2020

Democracy Promotion in U.S. Counterinsurgency: Tracing Post-War Security Sector Reconstruction in El Salvador and Iraq

Emma Redington Lawry
Bowdoin College

Democracy Promotion in U.S. Counterinsurgency:

Tracing Post-War Security Sector Reconstruction in El Salvador and Iraq

An Honors Paper for the Department of Government and Legal Studies

By Emma Redington Lawry

Bowdoin College, 2020

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

I owe a heartfelt thank you to several individuals for their help in bringing this project to life. First and foremost, I want to thank Professor Barbara Elias for advising me throughout this process, for continuously challenging me to broaden my scope, and for the innumerable hours she spent on my behalf. Her International Security class inspired me to pursue this study, and her guidance has completely transformed the way I think about war and American foreign policy. I would not have completed this project without her patience, insightful suggestions, and continuous support, all of which made the countless revisions and late nights of writing extremely worthwhile.

In addition to my advisor, I would also like to express my gratitude for the other members of my committee, Professors Allen Springer and Ericka Albaugh, for their thoughtful comments, engagement, and genuine interest in my success. I am so appreciative of the additional work they took on to help me strengthen my arguments and findings.

My thanks also go to all faculty of the Department of Government and Legal Studies and the Department of Hispanic Studies, for constantly challenging and supporting me throughout my four years.

Lastly, I owe a huge thank you to my family and friends, for making my time at Bowdoin possible, for being my biggest fans, and for four years of unwavering support. I am immensely grateful for their encouragement throughout this process. I owe a special thank you to my parents, who have taught me to take advantage of every opportunity and learning experience that comes my way.

Chapter I: Introduction

"The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. We will end a brutal regime...coalition forces will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security...we will help you build a peaceful and representative government...and Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent and sovereign nation..."

- Address given by United States President George W. Bush to Freedom TV on April 10, 2003

On January 30th, 2005, Iraq held its first multi-party election since 1954, just four years before King Faisal II was executed in the military coup that spurred Saddam Hussein's rise to absolutist power. The pre-election coordination effort was profound: the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) administered and monitored the elections in order to provide "a fair and transparent process;"[1] the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and a coalition of NGOs advised the IECI and provided additional technical support; the Iraqi National Guard and a group of Iraqi military forces received supplementary security assistance from twenty-nine nations; and finally, the United States, Japan, and the European Union contributed more than $100 million combined to logistically support the implementation and organization of the January 30th electoral processes.[2]

Despite the "insurgents' threats to 'wash the streets with blood," over eight million Iraqis turned out to vote across nearly 6,000 voting centers in Iraq's first democratic elections.[3] Roughly 19,000 candidates representing over 250 political entities vied for seats within the National Assembly, the provincial councils, and the Kurdistan National Assembly.[4] Scores of

---

[1] "Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005." *U.S. Department of State Archives*, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/41206.htm.
[2] "Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005." *U.S. Department of State Archives*, Bureau of Public Affairs.
[3] Anderson, Liam, and Gareth Stansfield. "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model." *Publius*, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4624718., p. 359
[4] "Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005." *U.S. Department of State Archives*, Bureau of Public Affairs.

Iraqi citizens were photographed proudly holding up indelibly purpled fingers, symbolic of uncompromising voter participation despite the ubiquitous threat of violence. Among other leaders around the world, President George W. Bush championed the success of the elections. In a speech delivered the same day, he declared:

> "The Iraqi people themselves made this election a resounding success. Brave patriots stepped forth as candidates. Many citizens volunteered as poll-workers. More than 100,000 Iraqi security force personnel guarded polling places and conducted operations against terrorist groups...Across Iraq today, men and women have taken rightful control of their country's destiny, and they have chosen a future of freedom and peace."[5]

