers of Stenon include Dutch anatomist Regnier de Graaf (1641-1673) and English anatomists Thomas Willis (1621-1675) and Nehemia Grew (1641-1712). Stenon is referred to by today's scholars under numerous other latinized or anglicized variations of his name, including Nicolaus, Nicolas, or Nicholas Steno, Niels or Nicolas Stenson, and Niels Stensen.

us that he will not be bringing up his doubts to the Cartesians that feels effective. This is even more true if we consider how the stability or resonance of the machine metaphor may be at stake in Stenon's criticism and therefore in the narrator's reference to it. We might compare the fictional Stenon's opinion that "perhaps [the pineal gland] deserves not to be advanced … above the other Glands" to a question the real Steensen asked his audience in a 1673 speech he made at the Domus Anatomica, an anatomy theater that existed in Copenhagen in the years 1644-1728: "what beauties would we see, … if we contemplated the entire structure of the body, if we gazed upon the soul which so many and so ingeniously constructed instruments obey?" (Steno 857). Here, the pineal gland is not "advanced" above other parts, to use the language attributed to the fictional Stenon—importance is placed instead on the *numerous* bodily "instruments" which Steensen suggests are controlled by the soul.[8] This is an image of a soul that is extended beyond the pineal gland alone; though this image still frames the body as a kind of mechanism directed by the soul, it arguably depicts the body as a more unified and holistic entity than the pineal gland theory does. The narrator's citing of Stenon may indicate a subtle resistance to the Cartesian machine metaphor.[9] It is more interesting then that the narrator withholds his doubt about the pineal gland—the narrator is doubting fundamental components of Descartes's machine model of the body, based on authoritative anatomical knowledge, but is careful to avoid telling this to the fictional Cartesians, indirectly portraying them as intolerant to opposition.

---

[8] Some scholars have cited Dutch anatomist Isbrand van Diemerbroeck (1609-1674)'s *Anatome Corporis Humani* (1672) as the last anatomy textbook to discuss the soul as part of a routine description of the human body and its parts. After this, following the broader Cartesian and scientific turn, "the soul disappeared from the scope of anatomy," as George W. Corner, M.D. writes in a 1919 essay appearing in the second volume of *Annals of Medical History* (1920). It is therefore worth noting that Steensen's discussion of the soul here in 1673 occurred right at the point of this transition.

[9] It is important to note that there are moments in *Voyage* when the narrator's testimony to some extent paradoxically corroborates the Cartesian machine metaphor, positioning *Voyage* again as a text that tows the line between criticism and homage. For example, once he successfully detaches his soul from his body, he confirms that all his body's motions "were performed … only by their Dependance on the Disposition of the Machine" (54).

This portrayal solidifies when the narrator decides to withhold even the most authoritative invalidation of their anatomy—his direct experience with his own pineal gland. Crucially, the narrator in the first place becomes convinced of the truth of M. Stenon's refutation of the pineal gland theory when he experiences soul-body detachment after gaining the Cartesians' trust and learning about the process under their guidance. In a sly moment when the narrator addresses the reader, he tells us that as he experiences his own disembodiment for the first time, he is able to firsthand see where his Soul resides—not in the pineal gland (52). In this case, the Cartesian pineal gland theory is undermined not just through allusions to outside knowledge, but is contradicted through the experience of the narrator himself, which arguably could not be more direct—it goes beyond the bounds of real-life anatomical experiment, allowing him to sort of look inside himself as a disembodied soul. By this point, *Voyage* has established that the fictional Cartesians, like the real Descartes, deeply value and are committed to empirical knowledge; for example, in an early passage, the old Gentleman tells the narrator that it was "[Descartes's] way (as all know) to endeavor to make good by Experience, the Truths he had discover'd by the meer Light of his Understanding" (9). In fact, earlier in the story, the old Gentleman told the narrator that, following his principles of empiricism, Descartes does in fact directly confirm his pineal gland theory when, during how own first experience with disembodiment, he supposedly "see[s] [his soul] advanc'd upon the Pineal Gland" (17). It is jarring then, when the narrator forces the reader to confront these two opposing experiences—at this point, we might wonder what would happen if the Cartesians were told about what the narrator saw, especially given their commitment to empirical knowledge. However, we never

find out, because once again, the narrator chooses not to tell the old Gentleman or Father Mersennus,[10] one of the fictional Descartes's colleagues, about his observation:

