A Comparative Perspective on Colonial Influence in the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid in South Korea and Algeria

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A Comparative Perspective on Colonial Influence in the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid
in South Korea and Algeria

An Honors Paper for the Department of Government and Legal Studies
By Viv Daniel

Bowdoin College, 2021
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1. **Introduction**

1.1: *Research Question*

Between the 1830’s and 1950’s, France launched a sustained and multi-staged mission of invading, colonizing, and integrating Algeria not only into its empire, but into the French national polity as a deeply unequal but indivisible *Département* of the nation. Within this complex period of over two-hundred years, another imperial power in Japan was rising on the other side of the globe, successfully annexing huge swaths of the Asian continent aided by the imperial expertise of France itself. Although French (and other European influences) can be found throughout Japan’s colonial administrations, it was especially prevalent in the colonies (*shokuminchi*) of Taiwan and Korea. During the Russo-Japanese War, French jurist Michel Revon remarked that Korea was “as strategically important for Japan as Algeria was for France.”

Contemporary scholars have also found Korea to be a useful Asian analogue to Algeria, and for good reason. Many of the policies employed by France in Algeria and by Japan in Korea bear important similarities, as do the justifications used to underpin each respective colonial project. The two countries even experienced many analogous political developments in the immediate postcolonial era.

Despite these similar historical experiences with colonization, South Korea and Algeria find themselves today in wildly different places economically and politically. South Korea is the world’s tenth largest economy and has a functional, if imperfect, democratic government. Meanwhile, Algeria remains a developing nation and is still caught up in widespread protest and

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political turmoil. Similarly, both South Korea and Algeria have received huge sums of foreign aid from their former colonizers and from other sources. Despite this, the ROK remains the only former aid recipient to join the OECD as a donor, meanwhile Algeria remains dependent, receiving 62 million U.S. dollars in funding from the OECD in 2019.2 In 1985, the last year before South Korea’s GDP per capita began to climb exponentially after having been on-par with that of Algeria since independence (Figure 1), the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) described the ROK as a “model user of foreign assistance.”3 As foreign aid remains an important part of diplomacy and international relations, it is critical to understand which underlying circumstances might make a country predisposed to being a “model user” of it. This study will aim to understand what made South Korea succeed in its appropriation of foreign aid where Algeria and other post-colonial nations have struggled, specifically, as the question pertains to the impact of colonial administration and development.

1.2: Literature Review

Many studies of Korea’s ‘Miracle on the Han River’ development and successful appropriation of foreign aid have focused primarily on endogenous qualities such as “Cultural homogeneity, the Confucian stress on education, the concept…of a meritocratic bureaucratic system,” etc. These were some of the causes to which Steinburg (1985) attributed Korea’s success in a U.S. government report authored around the beginning of the Republic of Korea’s astronomical increase in economic health. Ultimately, however, this piece does not present a particularly intense point of view argumentatively, functioning rather as a bird’s eye perspective on Korea’s economic path since independence, its effectiveness at directing aid to intended

\footnote{Ibid (68).}

Figure 1 shows the divergence in GDP per capita between South Korea and Algeria between 1960 and 2019. Y axis in thousands. Source: The World Bank.
targets, and the social outcomes of Korea’s brand of economic growth manifesting in inequality and issues of gender roles.

The idea that Confucian tradition played a role in Korea’s development (and that of East Asia more broadly) is not confined to musings in reports for the Agency for International Development.\(^5\) Confucian values such as social harmony and deference to authority are said by scholars like Herman Kahn to have functioned similarly to how the myth of the “Protestant work ethic” did in America, from the colonial era to the modern-day United States.\(^6\)

Much has also been written about South Korea’s emergence in the mid-twentieth century as a “development state,” with a culture promoting concerted effort towards transformative development and a heavy-handed government approach to guiding and managing this project of economic development. As Sang-In Jun elucidated in a 1992 article titled, “The Origins of the Developmental State in South Korea,”\(^7\) scholars had often traditionally associated the beginning of such a rapidly developing managerial state to the 1961 coup d’état which brought to power Park Chung-hee. However, Jun presents the argument that this more common point of origin for South Korea’s development does not encompass the whole reality. Jun instead anchors the origins of the development state in the pre-independence administration of the colonial era and subsequent American intervention. Jun argues that Japanese colonizers, though undeniably brutal, introduced many of the practices and much of the infrastructure which would later be


capitalized upon by the Americans and later, by South Korea’s burgeoning development state government.

Atul Kohli has also explored the linkages between precolonial Korea and postcolonial South Korean development. He cites several ways that Japanese colonizers laid the foundation undergirding eventual developmental success, including assertions about capitalist development, corporate culture and industrialization, and the modernization of land policy and agriculture. This Japanese colonialism-centered view is further shared by Bruce Cumings (1984), who broadens his analysis to include Taiwan’s own miraculous development. Others argue that Japan’s continued economic linkages to former colonies and its postcolonial aid packages helped Korea and others develop and provided a model of development by its own success (analyses shared by Fukada (1988), Hatch and Yamamura (1996), Lin (2003), and Petri (1993)). More narrative historical scholarship has also analyzed the question of Japan’s role in setting an industrial precedent on the Korean peninsula. In his book, Offspring of Empire, Carter Eckert chronicles the collaboration between Korean business elites and their colonial Japanese counterparts through the case of the Koch’ang Kim family. Their more conventional status as patriotic industrialists who helped drag an independent ROK into developmental ‘modernity’ is complicated by Eckert’s scholarship.

This Japan-centric developmental perspective has been rather controversial, an understandable fact. Scholars working within a Korean nationalist framework such as Haggard,

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10 Ibid.
Kang, and Moon,\textsuperscript{12} together wrote an article aiming to debunk Kohli’s claims and establish that Korea would have reached equal developmental heights without Japanese influence. Such scholars would suggest that in fact, Korean development came\textit{ despite} its colonial history, not because of it and push the “sprouts theory”\textsuperscript{8} that proto-capitalist elements existed before Japanese annexation and would have continued to develop. Although this scholarship is meant to fit into a Korean nationalist ideology, which arguably muddles its credibility, it is difficult to dismiss considering the immense destruction and trauma caused by Japanese colonization, and for that matter, by French colonization in Algeria. This problem is not helped by the fact that the colonial-apologist right-wing in Japan, much like its French counterpart, is often quick to latch onto any scholarship that they can spin to absolve their nation of historical culpability, as was unfortunately the case with Eckert’s work.\textsuperscript{8}

Many studies exploring the effects of colonial history on economic development tend not to take a cross-cultural approach, meaning that they focus either on the consequences of European imperialism or those of Japanese imperialism, but not the two together. Studies like that of Matthew Lange, James Mahoney, and Matthias vom Hau (2006)\textsuperscript{13} compare European cases. Their study looks at the economic models of Britain and Spain and the types of territory this led them to colonize. Through a quantitative analysis, they find that mercantilist Spain tended to colonize already well-developed places, leading to a more destructive relationship and proving detrimental to independent development. In contrast, Great Britain’s liberal economic system tended to lead them towards the colonization of underdeveloped areas where they had the


opportunity to bring the seeds of eventual positive development with them. Robin M. Grier’s study of colonialism attempts to look at development from a quantitative lens removed from more “theoretical or anecdotal” study. She compares British and French colonization and demonstrates that on average, colonies which were held longer outperform those colonized for shorter periods. This analysis raises more questions than it answers for our purposes, considering that France can be classified as a liberal power and retained its colony in Algeria for more than twice as long as Japan held Korea.