President Bush's declarations of "freedom and peace" were quickly extinguished by the emergence of a Sunni-dominated insurgency, sectarian violence, and terrorist organizations, all of which rose from the ashes of political turmoil. Although the Bush Administration heralded high voter turn-out and the relative lack of violence as decisive triumphs over the expanding insurgency, it failed to recognize the long-lasting implications of the electoral results themselves. Among other issues, a staggering 90-95% of Sunni Arab voters did not participate in the elections, resulting in the over-representation of groups like the Kurds in the Assembly.[6] Additionally, no seats were reserved for the religious minorities, further exacerbating existing ethnic and religious cleavages present in the country.[7] Finally, in interviews conducted in the wake of the ostensibly successful elections, many Iraqis expressed indignation over the role of the United States; many did "not accept that fundamental choices about the shape of their future political system…[had been] named by a foreign power, particularly one they [regarded] as a harbinger of secular, materialistic values far removed from the Muslim world's."[8] It was from

---

[5] "Transcript of Bush Address on Iraq Election." *CNN*, Cable News Network, 30 Jan. 2005, www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/30/bush.transcript/.
[6] Anderson and Stansfield, "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model," p. 365
[7] O'Sullivan, Meghan, and Razzaq al-Saiedi. "Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications." *Belfer Center Discussion Paper*, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2014, p. 18
[8] Burns, John F. "The Vote, and Democracy Itself, Leave Anxious Iraqis Divided." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/washington/world/the-iraqi-election-the-process-the-vote-and-democracy.html.

these seeds of discontent that the insurgency grew and terrorist organizations pervaded, taking advantage of gaping holes in Iraq's first democratic processes.

The American-led war not only shattered all political and military institutions in Iraq, but also undermined existing bureaucratic mechanisms equipped to provide stability and security for the civilian population. Two primary factors led to the inception of both the insurgency and the Islamic State (ISIS): first, the Bush Administration disbanded Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated army in 2003, which resulted in roughly 230,000 unemployed, military-trained men inclined to oppose the Shi'a majority.[9] Second, with the aid of Bashar al-Assad's anti-American regime in Syria, foreign fighters and extremist groups gained easy access to Iraq, facilitating the flow of weapons and supplies.[10] In 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and was categorized as "a splinter group," bent on the creation of a new caliphate centered in the Middle East.[11] Despite the devastation AQI endured between 2006 and 2010 at the hands of American-sponsored military campaigns, the mushrooming terrorist organization regained footholds by exploiting Iraq's volatile political arena and the departure of American military forces in 2011.

After the invasion and first elections, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki politically reconstructed the Iraqi state along Shi'a-dominated lines, further inflaming sectarian divides and disenfranchising the formerly-powerful Sunni population. He quietly endorsed violent Shia militia groups, effectively alienating moderate Sunnis and facilitating AQI's recruitment operations.[12] By 2006, sectarian violence had reached unprecedented levels, and the

---

[9] Yosufi, Abdul Basir. "The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict." *Connections*, vol. 15, no. 4, 2016. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/26326461, p. 97

[10] Pfiffner, James P. *US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army*, Intelligence and National Security, 25:1, 2010. DOI: 10.1080/02684521003588120, p. 79

[11] Martin, Michaela, and Hussein Solomon. "Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2017, doi:10.1177/2347798916681319., p. 18

[12] Yosufi, "The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict," p. 99

death toll climbed to just under 35,000; terrorist attacks exceeded 5,000 in November alone, and many Sunnis joined AQI, then transforming into the ISIS, and other extremist groups for protection.[13]

By 2010, a new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of ISIS and "started an aggressive campaign in 2010 to recruit former Ba'athists and army officers to revitalize the weakened insurgency," thereby incorporating swaths of trained, embittered men into its front lines.[14] To make matters worse, the United States formally withdrew from Iraq in December of 2011, thus aggravating existing gaps in Iraq's security vacuum and intensifying ISIS's campaign.[15] In June of 2014, ISIS captured international attention when it seized Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, and subsequently forced all "Shi'a-dominated Iraqi forces out, holding the reins of the entire city."[16] On June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi announced the formation of an empire extending from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq, the genesis of what the group hoped would become a global caliphate.[17] At the height of its crusade, the Islamic State controlled roughly 40% of Iraq's territory via a "blitzkrieg campaign" of force, fear tactics, and extremist propaganda.[18]