> For the first thing my Gentleman would persuade me, whether I would or not, was, that my Soul in the instant of Separation, saw herself seated on the pineal Gland. As I judged it unfitting to begin with them by a palpable Contradiction; I made an answer, That the Separation was performed heedlessly, I had no Time to make that Observation, What I said was true, and was also the least disobliging Answer I could find (52).

This moment solidifies these passages' depiction of the Cartesians' anatomy—particularly, of the pineal gland—as carefully contrived, and shakily maintained. That the narrator describes the old Gentleman as desiring to "persuade" him of the pineal gland theory arguably indicates a potentially anxious need to convince which would likely not be felt by the transmitter of a truly irrefutable anatomy. There is also the narrator's calculated resolution to not be "disobliging," which frames the Cartesians' theory as something that is expected to be complied with, and the Cartesians as prone to feel affronted if they are contradicted. It seems implied then that the narrator's decision to not contradict the Cartesians is a courtesy—he is comically aware of their fragility, and chooses not to offend. This situation suggests of course that there are truths outside of the Cartesian model, and that the Cartesians are lucky they are not confronted with them, and are allowed to remain in their insular, constructed reality. This reflection is reminiscent of a moment earlier on in the text, when the narrator, criticizing the Cartesians' unbounded allegiance to Descartes, asks the old Gentleman—about followers of alternative philosophies—"if their Reason hath discover'd to them another Path than what M. Descartes trod in, why are you angry if they follow it?" (6); the old Gentleman's response that the reason is because "Truth and Reason are manifestly on [Descartes's] side" (7) comes off lazy in comparison, or, at least, easy. Ultimately, if we choose to believe (within the context of the fiction) the narrator's firsthand

---

[10] The character of "Father Mersennus" appears to refer to Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), a French polymath who was a close friend of Descartes's and who shared many of his philosophical opinions.

knowledge of the pineal gland, then we must accept that the fictional Descartes (and his followers) so anxiously clung to and maybe even arrogantly insisted on the pineal gland theory that the reality of it was obscured, despite even empirical observation.

Though, as mentioned above, *Voyage*'s challenges to the pineal gland theory are not particularly impactful in and of themselves, the resulting portrayal of the fictional Cartesians as the propagators of a contrived, fragile, and anxiously maintained anatomy does do something useful as a satirical critique—it reminds us of the real conditions of the Cartesian anatomy/machine metaphor's creation, inadvertently showing us what potential there may be in critically examining Cartesian notions of the body as contrived and nervous. The passages explored in this section depict the pineal gland theory as empirically doubtful, and the Cartesians as avoiding this reality through a nervous and possibly even hostile intolerance to opposing perspectives. Notably, Niels Steensen's real criticisms of Decartes's pineal gland theory seem to suggest that the conception of the theory was the result of an uncharacteristic lapse in Descartes's empirical method—Steensen proves that the theory was based on incorrect anatomical data, and blamed Descartes "for not having applied his own method to the study of the brain" (Parent, "Niels Stensen," 486). Perhaps, then, there was also a hastiness to the real formation of the Cartesian pineal gland theory—a need to locate the material seat of the soul in order to justify its relationship to the machine of the body. This reflection should remind us that Descartes wrote about the seat of the soul almost in the presence of the humanlike automata of Europe, which directly threatened previous conceptions of the human body as being deeply unified with the rational soul. There was an urgency that the disorienting unfamiliarity of the automata engendered—such novel and strange constructions themselves felt like proof that the body could not be what defines the human, and there was of course a subsequent motivation to assert our

transcendence of bodily mechanism. Perhaps Cartesian anatomy did not need to be as rigorous about its empiricism as would otherwise be expected. The image of Cartesian anatomy as impatiently needing to assert itself reminds us again that the machine model of the body was in some ways a product of anxiety about the body and its relationship to mechanism. Considering this may compel us to reexamine our notions of mind and body today, and question the extent to which today's emerging technologies—like the automata of seventeenth-century Europe—require us to grasp at ways to assert our difference from machines.