Despite the prevalence of solely European studies of post-colonial development, cross-cultural studies are not rare. Understandably, South Korea is a popular point of comparison for much scholarship, considering it is the only post-colonial former aid recipient nation to join the OECD as a donor country, among the many other measures of economic success which it displays. A 2014 paper by Ayhan Özer and Nah Jeong Won examines how both South Korea and Turkey (an interesting pairing for this study considering Turkey’s positioning within the Muslim World also inhabited by Algeria) share a similar timeline of coups during the twentieth century and eventual unlikely economic prosperity. This paper though, does little analysis beyond elaborating these similarities and suggesting they make the two nations naturally compatible for the strategic partnership signed between them in 2012. Additionally, while the ROK and Turkey share some political and economic history, Algeria also experienced multiple coups during the

last century and shares Korea’s colonial legacy. This fact is one of the driving inspirations for this study.

Even more relevant than scholarship comparing South Korea with Turkey, is of course the existing scholarship comparing the ROK with Algeria. Plenty of scholars have already recognized the similarities between the two cases, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, and which make the two cases a fruitful point of comparison. Lionel Babicz (2013) describes the similarities in administration of the two colonies by their imperial occupiers, and then goes on to examine the ways in which the two “colonial couples”16 of France-Algeria and Japan-South Korea have gone about decolonizing and reconciling. This study helps to lay out the factors which will justify the analysis of the next few chapters.

Studies of foreign aid, though often aiming to understand the success or failure of one specific country like in Steinburg’s piece, are also likely to incorporate a cross-cultural, global comparative analysis. These studies are often written by economists or by state governments such as that of the United States, consistently the largest donor of foreign aid in the world.17 A 1997 report authored by Erick Jackson Labs for the Congressional Budget office is a typical example of this, comparing the outcomes of many countries that are recipients of American foreign aid in curated pairings.18 South Korea appears in this report, paired with the Philippines as an Asian counterpart. Algeria, at the time in the midst of a civil war, is almost nonexistent in the report, but its neighbor and former French protectorate, Tunisia, is among the nations chosen

for study, paired with Egypt. The report functions in part as a summary of existing literature at the time, both qualitative and quantitative, on the role of different aspects such as type of aid, domestic economic policy, regime type, etc. Rather than drawing one overarching conclusion, conclusions are summarized according to separate themes.

Niyonkuru F, writing from the perspective of SPANCO, a charitable organization based in Ghana, employs a different style of analysis towards foreign aid, removing it from the framing of U.S. interests, shrinking the scale to the continent of Africa, and recommending specific policy changes to mitigate the “failure” of foreign aid to the continent as it stood as recently as 2016. He argues that current strategies for aid to Africa have rendered much of the continent damagingly dependent and have failed to ameliorate the prevalence of poverty. The paper concludes by recommending that domestic policy shifts like tax reforms, greater transparency and accountability for aid flows, and that efforts be made to avoid privatization of aid money allocation.19 In 2006, Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle wrote a paper with a similar scope exploring the paradoxes of aid and economic independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. They conclude that states who source funding from foreign aid are less accountable to their citizens and less likely to wield power by popular legitimacy. They are also less likely to invest in public institutions, as their priorities might be muddled by foreign interest.20

Finally, on the study of foreign aid more generally, Burnside and Dollar (2000) aim to explain why foreign aid works in some countries while not in others. They find that aid should be

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more systemically predicated on responsible policies geared toward growth in the recipient country, as the presence of such policies has a large impact on the success of foreign aid, while the countries without such growth-oriented investment and trade policies show little benefit from aid.\textsuperscript{21}

Though not comprehensive, this review hopefully serves to illustrate trends in research ranging from historical, to political, to economic, on the post-colonial developmental studies and foreign aid. It should also help elucidate some of the less prioritized perspectives still relevant to such research, as will be defined as part of the significance of this study.

1.3: Research Significance

South Korea and its economic miracle are often held up in the study of developmental politics as a beacon for fellow postcolonial nations. The question of ‘why Korea?’ and not other formerly colonized nations is one that is often asked but which has many complex answers. We have already covered some of them, from the country’s social ethics to its relationship with the United States and importance to the American cause during the Cold War, to its appropriation of foreign aid, to the particularities of Japanese colonialism.

A related and always relevant question, which is the guiding query of this study, is why so many recipients of foreign aid struggle to grow their economies, achieve economic independence, and reduce poverty. The better understanding that we have of which underlying factors might facilitate the effective uptake and use of foreign aid in developing, post-colonial states, the easier time donor states will have tailoring aid to specific circumstances.

1.4: Methodology

As was established in the literature review, there is important research being done both in the historical field regarding colonial history and comparative colonial history, and in the fields of political science and economics regarding post-colonial development and the efficacy of foreign aid. What is less common, and what this study will attempt to present, is an alternative theoretical framework combining these two approaches.

This study will approach the question of, “in what circumstances is aid effective?” from a lens which prioritizes the impact of historical colonial administration and the attitudes and motivations of the colonizing power rather than the cultural and political values of the colonized. Such endogenous factors are undoubtedly crucial, but they have already been elaborated at length in existing scholarship. This paper will still place emphasis on the interplay between foreign influence and endogenous factors such as geography, but to reiterate, argues that the colonizing powers’ attitudes and motives were critical in shaping development and the ability to successfully use foreign aid. It should also be mentioned that the colonial histories of South Korea and Algeria cannot be cleanly extricated from their modern politics and economic policies. That is why a perspective on the effectiveness of foreign aid which prioritizes the role of this history is even more needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common perspective:</th>
<th>This paper:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of aid determined by endogenous cultural factors (social values, economic philosophy, regime type, etc.)</td>
<td>Effectiveness of aid is determined by the structures left behind after colonialism, which bear the influence of the differing motives and values of colonial regimes.</td>
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This approach is complicated to elaborate through a mostly quantitative lens, so this study will be largely qualitative, focusing on the differences between colonial administration in South Korea and Algeria, and their likely long-term effects on how the two countries have succeeded or not in their use of foreign aid. This, however, does not mean that quantitative evidence will be eschewed in this paper nor that further quantitative studies on this topic would not be encouraged or fruitful. This paper seeks to highlight uncommon and in ways more multi-disciplinary framework for the use of aid in post-colonial states.

In addition, while the research which went into this study pulls heavily on analyses of the colonial impact on growth, and on the influence of foreign aid on the postcolonial and postwar economy, this paper will attempt to fuse the two narratives and show how colonial structures influenced the uptake of foreign aid in South Korea versus in Algeria. Much of the ROK’s singular success lies in the uniqueness of Japan’s style of imperialism, even if Japan had been advised in the early days by the likes of France and other European empires. Japan’s assimilationist policies on the peninsula, spurred on by total war, aided the development of local capital and industry, which could be mobilized for postcolonial development by the government with the help of foreign aid funds. In contrast, centralized and exclusionary policies revolving around resource extraction under the French did not set up the same kind of apparatus for independent Algeria. Finally, the demographic and geographic differences between Korea and Algeria also added to contrasts in the penetration of colonial development.
1.5: Roadmap

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Historical Similarities between South Korea and Algeria and Comparative Frameworks

2.1: General Colonial Context
2.2: A Case for Comparison
2.3: Colonial Contrasts

Chapter 3: Differences in Colonial Administration and Effects on Success of Foreign Aid

3.1: Economic Foundations and Foreign Aid
3.2: Penetration of the Colonial Project
3.3: The Role of Education

Chapter 4: Conclusions
2. **Historical Background**

2.1: *General Colonial Context*

In Acharya and Buzan’s conception of I.R., the international political order which arose out of these ideologies is known as “global international society 1.0,” or “1.0 GIS.”\(^{22}\) “1.0” because it was the beginning of modern globalized political organization on a scale hinting at what was to come through institution like The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and many others. This 1.0 era witnessed the League of Nations and the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought the heightened promulgation of now standard international legal practices, often employed in the service of colonial ambition. Polities not unlike 1.0 GIS had existed throughout history; groups of states with certain shared cultural and political values which had any number of rules and institutions defining membership and “legitimate behavior.”\(^{23}\) Europe functioned this way for centuries, often developing law and diplomatic norms to prevent war and to legitimize colonial practices amongst each other. Another prime and even more tightly organized example was China’s tributary state system which dominated East Asia for millennia. However, 1.0 GIS was the first time such a polity extended over most of the globe, led by an aggressive European expansionism. Because 1.0 GIS was helmed by European powers, they had the upper hand in deciding what values and standards would be applied to it, leading to a rift which exists in part to this day between the peripheries of this global order and the early industrializing “privileged core.”\(^{24}\) This dynamic one might refer to now as the difference between the ‘global north’ and the ‘global south.’