In March of 2019, Kurdish and Arab forces financially and militarily supported by the United States recaptured the last of ISIS's strongholds.[19] Six months later, al-Baghdadi committed suicide while trapped in a tunnel by U.S. special operations forces. Despite these setbacks, the group remains operational, and, alarmingly resurgent; Russell Travers, director of

---

[13] Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 270
[14] Yosufi, "The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict," p. 97
[15] al-Hamid, Raed. "The American Withdrawal from Iraq: Ways and Means for Remaining Behind," *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 5:2, 230-251, 2012, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.669094, p. 244
[16] Martin and Solomon, "Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding," p. 18
[17] "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State." *Wilson Center*, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.
[18] Coker, Margaret, and Falih Hassan. "ISIS Is Weakened, but Iraq Election Could Unravel Hard-Won Stability." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/middleeast/iraq-election-abadi.html.
[19] "The World Factbook: Iraq." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_iz.html.

the United States National Counterterrorism Center, contends that "over the last year, ISIS carried out a number of centrally coordinated transnational attacks and propaganda campaigns, indicating a degree 'of enhanced connectivity.' Even after Baghdadi's death...the group 'remains robust and—in some areas—is expanding.'"[20] Furthermore, they have continued to capitalize on the security vacuum that still envelopes much of Iraq, enabling them to rebuild and concentrate in small, decentralized cells.

Retrospectively, Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in removing Saddam Hussein from power. However, the repercussions were calamitous and continue to incapacitate bureaucratic, economic and political stability today. As demonstrated by the wars in countries like Iraq and Vietnam, American foreign policy pertaining to post-counterinsurgency democracy promotion and nation-building has largely failed, yielding protracted national security threats and compromising the safety of civilians around the world. However, one U.S. counterinsurgency mission in the 1980s and 1990s has been championed as a resounding success; politicians around the world laud the efficacy of El Salvador's post-war rebuilding process, which incorporated former insurgents into the political arena, reconstructed the military and police forces, and brought human rights issues to the forefront of national reforms. These measures, along with other historical and cultural factors that facilitated stability, helped to ensure that El Salvador never regressed into total war.

Why did the El Salvador case and the Iraq case culminate in radically different outcomes? More broadly, why has the United States faced increased difficulty in translating political objectives via military means into stability and success, and why did Iraq in particular regress into near anarchy despite the introduction of democratic processes? Interestingly, the

[20]Almohammad, Asaad. "New Caliph, Same Old Problems." *Foreign Affairs*, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 3 Jan. 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2020-01-01/new-caliph-same-old-problems.

destabilizing effects of democratization have long been documented in political science and conflict with American foreign policy.

Research Question

In U.S. counterinsurgency missions, what are the effects of democratic elections and electoral processes on security in the *post bellum*, or post-war era? Under what conditions do we see heightened security? How can we reconcile the disparities between U.S. policy assumptions regarding democracy promotion and social scientific findings about democratization, stability and violence? In particular, how does the best case scenario of El Salvador compare with the worst case scenario of Iraq, and why were the outcomes of these conflicts so drastically different?

Structure of Thesis

In order to answer these questions, I will first compare U.S. foreign policy with literature exploring the correlation between democratization and violence. I will then dive deeper into the nature of insurgencies and Just War Theory in order to provide additional context surrounding the significance of security in the post-war era. Lastly, I will discuss my analytical methodology, case studies, and next steps.

The second chapter will provide a brief history of the Salvadoran Civil War, the post-war rebuilding era, elections, and the state of security. I will then draw conclusions based off of my findings relevant to the competing theories explained above and offer my own analysis of security studies. The third chapter will provide a brief history of the Iraq War, the attempted post-war rebuilding era, elections, and state of security. I will then draw conclusions based off of my findings, trace the state of security over time, and draw relevant conclusions. The final

chapter will draw conclusions from my deep-dive analysis of each case and will culminate in my approach to rectifying the tensions between U.S. policy and political theory.