The Cartesians' Confused Disembodiment

It is worth first briefly exploring how *Voyage* not only paints Cartesian anatomy as contrived and uncertain through its discussions of the pineal gland, but also through scenes in which characters negotiate the characteristics of disembodied souls—specifically, the text satirically indicates that even the Cartesians themselves cannot quite escape embodiment and its importance for defining the self. In *Discourse on Method* (1637), Descartes emphasizes his conviction that the body is effectively meaningless in constituting the self, claiming that full knowledge and constitution of the soul is possible without the body:

> This "I," that is to say, the soul through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body, and even if there were no body at all, it would not cease to be at all that it is (19).

Of course, a key premise behind the motivation of *Voyage*'s fictional Cartesians to detach their souls from their bodies is this same conviction. However, the experience of the narrator calls into question the extent to which the Cartesians' disembodied souls corroborate this belief that the self does not need a body to be whole. In one scene, the narrator interacts with two separated (disembodied) souls—Father Mersennus's and the old Gentleman's—that nevertheless appear to him to have bodies. He tells the two souls:

> It is not many days since I read in M. Descartes, That the Essence of the Soul consists in being a thinking Substance, and that she hath neither Extension, nor Figure, nor Colour; which I know not how to reconcile with what I see at present: For you give me to understand, you be purely Spirits, yet I perceive in you different Colours, and I see you form'd in the Figure of a Man, and you look like Beings that are extended (39).

In response to the narrator's confusion, Father Mersennus provides a comically far-fetched "explanation" for what he sees. He starts by telling the narrator, "though we seem to have a Face, and Hands, and Feet; yet we have neither Face, nor Hands, nor Feet" (39). He continues, explaining that he is manipulating the narrator's "Optick Nerve, to … [cause] [him] to see a Body, when in truth there is none to see" (41). Though distrust of the senses was a real, foundational quality of Descartes's anatomical philosophy (only the immaterial thinking faculty of the mind can truly be trusted), this is obviously an exaggerated version. It does seem like the Cartesians, as disembodied souls, exert a fair amount of effort to appear in physical forms—they are somehow capable of carefully and precisely manipulating an onlooker's optic nerve to create a perfect illusion. That the fictional Cartesians go to these lengths to appear to others in physical forms suggests that despite their convictions about the body's irrelevance to the soul, they cannot quite move beyond embodiment. If the Cartesians do in fact go to these lengths to appear to have bodies, it seems that even they cannot fully justify or operate in a world where bodies are untethered from the self.

The narrator continues to call into question the fictional Cartesians' ability to fully constitute themselves without their bodies when he inquires about the gender identities of the disembodied souls. The narrator asks Mersennus what names and titles disembodied souls ought to assign each other; because souls are, in French, gendered feminine, he says, it seems wrong to call Descartes's soul "Monsieur," but "Madam" or "Mademoiselle" seems equally wrong (54). In response, Mersennus tells the narrator not to worry about this, explaining, "we continue the same