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\(^{23}\) Ibid (18).

\(^{24}\) Ibid (19).
One notable exception to the rule of industrialized, colonial European hegemony at the outset of 1.0 GIS, as Acharya and Buzan point out, was Japan. Japan remained pre-industrial until the Meiji Restoration picked up steam in the late nineteenth century. Partially as a defense mechanism against western encroachment, in 1639 the Tokugawa Shogunate had undertaken a policy restricting access to the archipelago referred to by most historians as *Sakoku*, or “closed country” but likely known by the name *kaikin* (roughly, “maritime prohibitions”) to Japanese at the time.\(^{25}\) Anxiety over western influence did not go away however, once Japan ‘opened’ in the mid-1800’s. Japan’s neighbor and longtime cultural and political locust of the region, China, had just lost the Opium War to Great Britain in 1840 and found itself substantially weakened.\(^{26}\) As it emerged from *kaikin* into this world of preliminary 1.0 GIS which was never designed to include it, Japan remained largely underdeveloped in relation to European world powers and was attempting to move on from a social order which had existed since the mediaeval period. western powers such as the United States were keen on taking advantage of this, drafting unequal treaties granting westerners extraterritorial rights on the archipelago and compromising aspects of Japanese sovereignty for the first time in history. The celebrated German legal scholar Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, in his foundational 1905-1906 *International Law: A Treatise* wrote, “International Law as a law between sovereign and equal States based on the common consent of those States is a product of modern Christian civilization.”\(^ {27}\) Clearly, those studying and applying the rules of international legal practice during this period, such as Oppenheim, saw it as a fundamentally western ideology with roots in Christianity and enlightenment thought. This

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\(^{26}\) Acharya, Buzan (16).

explains why the states which emerged as part of the “privileged core” in the initial phase of 1.0 GIS felt free to impose its use onto periphery nations without worrying that it would be mastered by them and used to push back on western hegemony.

Japan, however, would prove this line of thought incorrect. Japan as a nation has long been remarkably adept at adoption and adaptation, and the transition from the Tokugawa to the Meiji era would prove to be one of its most impressive feats. The Meiji government succeeded in inducing rapid and unprecedented industrialization and militarization, using the western strategies formerly leveled against itself to subjugate an empire to rival some of Europe’s greatest powers.\(^1\) Japan would attach itself to many of the values of 1.0 GIS: the liberalism of international trade and law, the nationalism needed to industrialize and enforce an empire, and the use of racial science and ideology to support it all. This historical contextualization borrows from the work of Acharya and Buzan, known for their constructivist telling of historical international relations, because this paper’s analysis will also be arguing using a historiographical constructivist lens.

While it would be an over-simplification to suggest that Japan had never exerted any resistance in the face of western influence – the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under kaikin saw the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan and the effective taming of Dutch ambitions within the Shogunate\(^2\) – Japan’s unprecedented adaptation greatly impacted global perception across the globe.\(^3\) What initially set Japan apart from neighbors like China was its military success against a Western power. While China was ineffective against British aggression, the Meiji’s recently industrialized military apparatus proved shockingly effective in the Russo-

Japanese War at the turn of the twentieth century.\(^{30}\) Japan had attempted the decade earlier to join the club of global imperial powers when it beat a weakened China and gained control of the Liaodong Peninsula and the island of Formosa (Taiwan). However, the Liaodong holding was promptly lost to the “Triple Intervention” of Russia, France, and Germany. Japan’s eventual defeat of Russia proved enough to impress upon the West the necessity of bringing Japan at least partly into the fold of the 1.0 GIS elite. After beating Russia, Japan went through with annexing Korea uninhibited by western powers and gained itself a spot at the table in the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War and membership in the short-lived League of Nations. Oppenheim wrote of the Christian and western origins of international law, but in the same treatise spoke of the inferiority of law in states different “from the civilisation [sic] of most European and American States and of Japan” (emphasis added).\(^{31}\) The emergent ‘first world,’ realizing they could no longer intimidate Japan into peripheral submission, seemed to aim instead to guide Japan’s imperial and political development so as to coexist with it more easily.

In service of this strategy, western powers began accepting Japanese diplomats to learn about western law, military strategy, and imperial administration. This intellectual exchange followed in the footsteps of “Dutch studies,” or rangaku, which were prevalent among the educated elite under kaikin.\(^{32}\) Upon reopening, focus shifted towards anglophone studies to accommodate the Americans and Brits\(^{33}\) who were the first to engage with the transitional regime and impose unequal treaties. The Meiji government would continue soliciting British advice on colonial administration throughout the imperial period. Japanese diplomats in the West were also

\(^{30}\) Acharya, Buzan (26).


\(^{33}\) Dudden, 2005 (38).
enamored with Prussia’s militarism and emphasis on discipline.\textsuperscript{12} However, one western power
and infamous colonizer itself would prove to have an extremely consequential and somewhat
improbable effect on Japan as it shaped its empire.

Unlike Portugal, Russia, The Netherlands, Britain, and America, France did not have a
history of engaging with Japan before the late nineteenth century. In fact, based on France’s
involvement in the aforementioned “Triple Intervention” of 1895, one could be excused for
imagining that what relations France did have with Japan would have been strained and
contentious. On the contrary, the influence of French legal and administrative philosophy on
Japan’s development into a world power would prove essential.

When a group of Japanese diplomats came to Paris in 1873, they were treated to a lecture by
legal scholar, Gustav Boissonade, on civil and criminal codes. They were apparently so
impressed that they invited him to Japan, where he stayed for twenty years, teaching law at
Tokyo Imperial University, drafting legal documents for Meiji Japan based on France’s
Napoleonic codes, and consulting on international legal practice.\textsuperscript{34} Boissonade did not represent
the first Japanese exposure to French legal philosophy – the government-ordered translation of
French legal documents was already being undertaken during the preceding decade\textsuperscript{35} – but
Boissonade’s impact proved so profound that he is sometimes dubbed “the father of modern
Japanese law.”\textsuperscript{35}

French thought was not always equally influential in every corner of the Japanese empire.
John L. Hennessey, in a 2019 article in \textit{French Colonial History}, argues that French influence
tends to be overstated and questions the emerging dominance of viewing the imperial era as a

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid (105)
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid (38)
“bundle of relationships…involving knowledge exchange and emulation.” Still, this does not change the fact that future prime minister Hara Takashi and the Office of Taiwan Affairs solicited the advice of Frenchman Michel Revon vis-à-vis Taiwan, nor that French-American diplomat, Charles Le Gendre helped execute punitive campaigns against Taiwanese aborigines. Hennesey even admits that “the Japanese government’s solicitation of French advice on the colonial administration of Taiwan was not an isolated instance but rather part of a substantial exchange of colonial ideas and practices over time.”