U.S. Foreign Policy: Championing Democracy Promotion

The democratic peace theory, or "the idea that democratic or liberal states never or very rarely go to war with each other," can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's *A Project of Perpetual Peace,* published in 1795.[21] Throughout the 21st century in particular, certain facets of the democratic peace theory have informed U.S. foreign policy, as policymakers credit democracy promotion with long-term stability and peace. Liberal theorists suggest that the absence of "war between democracies is attributable to their domestic institutional arrangements," highlighting voter participation and accountability as a key deterrent in political decision-making when it comes to waging war.[22] Normative theorists contend that democracies, which share ideals and values regarding war, typically reconcile differences and disputes via non-violent means.[23] As Jack Levy indicated, the notion of democratic peace is "the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations."[24] As an extension of the democratic peace theory, democracy promotion has served as a core axiom of U.S. foreign policy since the end of WWII.

On January 18, 1918, in an address to a joint session of Congress, President Woodrow Wilson proposed his acclaimed "Fourteen Points," a compilation of recommendations aimed at preventing an iteration of World War I. His underlying message touted democracy promotion and the spread of political freedom as the basis for all peace. Years later, American policy-makers continue to defend Wilson's lofty vision:

---

[21] Gat, Azar. "The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity." *World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40060125., p. 73

[22] Elman, Colin. "Introduction: History, Theory, and the Democratic Peace." *The International History Review*, vol. 23, no. 4, 2001. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40108832., p. 760

[23] Russett, Bruce, et al. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton University Press, 1993. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rqf6., p. 38-40

[24] Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p. 88

> "Wilson's words have echoed through the years, and have been often repeated or restated by American presidents. This has particularly been the case in times of crisis: after World War I, Wilson called for democracy in Europe; after World War II we called for democracy in Japan and Germany; during the Cold War we called for democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; today, we call for democracy in the Middle East."[25]

Following World War II, democracy promotion rose even higher on foreign policy agendas. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) referenced "democratic participation" and "effective institutions of democratic governance" among the central tenets of U.S. foreign policy.[26] Since the 1960s, American politicians have asserted that democratic efforts "are essential to global development and U.S. security because stable democracies tend to have better economic growth and stronger protection of human rights,"[27] an idea that has fueled the allocation of more than $2 billion annually over the past decade from foreign assistance funds toward democracy promotion activities, all managed by American political institutions.[28]

The 1970s brought the establishment of a multitude of institutions pertaining to democracy and human rights promotion. In part bolstered by the Cold War, Congress amended the FAA in 1975 to "restrict aid to the governments of countries that engaged in a consistent pattern of 'gross violations' of human rights, as detailed in the legislation, and creating the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at State in 1976."[29] Democratization has been increasingly pivotal in U.S. foreign policy agendas and national security strategy since its founding, and especially since 1945.

---

[25] "Aid and Democracy Promotion in American Foreign Policy." *Wilson Center*, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/aid-and-democracy-promotion-american-foreign-policy.
[26] United States, Congress, "Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002." *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002*, I-A and I-B, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2003, p. 23
[27] United States, Congress, Lawson, Marian Leonardo, and Susan B. Epstein. "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance." *Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Congressional Research Service, 4 Jan. 2019. https://crsreports.congress.gov/R44858, p. 1
[28] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 1
[29] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 4

The following overview will provide a brief summary of the ways in which democracy promotion permeated foreign policy from Carter to Bush. The Carter administration propounded democracy promotion rooted in human rights campaigns; the Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations intensified the democracy promotion agenda via containment policies, particularly as the U.S. became threatened by communist regimes; and finally, the second Bush administration redirected democracy promotion as a preemptive national security strategy to prevent the recurrence of events like 9/11.