Names we had in the World when in our Bodies … for what's a Man? He's a Soul that makes use of a Body" (55). He also quotes Descartes's claim from *Discourse on Method* that the self is an entity wholly distinct from the body. It seems like Daniel is satirically calling attention to a contradiction here—theoretically, under the Cartesian maxim that we (our selves) are truly distinct from our bodies, disembodied souls should not necessarily retain their genders. So, Mersennus's matter-of-fact statement that disembodied souls naturally continue using the same titles as when they were embodied places a hard-to-ignore significance on the body for the self and identity. By explaining that disembodied souls retain their embodied genders, Mersennus paradoxically indicates that the body very much matters to the soul's constitution. With both his "embodied" and gendered souls, Daniel continues to depict Cartesian anatomy as contrived and confused. The souls in *Voyage* claim to be entirely distinct from their bodies, but these passages suggest that they are still in some ways inescapably tethered to their former bodily selves. By doing so, not only do they suggest that understanding what the soul is without the body is a more elusive project than Cartesians indicate, but they also once again situate the formation of Cartesian anatomy within an architecture of confusion and instability. Like the pineal gland passages discussed in the previous section, these passages thereby signal the utility of a critique that examines the machine model of the body as a product of radical, disruptive change in the way we are forced to see ourselves.

Transcending the Body and Evading Death

So far, I have argued that the primary success of *Voyage*'s satirical critique of Cartesianism is in its framing of it as contrived, confused, and anxiously maintained—it does this by challenging the authority of the fictional Cartesians's claims about the pineal gland and about the soul's distinction from the body, and simultaneously depicting the Cartesians as comically

insular and resistant to opposition. Both depictions suggest the utility of a critique of Cartesian anatomy and the machine metaphor that centers the ways in which anxiety, uncertainty, and radical novelty have shaped (and continue to shape) their creation and influence. In this section, I will focus on how *Voyage* inadvertently highlights the Cartesian fixation on the transcendence of mechanism that this anxiety, uncertainty, and novelty led to by exploring the fiction's depiction of how disembodiment allows its Cartesian characters to essentially evade death. This reading solidifies the *Voyage*'s memorableness as a text which is ultimately a seventeenth-century manifestation of some of the key implications of the machine metaphor's legacy: Daniel's fiction indirectly demonstrates the hold the machine model had over the fictional (and real) Cartesians, who, in order to transcend it, transport themselves beyond their bodies.

As has been alluded to so far, in *Voyage*, once Descartes and his followers discover that the rational soul can be separated from the body, Cartesians travel the world and the cosmos as disembodied souls. As traveling disembodied souls, all of the fictional Cartesians could arguably be said to have evaded death, to some extent—they are able to travel beyond the bounds of their bodies and the Earth while their bodies are still functional. However, as the result of absurd accidents, the soul-body separation in the story offers an even more direct loophole: when bodies become inhabitable (are no longer fit to house the soul), their disembodied souls are forced to wander eternally. Though this latter situation is depicted to some extent as an undesirable glitch, the text mostly portrays both temporary and permanent disembodiment as desirable fantasies that the Cartesians, and only them, get to enact and indulge in.

Part of how the text does this is by depicting Cartesian anatomical knowledge about the soul-body relationship as private, secret knowledge; in *Voyage*, only Descartes's most loyal followers are made aware of his most significant anatomical discovery—the process for

manually separating the rational soul from the body. Language in the text supports the idea that the discovery about separation is the fictional Descartes's highest end and greatest achievement: when the fictional Descartes informs the old Gentleman of his breakthrough, he tells him "I have found out the Secret, *not only* of the Union of the Soul and Body, *but also* how to separate them when I please" (16).[11] It is significant then, that the fictional Descartes decides to withhold this knowledge from public dissemination. As Justin E.H. Smith puts it, Cartesianism in the fiction is framed as "a sort of mystery cult, which reveals its true secrets only to select initiates" (Smith, 796). Notably, early modern anatomists generally emphasized the importance of dissemination and utility, shaping them into "living embodiment[s] of a … regime in which knowledge was to be made publicly available for the benefit of all" (64). This is of course the opposite of the approach the fictional Descartes takes to hide his knowledge from most. In fact, knowledge about disembodiment is restricted to only Descartes's most loyal followers: the old Gentleman recalls what Descartes said to him when he first made his discovery:

> It is the most curious Secret in the World. I am resolv'd to commit it but to very few; but that Adherency which you have manifested until this time unto me, will not suffer me to be reserv'd in any thing (16).