There are other notable cases where French administrative clout is more directly visible. Korea is one of them. During Boissonade’s two decades in Japan, he consulted with Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi on Japan’s administration of Korea. Boissonade had also pressured Japan into abolishing its practice of torture, finally allowing the country to shed the shackles of western extraterritoriality and giving it the legitimacy it needed to undertake a “mission législatrice” (a play on colonial France’s “mission civilisatrice”) in Korea. This mission involved building European-style courts in Seoul where French-inspired Japanese legal codes could be enforced. Korea, lacking western concepts of civil and criminal law, was a ripe target for rhetoric of barbarism and extraterritoriality, as Japan itself had once been. Japan did still have to fight to escape the “imperial gaze” cast upon it – some westerners found initial Japanese brutality in Korea borderline uncivilized – but the more Japan adhered its mission to western liking and to the legal lessons learned from figures such as Boissonade, the more Japan was

37 Ibid (105).
38 Ibid (105).
39 Dudden, 2005 (107)
40 Ibid (100).
41 Ibid (100).
accepted into the legitimate “privileged core” of international law and relations, exemplified by its inclusion in Oppenheim’s work as the only non-western nation to have achieved parity, and thus, the right to “civilize” other territories. Besides, the issue of perception was not only a Japanese problem. Even the French in Indochina and Algeria struggled to balance brutality and “respectability” to stop their own legitimacy from being questioned by other western powers.42

2.2: A Case for Comparison

As noted in the introduction, Michel Revon once opined that the Korean peninsula was “as strategically important for Japan as Algeria was for France,”19 placing the two colonies in a similar position within their respective empires. This is not surprising, considering each nation was the most wholly integrated into the colonial polity, annexed under the rule of a “Governor General.” When viewing Japan’s legal strategy in Korea, analogy between the two nations becomes even clearer. France began colonizing Algeria in 1830 using unequal treaties. They used the rhetoric of civilization and international law as a justification for occupation much as Japan would in Korea. Despite this imperial desire to “civilize” the colonial legal systems, both France and Japan made attempts at legitimizing their occupations within the existing indigenous structural frameworks. In Algeria, this manifested in the cooptation – not abolition – of Muslim law courts,43 and in Korea, Japan took the opportunity to compile local customary law during land surveys for potential inclusion in new legal codes.44

Both Algeria and Korea functioned as settler colonies. In Korea, the Japanese occupation gave out land for the settlement of over 100,000 Japanese families in a country of around seventeen million. Algeria, having been occupied for much longer than Korea ever was, was home to a European population of about a million at its height in a country of roughly nine million. Due to this settler colony status, Japan and France both had the impetus to develop Korea and Algeria to a greater and more functional extent than a typical extraction colony. Japan and France each focused on agriculture, France because agriculture was an area of expertise at home and Japan because it wanted to use the southern part of the Korea peninsula as a breadbasket for the metropole. Japanese innovation doubled Korean rice yields during colonial rule. Colonial development also took the form of setting both Algeria and Korea on their eventual economic developmental paths. The French are largely responsible for the initial development of the oil industry in Algeria, upon which it now relies for the majority of its economy (it will be argued in the next chapter as to whether this is a positive or a negative, but it was certainly consequential). Today, oil accounts for twenty per cent of Algeria’s GDP and eighty-five per cent of total exports. In Korea, Japan was responsible for developing manufacturing and the roots of the modern chaebol, with many formerly Japanese-run companies remaining engines of the South Korea Economy to this day.

Both France and Japan set about imposing educational systems largely in the colonial language, geared towards the training of a more skilled workforce. Algeria’s was modeled on

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France’s own education system and consisted of two tracks: one which was taught in French and facilitated social mobility, and one taught in Arabic for those who would go into crafts. Although this system was unsuccessful at reaching a critical mass of Algerians, especially due to the prioritization of French children and the difficulties of penetrating deeper desert communities, to this day, areas with higher levels of historical colonial settlement maintain better access to schooling. Japan also instituted policies to increase schooling, mostly so the occupying regime could control curricula, teach Japanese, and have a more educated workforce. The colonial schooling instituted by Japan however, was widely successful in its scope, and this is reflected in the hegemony of the Japanese language at the time. Many colonized Koreans were even legally compelled to take on Japanese names.

In the modern age, similarities between the two cases continue. Both the Republic of Korea and Algeria have witnessed turbulent political development since colonization ended. The U.S.-installed first President of the ROK, Syngman Rhee, ran the country as an illiberal republic until he was ousted in 1960 by student protests characteristic of many countries during the decade. The country would then proceed to suffer two coups, one in 1961 and one in 1979, and swing between military juntas and oppressive republican structures. Although things have improved considerably, Korea maintains both a corruption problem and a robust culture of protest evidenced by the 2017 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye.

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49 Ibid.
Algeria, by comparison, is no stranger to many of Korea’s postcolonial experiences. The origin of modern Algeria lies in the war for independence fought between 1954 and 1962 by the National Liberation Front (FLN), and the group, now a political party, has maintained a vice-grip on national politics partially through illiberal governance and partially through their association with nationalist pride. The first Algerian President was taken down by a coup three years after he was instated, and yet another spiraled the country into civil war during the 1990s. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, former foreign minister, emerged as the popular democratic choice to lead Algeria out of the war, although his consolidation of power and his attempt to gain a fifth term in office sparked massive protests across the country in February 2019.\(^5^3\) Although protests and civil unrest during the Arab Spring of 2010-2012 left the Algerian government largely untouched compared to other Arab nations, this current movement, called the *hirak*, has already forced Bouteflika to step down and prompted the investigation of other government officials. Still, the FLN remains in power and protests continue in ebbs and flows.\(^5^4\)

As is not uncommon with former colonizer-colonized relationships, Korea and Algeria remain closely economically linked to Japan and France. As of 2019, France was Algeria’s third largest trading partner, as was the case between Japan and Korea.\(^5^5\) Both former colonizers have


\(^5^5\) World Bank.
given aid and reparations to their old colonies,\textsuperscript{56,57} however such reparatory payments are not always viewed as adequate by certain factions within Korean and Algerian politics.

The ROK and Algeria, due to their regional proximity to and continued dependence on their former colonizers, both brush up constantly against sensitive historical wounds left over from colonization. From the quarrels over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Islands to controversy over the “comfort women” issue, such polemics are used by nationalist politicians in both Japan and Korea when politically expedient despite reparations agreements have been paid many times over. Korea has also attempted unsuccessfully to make Japan’s entire colonial project retroactively illegal\textsuperscript{58} on several stages. A group of former Taiwanese and Korean comfort women even appealed to the United States judiciary with the case \textit{Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan} (2002) under the Alien Tort Claims Act, however the court found the case outside the reach of the Act and did not rule.\textsuperscript{59}

Algeria too has attempted to litigate the very act of colonialism. The 2000s saw an Algerian push for French colonialism to be retroactively deemed illegal. Although unsuccessful, it did nothing to cool tensions between Algeria and its former colonizers, which were running high over Bouteflika’s remarks that early-independence action by the state to confiscate property unclaimed by fleeing \textit{pieds-noirs}, or French Algerians, was justified by the pillaging act of colonization itself. The \textit{pieds-noirs} have remained a culturally and politically important group in France, and far right parties like the National Front (now the National Rally) still see Algeria as


\textsuperscript{58} Alexis Dudden, \textit{Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States} (Columbia University Press, 2008).

part of the French *patrimoine*. Like Japan, France has struggled in the eyes of its former colony to sufficiently apologize and continues to venerate the very people who committed the act of colonization, while in Algeria, controversy existed for many years after independence about whether the cadre leading the country was too culturally influenced by France.

All this context taken into consideration, the colonial and developmental similarities between South Korea and Algeria end when you look at the two countries’ current developmental status. While the ROK is a functional, if imperfect, democracy and has been since 1987, Algeria plunged into civil war as Korea democratized and citizens still fight for greater democratization to this day. South Korea stands at an 83/100 on the freedom scale according to Freedom House, while Algeria maintains a poor 34. South Korea has the tenth largest economy in the world and projects soft power through popular culture across the globe to a degree which is unthinkable for most countries – especially most which had such troubled politics only a generation ago. Meanwhile, Algeria’s economy struggles to grow and even the country’s film industry is heavily dependent upon the support of French production companies. Shifting towards the conversation of aid which will anchor much of the coming analysis, Korea is also outperforming many other former colonies by having joined the OECD in 2010 — the first past recipient to do so.