The Carter Administration: Human Rights and Democracy Promotion

Overtly cognizant of the immense failures of the Vietnam War, the Carter administration emphasized democracy promotion as part of its larger human rights campaign, seeking "reform within existing regimes, not the overthrow of totalitarians."[30] Carter attempted to reform what many perceived as an American imperialist agenda, or a "'policy by manipulation' rather than internationalism grounded in respect for personal liberties."[31] Subsequently, President Carter sought to "transcend the quasi-imperialistic hubris of the moralistic foreign policy that had ensnared the United States into the Vietnam War" by announcing his commitment to upholding man's "most basic right," which was to "be free of arbitrary violence, whether that violence come from governments, from terrorists, from criminals, or from self-appointed messiahs operating under the cover of politics or religion.[32]

In doing so, Carter encountered issues of "uneven leverage, perceptions of national security interest, and specialized bureaucratic focus militated against consistency."[33] Many criticized the his administration for "definitional ambiguities, always tending to expose tensions

[30] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 4
[31] Bouchet, Nicolas, et al. *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*. Routledge, 2013., p. 123
[32] Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, p. 121
[33] Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, p. 128

between rights, interests, and the principle of state sovereignty."[34] Despite these setbacks, the Carter administration has left behind a legacy of institutionalized human rights practices hinged upon democratic freedoms and values.[35]

The Reagan Administration: Anti-Communist Democracy Promotion

In a shift in policy, the Reagan Administration distanced democracy promotion from Carter's human rights campaign, instead reorienting it as a crucial building block within his broader anti-Communist scheme.[36] Reagan operated under a structural lens of democracy, emphasizing "free and fair elections" as touchstones in the process of democratization; to this point, many assert that Reagan "solidified a bipartisan consensus within Congress and the American public that the United States had a strategic interest in promoting a transition to electoral democracy among its autocratic allies."[37] Accordingly, Reagan sought to propel forward "The Third Wave" of democracy through the establishment of institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its affiliated branches, which include the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for National Affairs, and the Free Trade Union Institute. Above all, he is largely credited with diminishing the power of the Soviet Union and championing the idea of American exceptionalism:

> "I've always believed that individuals should take priority over the state. History has taught me that that is what sets American apart—not to remake the world in our own image, but to inspire people wherever with a sense of their boundless possibilities."[38]

In order to "inspire people" and create favorable conditions for democratization, Reagan lobbied for the enlargement of international alliances and global partnerships, particularly

---

[34] Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, p. 124
[35] Rosati, Jerel A. "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy over the Carter Administration." *Political Psychology*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1988, *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3791726., p. 483
[36] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 5
[37] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 5
[38] Nau, Henry R. *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan*. Princeton University Press, 2015., p. 175

through the revitalization of NATO and the IMF. Furthermore, he actively applied government-to-government policies foundationally intent on applying "persistent diplomatic pressure to support domestic dissidents and economic sanctions to weaken non-democratic governments."[39] Lastly, Reagan supported military interventions to "subvert non-democratic governments, particularly by covert actions."[40] However, in comparison to George H.W. Bush, who led the first Gulf War, and his son, George W. Bush, who launched invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, many depict Reagan as "a dove."[41]

The George H.W. Bush Administration: Anti-Communist Democracy Promotion

President George H.W. Bush intentionally maintained the democratic rhetoric and promotion policies of his predecessors, representative of the continuation of a long-term strategy meant to impair the spread of communism abroad.[42] He is credited with supporting "successful transitions to democratic governance and free markets...and an end to communist expansion" during his term in office, often employing military and interventionist means to do so.[43] In his 1989 inaugural address, Bush promoted democracy and the exportation of democratic principles abroad: "Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth: through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state."[44]

The end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw immense changes to the communist coalition in Europe, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the slow but steady disintegration of the

[39] Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan*, p. 151
[40] Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan*, p. 151
[41] Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan*, p. 151
[42] Engel, Jeffrey A. "A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On." *Diplomatic History*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 25–46. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/24916032., p. 29
[43] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 5
[44] Engel, "A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," p. 30

Soviet Bloc by means of peaceful revolutions. While Bush wholly supported these changes, his policy favored stability over immediate transformation:

> "Because he longed to extend the sphere of American-led democracy, bringing new areas under the American orbit of stability, Bush feared volatility most of all...For example, he argued in May of 1989 for peaceful East-West negotiations capable of producing a slow but steady strategic transformation and integration of the Soviet Bloc into the global system, rather than outright Communist collapse, hoping to 'dramatically increase stability on the continent' so as to 'set out a new vision Europe...'"[45]

Despite his prudence, "the end of the Cold War seemed for Bush and for those around him validation of American values and policies. American leaders believed democracy had won, actively vanquishing their long-term adversary. They had not merely survived and transcended communism. They had defeated it."[46]

The Bush Administration prevailed a second time during the First Gulf War following Iraq's unprecedented invasion of Kuwait; Operation Desert Storm, Bush's military mission, began in January of 1991 when U.S.-led coalition forces initiated an air strike campaign against Iraq. Roughly one month later, the coalition commenced the ground war and swiftly overwhelmed Iraqi forces, proclaiming victory on February 28th. On March 6th, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and declared, "tonight Kuwait is free," just two months after the war began.[47]

The First Gulf War had morale-boosting effects on policy-makers and the U.S. military; it demonstrated the viable feasibility of what Bush referred to as the "'New World Order,' breaking down Cold War alliances and using peaceful nations to stand united against rogue states."[48] Many realists argued that it would be difficult to justify American intervention in states

---

[45] Engel, "A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," p. 32
[46] Engel, "A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," p. 30
[47] "Transcript of President Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 1991, www.nytimes.com/1991/03/07/us/after-war-president-transcript-president-bush-s-address-end-gulf-war.html.
[48] Knott, Stephen. "George H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs." *Miller Center*, 1 Aug. 2017, millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs.

without a "clear national interest."[49] Bush, pushing back on this conviction, asserted that since the ending of the Cold War, the United States possessed a duty as the undisputed world leader to "guard against human rights abuses, defend democratic regimes, and lead humanitarian efforts."[50] Subsequently, the Bush Administration introduced the Freedom Support Act in 1992, which was "intended to help the people and governments of these newly independent states navigate the difficult transition from communism to democracy and market-based economies."[51] Bush's vision of a New World Order transcended his term and influenced the Clinton Administration deeply, emblematic of the unequivocal continuation of democracy promotion across generations and presidential terms.

The Clinton Administration: Democratic Enlargement

Like the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration designated democracy promotion as one of the foremost pillars of its' foreign policy. In his 1994 State of the Union Address, Clinton asserted that "ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other; they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy."[52] Generally, the 1990s saw "tremendous growth in democracy promotion activities, which experts have attributed to a low threat perception, a global wave of democratic transitions that provided many windows of opportunity, and no strong ideological rival to Western liberal democracy."[53] His policy became known as "democratic enlargement," the successor of containment and a scheme that arose from the post-Cold War world:

---

[49] Knott, "George H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs." *Miller Center*.
[50] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 5
[51] Gordon, Philip H., and Daniel Rosenblum. "The FREEDOM Support Act: 20th Anniversary." *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State, 21 Sept. 2012, 2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/198152.htm.
[52] "Excerpts From President Clinton's Message on the State of the Union." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 26 Jan. 1994, www.nytimes.com/1994/01/26/us/state-union-excerpts-president-clinton-s-message-state-union.html.
[53] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 6

> "Our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions."[54]

Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS) pronounced that "all of America's strategic interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations."[55] "Serving the community" meant siphoning billions of dollars into market reforms, the establishment of new institutions like the Agency for International Development (AID), and putting pressure on multilateral, international organizations to adopt democratic standards.[56] Liberal internationalists prevailed throughout Clinton's second term, championing the capabilities of transnational organizations; for example, "they praised the multilateral strength of military organizations such as NATO, which came to represent the iron fist of protection for more pacific transnational projects such as improved human rights, enhanced global trade, or a United Nations finally free to fulfill its global mandate absent its Cold War restraints."[57] The Clinton administration's foreign policy legacy is largely positive; increased democratic rhetoric and the sustained institutionalization of free market capitalism and human rights engrained democracy promotion into peace-time foreign policy.