The old Gentleman then tells the narrator that "[Descartes] went on, without giving me time to compliment his Generosity" (16). Here, the fact that the fictional Descartes is depicted as being generous for revealing his discovery to only his most loyal followers (those who show the most "Adherency") fashions Cartesian anatomy into a kind of indulgence that the Cartesians are lucky enough to experience.

Part of this is achieved by the text's descriptions of the process of manual soul-body separation that read more like descriptions of a magical dream than like real science. When the old Gentleman recalls for the narrator the moment he first witnessed Descartes undergo the

---

[11] Emphasis in italics is my own.

separation process, he says that he "durst have swore at that moment, there had been no small Conjuring in the Business of our Philosopher" (15). The method of the fictional Descartes's soul-body separation requires him to inhale tobacco snuff mixed with an unidentified herb, putting the body in a trance and loosening the soul from it; to re-enter the body, the disembodied soul brings a bottle of "Hungary Water" under the body's nose, jolting the senses and allowing itself to re-enter the body. In explaining this process, the old Gentleman recounts a scene that reads like a dream: he describes how he watched Descartes's soul (which was invisible to him at the time) "[take] the bottle, … and [bring] it in the Air from the far Side of the Chamber to his Body" (22). This does not read like the description of a serious anatomical experiment, and more like the work of a magician.

When it becomes clear that the Cartesians in *Voyage* can redefine the parameters of death using Descartes's knowledge, Cartesian anatomy seems all the more self-serving and indulgent. At this point, we might recall the language used by Descartes when he first tells the old Gentleman of his success—he says, "I have found out the Secret, not only of the Union of the Soul and Body, but also how to separate them when I please" (16). The "when I please" clause is significant—Cartesian anatomical discovery has figured out how to separate or reunite soul and body *at will*, enabling the Cartesians to truly indulge in their discovery, by detaching from their bodies spontaneously and frequently. This ability reaches a new height when, after an accident, Descartes's disembodiment allows him to intervene in and redefine what would otherwise have been his death. *Voyage*'s narrator introduces the topic of death when he wonders how Descartes came to die at the age of fifty four, asking the old Gentleman, "Was he so much out of Love with his Life as to neglect the repairing those effluxes of his Machine?" (24). To this question, the old Gentleman comically responds, "Do you believe then … that M. Descartes is dead?" (24). The

narrator is stunned, and explains why it seems that, without a doubt, Descartes must in fact be dead—because his body has perished, and been buried:

> I know not, … how you understand it, but methinks the Corps of a Man should not be buried unless he was dead before; and all the World knows that in the Year 1650, the Body of M. Descartes was interred at Stockholm with great Pomp and Solemnity … It seems to me once more, That all this supposes a Man as dead as dead can be (25).

The old Gentleman responds, explaining that because Descartes's "death" did not follow the natural laws of the universe, he cannot truly be considered dead:

> All these particulars are true, … but for all that it is false that M. Descartes is dead; for that we call Death is when our Body becoming incapable of Vital Functions, … the Soul is oblig'd to quit her Habitation, following the Laws of their Union establish'd by the Sovereign Master of the Universe: But Cartesius's Soul was by no means separated from his Body after this manner (25).