This all seems a bit unexpected, considering that France had such a guiding effect on Japan’s learning of empire and on Korea’s administration, and considering Algeria and Korea occupied a similar status within their respective empires, as the metropole outside the metropole.

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61 Ibid.
experiencing many colonial and developmental similarities. Ultimately, the focus on colonial and postcolonial history between South Korea and Algeria in this chapter is meant to bolster the legitimacy of using the two cases as analytical counterpoints. The two nations differ in many ways, but so do, for instance, South Korea and Turkey as utilized in Özer and Nah’s study. Despite differences cultural, geographic, political, etc., the ROK and Algeria share some interesting historical commonalities often rooted in the era which institutionalized 1.0 GIS and cross-colonial intellectual exchange. Since South Korea has outperformed Algeria so starkly since the 1980’s, despite relative parity until that point, Algeria presents an intriguing and underused reference point for examining the “why Korea?” question.

2.3: Colonial Contrasts

This elaboration of the historical similarities and linkages between French imperialism in Algeria and Japanese imperialism in Korea have hopefully served to establish the justification for a modern-day exploration of their contrasting developmental paths. Before getting into this development further however, we must first examine the significant differences between the two cases of colonialism, as they will be equally important to this paper’s argument.

The most striking difference between the two empires was their guiding ideologies in the years leading up to the Second World War – especially pertaining to race relations. While France, even in attempting to integrate Algeria into the nation as a political and geographic construct, tended to retain colonial hierarchies through racial othering, late Japanese imperialism took a drastically different tack.

In the early twentieth century, as Japan was cementing its rule in Taiwan and formally annexing the Korean peninsula into the empire, some Japanese thinkers did begin to push the
idea that Japanese and other Asian ethnicities were all descendants of the same race. Aspects of this idea are not necessarily ideological falsehood either, as some ethnographic research suggests some Japanese people may be descended from premodern migrants from Korea.63 However, this ideology of Asian brotherhood was not the hegemonic ideal at the time and the Japanese Empire’s general discourse regarding colonized peoples remained more in line with that of western imperial counterparts, stressing narratives of racial superiority, civilization, and the violent versus noble savage.64

This all changed however, in the decades between the two World Wars. After World War I, the Versailles-Washington orientation of global politics promoted the importance of peace and self-determination. Suddenly, Japan found itself being lectured to on empire by the very nations which had been carving up the globe for centuries, and in the cases of France and many others, had taught Japan how to be a more effective imperial power. This ambiguous tension and sense of Japanese self-righteousness only escalated in the immediate prewar context of the 1930s.

During the 1930s and 40s, or the years comprising what most Americans think of as World War II along with the war in East Asia as it existed in a post-“Marco Polo Bridge Incident” of 1937 context, Japan acquired more territory in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, while strengthening its integration in previously held colonies. This rapid expansion of both territory and bureaucracy was part of a supposedly Pan-Asianist project called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Much of the rhetoric and propaganda from this late colonial era positions Japan’s empire in stark contrast to those of the European powers which had dominated

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much of the globe. Japan was, according to this line of thinking, an enlightened nation merely concerned with ridding Asia of foreign hegemony and conquest and in teaching good Asian values to help less prosperous Asian nations build themselves up. Tokyo-based radio programs decried the commercial and colonial incursions of the Dutch, French, English, and Americans in Asia, focusing on their racist policies and promising colonial troops freedom from the “bondage” of European imperial command.65 This was standard for Japan’s anti-allied forces rhetoric.

Though sounding anti-imperial in their own way, Japanese Pan-Asianism’s favorite talking points were meant to gloss over the use of colonies and even semi-independent occupied territories as resource banks and later, defense outposts for Japan’s total war mobilization. A demonstrative example of this in rhetoric is the Japanese Director General of Military Administration’s speech in the occupied Philippines in 1942. In it, he promised to help instill “pride of being Oriental peoples” who appreciate the “nobility of hard work,” have a “love of labor,” and a sense of “unselfish service” which would become a “national trait” of Filipinos.66 Any emphasis in this speech of distinct national identity or development is thus subsumed to the need for unquestioning labor and a greater Asian character.

On the Korean peninsula, these processes of the pre-war period took the form of the naisen ittai policy,11 which aimed to assimilate Koreans, imbue them with imperial loyalty, and build up/take advantage of Korean industry. Huge mobilizations of industry and military manpower took place under this policy, including some of the most infamous examples of abuse and cultural erasure, such as the forced adoption of Japanese names and customs and the

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enslavement of Korean “comfort women,” a practice which continues to engender controversy and geopolitical strife between Japan and South Korea to this day.

Taking the exploitative and abusive nature of the Co-Prosperity Sphere into account, it is still important for the case of our argument to recognize the fundamental uniqueness of Japan’s very modern form of empire. Although Japan saw the home islands (naichī) and its people as occupying the top of a social, political, and civilizational hierarchy, colonies like Korea were, on the eve of the war, being prepared for full integration into Japan as a nation. There is also the confounding fact that in the later years, Korea served an important geopolitical role as a land bridge between Japan and its occupied puppet territory of Manchuria (Manchukuo) in northeast China. The territory was an important testing ground for the assimilationism and militarism which characterized the 1930s under Japanese rule, and ethnic Koreans alongside Japanese were encouraged to move there to cultivate the land.67 In this way we can see that through the Co-Prosperity Sphere and naisen ittai, imperial Japan seemed to be setting up a colonial future which would view Koreans and other colonized peoples less as others and more as an inferior, but fundamentally Japanese part of the nation.

This approach was never taken in France. The colony was largely seen as a space for excess French population, with native Algerians displaced and used to the ends of the settlers. For most of Japan’s reign in Korea, Japanese and Korean alike were subject to the same set of laws. However, the case of Algeria is more complicated, as France occupied the country for over a century and had several legal phases. Until World War II, “natives” were disciplined using the Code de l’indigénat under the Governor General’s regime. The French legal codes, dating from

the inter-Empire period, included far harsher punishments for Algerian subjects than for French citizens living in Algeria; punishments such as indefinite arrest and the enforcement of collective penalties on native communities in which crimes were committed. Native elites who had served the French colonial administration and who spoke French had the opportunity to attain French citizenship and be equal under the law to white Frenchmen, but submitting to the French Civil Code would mean losing access to the potential positives of living under the indigenous codes, such as its Koranic influences. War changed the calculus of colonial administration, as it had for Japan, creating a climate where it made sense to grant citizenship to colonized Algerians. However, some religious statutes continued to apply to them and there was not an organized propagandistic push towards any ideological equivalent of a “co-prosperity sphere.”

Of course, France was very much not anti-assimilationist. The Frenchification of Algerian elites had always been useful to the colonial government. In addition, while annexed Korea remained an administrative colony, Algeria was integrated as an official Department of France as early as 1848. Some French scholars even tried to argue along similar lines as Japanese Pan-Asianists, claiming a shared Mediterranean history across France and Algeria. However, this was not a common point of view in France – not nearly as widespread as Pan-Asianism in Japan. French Assimilationism then, did not include the Japanese emphasis on racial brotherhood and civilizational uplift outside the narratives around civilizing colonies common among European imperialists in general, and this fact would have a large influence on each former colony’s development.