The old Gentleman then describes what really happened to Descartes's body and soul, not long after he first makes his discovery about disembodiment. He explains that while Descartes's soul was out traveling the world, his body is of course left behind. Normally, as mentioned, to conclude the body's trance and startle the soul back into the body, the soul administers "Hungary Water" to the body. While Descartes's soul is out traveling, a physician visits and, seeing a body lying on a bed and not waking up, tries to wake it with a "liquor" that is stronger than the Hungary Water, which causes the body to wake from its trance, open its eyes, let out a few groans, and respond to some basic questions. However, because in true Cartesian fashion the "Soul was not there to talk rationally, … the Answers were full of Extravagance and Delirium" (26); concerned by this, the physician applies several violent remedies to Descartes's body, which "so exhausted and altered … [it], that in a short Time … it [becomes] a meer Cadaver, … unable to perform the Duties of Life, and to Receive his Soul" (27). Descartes's soul thus becomes fated to wander eternally around the Earth and other worlds in the heavens, where other

disembodied souls of Cartesians also travel, and is ultimately not considered "dead" by the old Gentleman.

It does *seem* like the fictional Descartes should be considered dead by the definition given by the old Gentleman earlier—his body has become inhabitable, and his soul has thus been obliged to leave it permanently. The crucial difference seems to be that this did not occur under neutral laws—Descartes's soul and body were separated in "life," while the body was still habitable; this is antithetical to the Christian definition of death (which, by *Voyage*'s publication, was a very old one), under which the soul becomes separated *only* once the body has become inhabitable. It seems that death in this commonly accepted sense has thus been precluded from happening by the fictional Descartes's body-soul separation; it is almost like some sort of glitch—Descartes is alive when he should be dead, or, in other words, alive under the conditions of death.

Daniel has thus pictured a Cartesian anatomy whereby Descartes and his followers—if their bodies become inhospitable, like Descartes's—are able to cheat death and the laws of nature, or at least claim that death does not apply to their situations. At the least, this depiction portrays Cartesian anatomy as more than just absurd, and also as a construction which has enabled the ultimate self-serving indulgence—the ability to circumvent our bodies and the laws of nature.[12] The text also implies that this situation is a very positive one for the Cartesians. For one, upon becoming permanently dislodged from his body, Descartes embarks on a prolonged journey to other planets to explore and eventually create a world according to his design (Smith 796). In addition, at one point, Descartes's disembodied soul even tells the old Gentleman that

---

[12] At the worst, this is also a depiction of an extremely arrogant anatomy: if there is no death—if Cartesians can say that someone is alive even in what very much appears to be death—then, arguably, life itself suddenly becomes trivial and meaningless. In this view, Cartesianism so arrogantly thinks it has the power to reshape our most fundamental notions of life and death.

she "found herself incomparably better out, than in the Body" (30).[13] It seems, then, that disembodied souls in *Voyage* are eagerly detached from the body, able to find significant meaning once separated from the body. Ultimately, Daniel's depiction of Cartsian anatomy as a contrived way to get around death once again highlights a useful critical understanding of the machine metaphor—one which invites us to notice how the Cartesian fixation on the distinction between soul/mind and body, strengthened by a desire to transcend our ties to mechanism, may encourage us to pursue radical fantasies of disembodiment.

[13] This statement is of course reminiscent of the Platonic corporeal prison model discussed in the previous chapter, which Descartes's machine metaphor was influenced by and expanded on.

Epilogue

This project has traced the gradual arc from the emergence of anatomical science and its appreciation of both the body and mind in the early to mid-seventeenth century, to the arrival of the Cartesian machine metaphor in the later part of the century, which separated body from mind, no longer accepting the body as a crucial marker of selfhood or humanity. Phineas Fletcher's *The Purple Island* straddles the turning point between these two developments, creating—through an effective dissective poetry—a vision of the human being as both fragmented and whole, and ultimately as the masterful result of a unified mind-body relationship. Gabriel Daniel's *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius* writes decades after the turn, and ultimately reveals—through a captivating satirical fiction—how understanding Cartesian anatomy as the product of anxiety, uncertainty, and novelty helps us better see how we became motivated to transcend our bodies and the mechanistic view of ourselves.

Where Chapter Two leaves off—with the dominance of the Cartesian machine metaphor and the desire to escape our bodies—provides the opportunity to reflect briefly on the impact of this dominance on twentieth and twenty-first century culture, and the questions that, like Fletcher and Daniel, we are now asking ourselves about our bodies and minds. Like these authors, we are engaged now in imaginative projects that reflect a pressure to redefine ourselves in the face of radical change—particularly, technological change in the field of artificial intelligence (AI)—which threatens to disrupt our existing understandings about what makes us human.

The universe-wandering disembodied Cartesian souls in some ways feels like a satire not just of these characters, but also of those of us today in 2022 who, for example, imagine what it might be like to achieve immortality via whole brain emulation or in other words, by uploading our minds to the digital realm. This is, at the moment, more of a science fiction resembling

Daniel's disembodied souls than it is a realistic goal; however, its progress in recent years suggests a Cartesian-esque willingness and desire to discard and transcend our bodies and mortality, and to become constituted only by our minds. In the 2020 book, *AI Narratives: A History of Imaginative Thinking about Intelligent Machines*, philosopher Steven Cave writes about the idea that we might transfer our minds to a "more durable substrate" under a subheading titled, "Mind Uploading: The Promise of Technological Transcendence" (314). Cave notes that such fantasies of immortality and transcendence via technology have been advocated since 1982 by numerous figures in the AI field, and notes that Descartes's dualism was a turning point in "making the dream of digital immortality possible," because of its conception of the body as a burden to the mind and of the possibility that the mind could be freed from it (314-15). Present-day fantasies (and fears) about mind uploading reflect the persisting dominance of Cartesian ways of viewing ourselves, with the additional implication that our minds themselves have become equated with mechanism/computation (if they can, in fact, be uploaded like software to a digital substrate). In this imaginative project, the body seems like the farthest thing from our thoughts.

Conversely, the AI field has seen a recent growth in efforts related to "Embodied AI," or "biologically-constrained AI." Neuroscientist and tech entrepreneur Jeff Hawkins has been leading a slowly-growing movement to develop AI that is inspired in a highly detailed way by the human brain. Hawkins has argued that we should build AI that is created with the recognition that our embodiment—our senses, our movement, etc.—is crucial to how we learn and experience the world (Heaven, 2021). Hawkins's view arguably asks us to consider a less abstracted understanding of human intelligence—our own minds—in order to contemplate how our embodiment and existence as biological entities shapes who we are.

Perhaps, if we are skeptical of fantasies of transcendence of the human body—either by ourselves as we upload our minds, or by AI that is created in its image—we should follow behind Fletcher and Daniel, imagining various anatomies in motion, and possibly arriving at a better understanding of why we imagine what we do.

Works Cited

Anstey, Peter R. "Philosophy of Experiment in Early Modern England: The Case of Bacon, Boyle and Hooke." *Early Science and Medicine,* vol. 19, no. 2, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1163/15733823-00192p01.

"autology, n." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, December 2021, www.oed.com/view/Entry/13450.
Accessed 10 December 2021.

Bromley, James M., "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Altar: The Anus, Marriage, and Narrative in Shakespeare." *Intimacy and Sexuality in the Age of Shakespeare*, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 49–78.

Cave, Steven, "AI: Artificial Immortality and Narratives of Mind Uploading," *AI Narratives: A History of Imaginative Thinking about Intelligent Machines*, edited by Stephen Cave, Kanta Dihal, and Sarah Dillon, Oxford University Press, 2020.

Corner, George W., "Anatomists in Search of the Soul," *Annals of Medical History*, vol. 2, edited by Francis R. Packard, Hoeber, 1920.

Daniel, Gabriel, 1649-1728. *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius Written Originally in French, and Now Translated into English*. London, Printed and sold by Thomas Bennet .., 1692. *ProQuest*.

Descartes, René. *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*, fourth edition, edited by Donald A. Cress, Hackett Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1999, *ProQuest Ebook Central*, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bowdoin-ebooks/detail.action?docID=583972.