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3. Differences in Colonial Administration and Effects on Success of Foreign Aid

3.1: Economic Foundations and Foreign Aid

South Korea is not only exceptional in how well it has developed as a nation and in doing so, made use of the aid it has received, but also in how *much* aid it has received. American aid to Korea began directly after liberation from Japan at the end of World War II. Between 1946 and 1976, in the immediate postcolonial era, the ROK received a staggering $5,867,800,000 in aid from the United States and more than $1 billion in aid from Japan during this period once relations had begun to normalize in the 1960’s. For perspective, in the same period, the entire decolonizing continent of Africa, Algeria naturally included, received a sum of $6,890,000,000 from the United States – only one billion more than the Korean peninsula. Even as Algeria was coming out of its immensely destructive civil war in the early 2000’s, the country received only 152,000,000 USD in OECD aid. This disparity in U.S. aid makes sense considering America’s heavy involvement in the postwar Japanese occupation and Korea’s instrumentality in American geopolitical strategy during the Cold War. Japanese aid and trade still existed and was hugely significant, partially out of reparational necessity and partially out of a desire to take advantage of the economic linkages left over by colonialism. Still, because of the immediacy of American interest in South Korean success, the United States became an overwhelming third-party influence devoid of the colonial baggage exemplified by Korea-Japan relations. The United States’ involvement in the Korean War did complicate relations to a degree, but America was not negatively entrenched in Korean discourse like Japan and could act as a more neutral point in the triangular relations between the three countries. The U.S. would even help normalize dynamics

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70 Ibid.
between Korea and Japan to and work to shift some of the aid burden onto the former colonizer.62

Many scholars have studied the idea of “democratic peace,” in which democratic nations are less likely to go to war with one another. Literature is also increasingly considering the theory that democracy and economic growth are positively linked. Acemoglu et al. (2014) argued that this was the case by examining the growth of GDP along with democratization, concluding that it increases GDP per capita by twenty percent.71 Democratic backsliding, similarly, has been linked to negative economic growth. That being said, scholars such as Almas Heshmati and Nam-Seok Kim actually use South Korea and fellow former Japanese colony, Taiwan, as examples of how some democratic “development states” were so focused on order, state-building, and development that they allowed political and social freedoms to languish compared to more established democracies.72 Still, both South Korea’s economic development and democracy index are far ahead both of where the ROK and Algeria were forty years ago and where Algeria finds itself now.

While some scholarship included in this study conclude that dependence on higher sums of aid can lead to less accountable, more illiberal states, South Korea is an example of how this trend can be beaten in the long-term. As Burnside and Dollar have shown, amount of aid is unimportant compared to how the aid is used. South Korea has been touted for its effective use and domestic application of foreign aid. It is not just critical that a developing nation be given funding to facilitate this development, but also that the funds go to good use. Niyonkuru and Moss and Pettersson raise important concerns regarding the degree to which countries depend on

72 Ibid.
foreign aid, but the early development of South Korea postwar will show that effective management of aid can override this dependence and lead to growth-centered democratic states.

As promised, this chapter will attempt to explain South Korea’s unique outcome by highlighting the effects of unique aspects within Japanese empire-building on the peninsula. Despite the many similarities explored in Chapter 2 between colonial administrations and ideologies, and the historical inspiration drawn from France by Japanese officials, the differences discussed later in the chapter help to account for the contrast in material realities left on the ground in each colony upon decolonization. These differences manifested most strongly in terms of economic structure and workforce and can be observed to this day in the importance of large Korean industry and corporations and in Algeria’s more agrarian society still dependent on oil for much of its economy.

As discussed earlier, both Japan and France employed the common colonial tactic of allying with and coopting local elites, however they went about this in contrasting ways. Japan, unlike France, focused heavily on industrializing its annexed colony, and allied with Korean elites and businessmen in a way that would both buy their loyalty and set Korea up to have a robust ‘modernized’ capitalist infrastructure and business ties to Japan once independence was gained and relations eventually normalized in the early 1960s. This drive to industrialize accelerated significantly in the prewar years before the Second World War, in tandem with greater emphasis being placed on assimilating the native Korean population. Although Algeria too was an assimilationist colony with colonial soldiers in fighting World Wars, assimilation and industrialization were not viewed as urgent, simultaneous endeavors. In addition, the security necessity of penetrating the Asian continent through the peninsula was critical during the war years while a similar strategy for France in Algeria would not have been.
The Bank of Chosen served as an important economic instrument of this colonial penetration into Korea and the rest of the Asian continent throughout the imperial era, giving loans to colonial as well as domestic businesses. A loan from the Bank was, for instance, critical in keeping factories like the arch industrialist Kim brothers’ Kyongbang Spinning and Weaving Company afloat. Even with the abject destruction brought on by the Korean War, the Republic of Korea benefitted from already having a culture of industrial capitalism and experience building and running factories and supply chains. This is evidenced by the fact that many of Korea’s largest companies today have roots in the colonial era, one of the most prominent examples of this being Kia Motors, the seventh most profitable company in the entire country. The chaebol was founded in the waning days of the Japanese Empire.

In “The Useful War,” John Dower discusses how many Japanese zaibatsu corporations that had received a boost from the demands of the war effort maintained their resources and leadership after Japan had surrendered. This gave Japan an important industrial base to build upon in pursuit of its eventual economic miracle, even with the devastation mainland Japan had faced in the Pacific War. With Korea adopting a similar style of industrialization through the chaebol under Japanese occupation, it is unsurprising that this history played a parallel role in South Korea’s own development.

Arch capitalists like the Kim were not the norm during the colonial years, as most enterprises were still owned and spearheaded by the Japanese, and Koreans who wanted to get into business at such a scale would likely be required to act in ways which could see them labelled collaborationists. Importantly, though, when the Japanese were forced to give up their colony,

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many of these company assets were transferred over to Korean owners in the 1940’s and 1950’s.\textsuperscript{75} This would mark the handing over of the \textit{zaibatsu} system, turned \textit{chaebol} system, into indigenous Korean hands. This process also highlights the important role played by Japan and France’s outcomes postwar. South Korea and Japan were estranged for over a decade after colonization ended, opening the door to third party management which could ensure Korean control of the economy and eventually, that foreign aid from Japan was not exploitative. Meanwhile, France only lost Algeria in a revolution over a decade after World War II, and therefore no strong international apparatus was in place to manage the role of aid in decolonization.

The 1950’s and 60’s would see an explosion of Korean enterprise built out of this system (LG Electronics, the ROK’s fifth largest company\textsuperscript{77}), spurred on at first by the need to rebuild in the aftermath of the Korean War and then by Park Chung-hee’s “development state” described by scholars like Sang-In Jun. Many of the policies cited by studies like that of Steinburg as to why South Korea was such a model user of foreign aid can be attributed to the preexistence of this industrial system. Steinburg makes a point of noting the rarity of a recently independent former colony having the kind of “light industrial base”\textsuperscript{3} that it did, even in the wake of the Korean War’s utter destruction. Although he also acknowledges the importance of regime type in directing the use of foreign aid and being able to “exploit”\textsuperscript{76} such an industrial advantage, it is critical to recognize how unusual the presence of such a base to exploit really is. South Korea

\textsuperscript{75} William R. Shaw; Andrea Matles Savada, ed., \textit{South Korea, a country study}, United States Department of the Army, Library of Congress: Federal Research Division. 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Washington, D.C., 1992). \url{https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112039602260&view=1up&seq=1}.

\textsuperscript{76} Steinburg, 27.
had the critical advantage of a dynamic business sector into which the government could direct developmental aid funding.