Fletcher, Phineas, 1582-1650. *The Purple Island, or The Isle of Man: Together With Piscatorie Eclogs and other Poeticall Miscellanies* (1633)*,* in *Giles and Phineas Fletcher: Poetical Works*, vol II, edited by Frederick S. Boas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908-9, *HathiTrust Digital Library*.

Garrison, Daniel H., "Translator's Introduction," *De humani corporis fabrica = The fabric of the human body / Andreas Vesalius; an annotated translation of the 1543 and 1555 editions* by Daniel H. Garrison, Malcolm H. Hast; with contributions by Vivian Nutton, Nancy G. Siraisi., Basel: Karger, 2014.

Healy, Thomas. "Sound Physic: Phineas Fletcher's 'The Purple Island' and the Poetry of

Purgation." *Renaissance Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, Wiley, 1991, pp. 341–52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24412388.

Heaven, Douglas Will. "'We'll never have true AI without first understanding the brain.'" *MIT Technology Review*, 3 March 2021, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/03/1020247/artificial-intelligence-brain-neuroscience-jeff-hawkins/

Hillman, David and Mazzio, Carla, ed., *The body in parts: fantasies of corporeality in early modern Europe*, Routledge, 1997.

Lokhorst, Gert-Jan, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/pineal-gland/.

López-Muñoz, F., and C. Alamo. "Cartesian Theories on the Passions, the Pineal Gland and the Pathogenesis of Affective Disorders: an Early Forerunner." *Psychological Medicine*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2011, pp. 449–451., https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291710001637.

López-Muñoz et al., "The pineal gland as physical tool of the soul faculties: A persistent historical connection," *Neurología* (English Edition), vol. 27, no. 3, 2012, pp. 161-68, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nrleng.2012.04.007.

Maisano, Scott. "Infinite Gesture: Automata and the Emotions in Descartes and Shakespeare," *Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life*, edited by Jessica Riskin, University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Merchant, Carolyn. "'The Violence of Impediments': Francis Bacon and the Origins of Experimentation," *Isis*, vol. 99, no. 4, December 2008, pp. 731-60, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/597767.

Mitchell, Peter. The Purple Island *and Anatomy in Early Seventeenth-Century Literature, Philosophy, and Theology*, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007.

Nutton, Vivian. "Historical Introduction," *De humani corporis fabrica = The fabric of the human body / Andreas Vesalius; an annotated translation of the 1543 and 1555 editions* by Daniel H. Garrison, Malcolm H. Hast; with contributions by Vivian Nutton, Nancy G. Siraisi., Basel: Karger, 2014.

Parent, André. "Berengario da Carpi and the Renaissance of Brain Anatomy," *Frontiers in*

Neuroanatomy, vol. 13, 2019, doi: 10.3389/fnana.2019.00011.

Parent, André. "Niels Stensen: A 17th Century Scientist with a Modern View of Brain Organization," *The Canadian Journal of Neurological Sciences*, vol. 40, no. 4, July 2013, pp. 482-492.

Principe, Lawrence. *The Scientific Revolution: A Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2011.

Quesnel, Pasquier (1693), *Le roman séditieux du nestorianisme renaissant, convaincu de calomnie et d'extravagance*. Paris.

Sawday, Jonathan. *The Body Emblazoned: dissection and the human body in Renaissance culture*, Routledge, 1995.

Smith, Justin E. H. "Gabriel Daniel: Descartes Through the Mirror of Fiction," *The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism*, Oxford University Press, 2019.

Spiller, Michael R. G. "The Idol of the Stove: The Background to Swift's Criticism of Descartes." *The Review of English Studies*, vol. 25, no. 97, 1974, pp. 15-24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/514202.

Steno, Nicolaus. "2.32 Preface to Anatomical Demonstrations in the Copenhagen Theatre in the Year 1673," *Nicolaus Steno: Biography and Original Papers of a 17th Century Scientist*, translated by Troels Kardel and Paul Maquet, Springer, 2018, pp. 853-59.