According to Kuk (1988), foreign aid, of which a significant portion came from the United States, was critical in establishing the South Korean economy in the wake of Japanese occupation and North-South partition. This aid funding, whose U.S. and Japanese contributions can be seen in greater depth later in Figure 4, comprised most of Korea’s imports between 1953-61 and was a huge source of capital accumulation. The government was also able to use the chaebol system leftover after colonization to direct foreign aid flows into local industrialization and development projects throughout the 50’s, 60’s, and 70’s.77

Kuk’s assertions are consistent with statistics gleaned from the contemporary sources of the early independence period. From the OECD’s side of things, finding detailed statistics on programmable aid to South Korea before the 1980’s is very difficult. However, the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics Yearbooks provide a robust look into the financial allocation of postcolonial Korea. In the first available of such yearbooks, dating from 1955, the importance of directing funding towards industry is evident by the 5,780,000,000 won shelled out by the government’s central bank to commercial industrial banks in 1954. The next most well-funded sector, commerce, received 2,262,000,000 won in comparison.78 The Korean Reconstruction Bank, formed that very year and now known as the Korea Development Bank, also gave significant loans to manufacturing and heavy industry, with these sectors receiving the most


funding besides agriculture.\textsuperscript{79} The Bank of Korea’s report from a decade later in 1965 shows similar trends, but even more exaggeratedly. Loans given to the manufacturing sector rose from around five trillion won in 1958 to over eleven trillion in 1964 while agriculture stayed much more stable as land reforms helped the industry back on its feet. The sums of these loans dwarfed those to any other sector of the economy, taking up fifty per cent of the Bank’s loans in total.\textsuperscript{80}

The industries benefiting from loans to commercial manufacturing banks, such as textiles, machinery, and chemicals, had been pillars of Japanese colonial development and were dominated by the \textit{chaebol} system. In 1955, the South Korean government relied on foreign aid for forty-four per cent of its revenue (Figure 2),\textsuperscript{81} meaning that the government’s ability to direct the necessary sums of money towards manufacturing and industry would be contingent upon this aid in the early years. Although it is difficult to trace aid from the donor directly to specific \textit{chaebols} or specific government projects, these early central bank statistics illustrate both the country’s intense reliance on foreign aid and the bank’s prioritization of loans to \textit{chaebol}-dominated industries with roots back in the era of the Koch’ang Kims as a strategy for postwar and postcolonial development.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid (60).
As an important note, American military assistance as a form of aid also played a large role in freeing up government funds for development projects. Due to the U.S.’s involvement in the Korean War and South Korea’s subsequent strategic importance during the Cold War, the American military spent twenty-seven per cent\(^2\) of its entire assistance budget to East Asia on the ROK between 1949 and 1968 (Figure 3). With its American ally largely subsidizing expensive and very necessary defense in much of this period, the developmental state would have been more empowered to direct funds to the manufacturing and industry sectors which proved so essential to South Korea’s economic miracle. This situation, ironically, is not dissimilar from that of Korea’s former colonizer, which transitioned post-war into a demilitarized U.S. ally.

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Like Algeria, South Korea has had and maintains close economic ties with its former colonizer. This has been established earlier in this paper. After Syngman Rhee’s regime was ousted in 1960, and after the no normalization of South Korea-Japan relations in 1965, the government was able to shift gears away from policies of import substitution to engaging in robust trade with the United States, similarly taking advantage of historical business ties in trade with Japan.\(^8\) As Han (1974) notes, Japan hoped to exploit South Korea’s economic dependence, and they were able to in the early years, as the Park government understood that fanning the

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\(^8\) Steinburg.
flames of recent political bad blood would likely lead to being cut off from Japanese funding.\textsuperscript{84} Ironically though, in the longer run, it was thanks to some of the very structures laid down by Japanese colonization that Korea was able to assert some economic independence.

One might contend that the development experienced by South Korea and especially its rapid increase in quality of life had a lag effect, kicking in after big donors with interest in the country such as the United States and Japan had already ceased most aid programs. However, this lag is easily accounted for by the sheer destruction with which the Korean government and economy had to contend in the couple of decades after the Korean War. Even with enormous amounts of aid being given to Korea in the early years post-independence, most of it was simply “essential for the survival of the state” and couldn’t do more heavy lifting than allowing for “modest growth.”\textsuperscript{85} For instance, in the early days after independence, the state used foreign aid to keep colonial-era factories and industry operating, then later used it to direct the rebuilding of that infrastructure, and eventually, of the economy through such infrastructure.\textsuperscript{86} Foreign aid early on saved the Korean economy from collapsing, but the underpinnings of large-scale industrial capitalism allowed the state to direct the use of aid, avoid becoming dependent upon it, as Niyonkuru and Moss et al. warned against, and eventually grown the economy down the road.

![Figure 4](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642837)

**Figure 4** shows the amount in millions of U.S. dollars of American and Japanese aid to South Korea in the years preceding its rapid economic success. *Source: Developing Economics.*

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\textsuperscript{85} Steinburg, xiii.

To summarize the connection between Chapter 2 and this chapter’s argument, while non-Japanese were often orientalized, repressed, and forced to take up Japanese customs, the Japanese Empire also espoused the gospel of Pan-Asianism. Many pro-imperialist thinkers pushed this ideology not because of its kind-seeming bent, but because it was supposed to legitimize the presence of Japanese colonizers outside the archipelago. The idea of Pan-Asianism ramped up during the 1930’s under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and as Japan was preparing to mobilize for total war. On the Korean peninsula, this took the form of the naisen ittai policy, which urged Koreans to see themselves as Japanese first, and which aimed to invest in heavy industry for the war effort. Despite this relationship remaining grossly exploitative and Japan’s end goal essentially amounting to cultural genocide, the aggressive assimilation of Korea during the late colonial era would paradoxically help develop the industrial base that was so effective at absorbing the benefits of foreign aid. The zaibatsu/chaebol system, though meriting critique for how it engrained social stratification and industrial monopolization of the South Korean economy, nonetheless existed in the postcolonial context at a useful nexus of government control and the assent of local capitalists offering development and employment opportunities.

This was not the case in Algeria. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the French did not subscribe to any ideology analogous in style nor in outcome to Japan’s Pan-Asianism. While Algeria was annexed as an official Département of France and had some representation in the metropole, the French, being famous for their assimilationist strategies, did not perform assimilationism in the same way that Japan did through programs like naisen ittai. As previously established, this is evidenced by the fact that both Koreans and Japanese in Korea lived under the same ‘civilized’ legal codes while Algerians remained under a separate Code de l’indigénat for most of the
occupation, making them legally second-class citizens. This is not to say that this was not functionally the case in Korea, but it was not official in the same way.

This difference in framing also manifested in Algerian development being even more exclusionary than that of Japan. When oil was found in Algeria near the end of the colonial era, control of the industry concentrated in the hands of the colonizers.\footnote{Mohammed Rahmoun, “Industrial Colonies in Algeria, the urban history of mining town of Beni-Saf,” \textit{Université Paris 1 Sorbonne} (2011). \url{https://www.academia.edu/8838970/Industrial_Colonies_in_Algeria_the_urban_history_of_mining_town_of_Beni_Saf}.} Even before that development, mining company towns began to pop up in small, homogenously French settlements along the coast.\footnote{J.R. Nellis, “Socialist Management in Algeria,” \textit{The Journal of Modern African Studies} 15, no. 4 (1977): 529-554. \url{http://www.jstor.com/stable/159578}.} The exclusion of Algerians from industry in their own country meant that upon independence, the government and people were less invested in the country’s (admittedly small) industrial base as it existed. Post-independence in the 1960’s, Algerian leaders like President Ahmed Ben Bella privatized much of the country’s economy and encouraged the workers to take ownership of whatever was not transferred to state control, in an ultimately unsuccessful process called \textit{autogestation}.\footnote{Sara B. Pritchard, “From hydroimperialism to hydrocapitalism: 'French' hydraulics in France, North Africa, and beyond,” \textit{Social Studies of Science} 42, no. 4: Water Worlds (2012): 591-615. \url{https://www.jstor.org/stable/41721343}.}

France also notably focused most heavily on natural resources, in contrast to Japan’s industrial development in Korea. Industries such as oil, mining, and hydropower were developed in a manner meant to keep Algeria dependent on its colonizer even after independence.\footnote{Sara B. Pritchard, “From hydroimperialism to hydrocapitalism: 'French' hydraulics in France, North Africa, and beyond,” \textit{Social Studies of Science} 42, no. 4: Water Worlds (2012): 591-615. \url{https://www.jstor.org/stable/41721343}.} In such cases, it can be easy for foreign aid and investment to take a more exploitative tack, with France regularly using aid and trade as incentives for performing certain favorable policies or as excuses to keep French technical educators around in Algerian industries as they privatized.\footnote{Mohammed Rahmoun, “Industrial Colonies in Algeria, the urban history of mining town of Beni-Saf,” \textit{Université Paris 1 Sorbonne} (2011). \url{https://www.academia.edu/8838970/Industrial_Colonies_in_Algeria_the_urban_history_of_mining_town_of_Beni_Saf}.} The fact that Algeria did not received the guidance of a third party world power in its decolonization
process, as South Korea had with the United States, also lead to a more disorganized transfer of Algerian assets back to Algeria. In the 1960’s, Algeria found itself with huge debts to France from loans. Furthermore, more than half of aid from France to Algeria immediately after independence existed “without Algerian control” and “directly profited French enterprises.”

Much of the rest of it was either restrained by French policies in their former colony or set aside for enterprises to be “realized with French capital.” Dependence made it difficult for Algeria to control its own investment and diversify its economy.

France, a highly centralized state itself, in its focus on agriculture and exclusionary resource extraction, did not leave behind the same kind of opportunity for established local capital and development guided by the state that we see in South Korea. This structural inability to develop independently has also left the country vulnerable to illiberal influences (Islamism, military aid deals with the USSR bleeding over into modern cooperation with Russia on arms and oil) and to modern iterations of imperialist developmental aid, such as when Algeria ceded control of an oil manufacturing zone to China in the past decade.

This analysis is not intended to push an agenda that capitalist development is always good and socialist development definitionally bad. Rather, it is to show that Japan’s investment in industrialization left South Koreans with more potential for economic growth than did France’s strategy of exclusionary resource extraction. Certainly, as Steinburg and many other studies of

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91 Ibid.


South Korean development have pointed out, while *chaebols* were important vectors for the ROK’s developmental direction and use of foreign aid, they still left the country with an oligarchic class divide.

There is also the issue of the partition of the Korean peninsula with which to contend. South Korea seems to have benefitted, emerging from the Korean war with the technological and business hub of Seoul in its territory, rather than the mountainous extraction areas of North Korea. Although North Korea does not possess any asset as valuable as Algeria’s oil, its colonial exploitation is nevertheless more analogous to the kind of physically extractive colonialism experienced there. The Korean peninsula’s particular history of partitioning though, does not negate the fact that France largely shut Algeria out of industry and left the colony upon independence with little in the way of a technology or business center akin to Seoul.

While this explanation of how colonial industry created the pathways for eventual developmental success or lack thereof in South Korea and Algeria is crucial, this paper will go on to elaborate two more short categories of colonial and developmental differentiation: the penetration of colonization, and the role of education. These two topics are closely related to the differing attitudes towards and motivations for imperialism between Japan and France. They also helped shape the eventual effectiveness of foreign aid in each case.

3.2: Penetration of the Colonial Project

As noted in Chapter 2, Japanese colonists in South Korea drew heavy inspiration from scholars such as Boissonade, who specialized in Napoleonic Law and conceptions of colonization. Under Napoleon is where modern styles of area studies, essentially with the
intention of understanding a place and a people so that one might better control it, got their start with the *La Description de l’Égypte* in the early nineteenth century.

Japan, as scholars have noted, proved to be one of the best empires at studying, characterizing, and quantifying its territories and subjects.94 This is evidenced by the incredibly thorough land surveys conducted by the Japanese after annexation, meant both to catalogue and understand the peninsula’s land and resources but also its people and customs.44 France, though deeply interested in controlling Algerian land – mostly for agricultural purposes during the majority of their occupation87 – had a more difficult time imposing influence upon remote communities in the inland deserts and did not display the overwhelming bureaucratic knowledge at which Japan succeeded so impressively.53 In addition, as stated earlier, France had less of an incentive to access remote desert regions of Algeria than Japan had, since Korea served as a strategic link between Japan and the territory of Manchuria further inland.

![Map of Algeria and Korea](image1.png)


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Simply viewing maps of railways built in the two colonies emphasizes this contrast, with Korea’s Japanese railways thoroughly traversing the entire peninsula to maintain control, while Algeria’s were limited to coastal centers of population and industry. This problem of penetration meant that whatever development did occur did so in concentrated areas near the coasts and the Capitol of Algiers. This would not seem like too large a problem or too distinct a difference between the cases of eventual South Korean and Algerian development. Though it is easy to see how the neglect of Algeria’s interior in contrast with Japan’s deep access to Korea would impact things like the integration of the populace into the industrial project or, as we will cover briefly in the next section, the education of the Algerian people.

3.3: The Role of Education

As Merrouche notes, less colonial penetration resulted in undereducation outside metropolitan centers with large French populations. This only compounded upon the fact that Algerians were already underprioritized by the colonial education system. In Korea, by contrast, education was seen as playing a crucial role in indoctrinating support for Japanese culture and the Japanese colonial effort. Essentially, the education system was meant to prioritize the molding of Koreans into skilled workers and uncritical Japanese subjects, especially starting in the 1930’s.54

We can see the difference this made in the fact that both France and the United States sent over technical educators to Algeria and South Korea respectively as part of their foreign aid strategies, but South Korea was able to outpace the need for such dependent assistance much more quickly.80 Steinburg recognizes in his analysis that South Korea had a “higher educational standard” upon independence than most other post-colonial states,3 with the ability to access and monitor the colonized population aiding the enforcement of educational policy. The ideology of
Pan-Asianism also lead to a greater emphasis on the moral and political good of education in the Korean colony.
4. Conclusions

This study has been recognizably constrained by its limited comparative scope, by its qualitative methodological approach, and by the difficulty of compiling data for these many prongs of analysis. For instance, this study did not have analytical space to fully examine the importance of a consistent third-party world power in the United States. Still, it has hopefully succeeded at illustrating a place in which overlap between fields might merit closer inspection.

Whereas most studies focus on either the repercussions of colonialism in development or the role of foreign aid, this study has aimed to connect the two: viewing aid’s success as contingent upon the developmental strategies and penetration of historical colonial regimes and showing how the endogenous attitudes towards and contexts surrounding colonization create structures independent of the exogenous cultural or political landscapes of the colonized nation. France saw Algeria as an opportunity to relocate excess population and increase agricultural output. Japan, under France’s initial tutelage, colonized Korea as part of a large-scale project aimed at catching up to western super-powers, but would eventually modify its priorities there to accommodate total war.

The miraculous development of Korea from one of the world’s most notable aid receivers to a donating member of the OECD is as singular as the country’s post-colonial positioning. We can see that aid works best when applied to a state with developmental priorities, high levels of education, and an understanding of how to run industry and trade. This is a combination found extremely rarely, even among former colonies such as Algeria, which occupied similar stature within another empire. The rarity of finding a state poised to become a “model user of foreign aid” perhaps suggests that more study into the potential reconfiguration of foreign aid policy would be fruitful.
What this paper hopes to have put forward is a narrative which links the colonial modernity of development to the way in which countries appropriate foreign aid, either successfully or not. In the cases of South Korea and Algeria, Japan’s Pan-Asianist approach led to the greater development of Korean manufacturing and industry, which could be appropriated by the postcolonial government for development funded by foreign aid. This contrasts sharply with the exclusionary and geographically isolated development of Algeria, aimed at exploiting natural resources and engendering dependence. Finally, we briefly touched on how the geography and linked demography of each colony played a role in development and workforce capacities.

As a final note, it is important to acknowledge that similar studies have often been accused of apologism for Japanese imperial history and policies, or else used that way by elements of the Japanese right wing. As this accusation grows more and more common, it should be clear that this is not the aim of research into Korean development that does not explicitly support such an ideology. Both Japan and France were brutal empires conducting themselves as they saw fit to advance their own interests. Whatever benefits may have been gained from one policy or another are coincidental to the abused of the imperial era.