The George W. Bush Administration: The Freedom Agenda

President George W. Bush's democracy promotion agenda intensified sharply, particularly during the aftermath of the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in 2001: "In post-Cold War America, the foreign policy establishment had been adrift, with no obvious overriding threat akin

---

[54] MacKinnon, Michael G. *The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fair Weather Friend?* F. Cass, 2000., p. 171
[55] Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, p. 164
[56] Kubbig, Bernd W., et al. "The Primacy of Unilateralism: The American Superpower and the International Organizations in the Clinton Era." *Amerikastudien / American Studies*, vol. 46, no. 4, 2001. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41157686., p. 636
[57] Engel, "A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," p. 31

to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The September 11 attacks filled that void. The Bush administration's response became the dominant issue in U.S. foreign policy, overshadowing all other international issues."[58] Furthermore, the Bush administration asserted that "a lack of democracy in the Arab world created a breeding ground for terrorism, and that democracy promotion could help contain Islamist extremism as it once had sought to contain Marxist rebels."[59] In cases of democratizing nations, the Bush administration provided aid and funding, and in cases of autocratic nations, President Bush considered democracy promotion to be essential in preventing the recurrence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

As seen in the cases of former administrations, Bush's "freedom agenda" was rooted in the democratic peace theory, a policy that Bush applied through military intervention and counter-terrorism missions. The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent installation of a pro-American president were thought to contribute to a democratic "domino-effect" in which other countries would democratize as well in what Bush perceived to be an "incubator of extremism."[60] In a speech given on September 12th, 2002 at the United Nations, Bush stated: "The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world."[61]

In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched a comprehensive vision of transformational diplomacy designed to elevate democracy-promotion activities and "to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the

---

[58] Pressman, Jeremy. "Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East." *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 4, 2009. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40207155., p. 155
[59] Lawson and Epstein, "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance," p. 5
[60] Leeson, Peter T., and Andrea M. Dean. "The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 53, no. 3, 2009. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25548136., p. 544
[61] George W. Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 12, 2002, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: George W. Bush*, Vol. 2, p. 1576

international system."[62] This transformational diplomacy diverged from anteceding policies in that it no longer "claimed to view foreign policy...as managing relations between states, but as helping to bring about changes within states through promoting democracy, with the goal of a 'balance of power that favors freedom.'"[63] More specifically, the 2002 National Security Strategy redefined the balance of power as one that would prioritize "human freedom," meaning individual liberties that transcend the authority of the domestic political system.[64] Accordingly, the Bush administration (1) increased spending exponentially; (2) created new bureaucratic institutions designed to oversee security and promote democracy, including the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the office of the Director of National Intelligence; and (3) deployed military forces in nations around the world, focusing primarily on accumulating U.S. military presence in the Middle East and North Africa.[65]

Since the end of President Bush's term in office, many have argued that his "freedom agenda" was undermined "…by the association of democracy promotion with military intervention, the use of counterterrorism measures that 'undercut the symbolism of freedom,' and free elections in the Middle East in which Islamist parties made gains, in conflict with U.S. interests.'"[66] As exemplified in the first few pages of this chapter, many of Bush's foreign policies failed significantly, the direct cost being threats to national and domestic security. While many blame the failures of recent American counterinsurgency efforts on the factors listed above, proponents of the violence and democratization theory offer supplementary evidence to

---

[62] Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 14, 2006.
[63] Spanger, Hans-Joachim. *Transformational Diplomacy: Democracy Promotion in Practice*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, in *Between Ground Zero and Square One: How George W. Bush Failed on Russia*, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14489.6., p. 17
[64] Pressman, "Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," p. 154
[65] Pressman, "Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," p. 155
[66] Lagon, Mark. "Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community." *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 2011.

exhibit the often adverse effects of democratization on security, stability and peace in transitioning states.

Literature Review: Political Science on Democratization and Violence

As illustrated above, the majority of American presidents and their administrations throughout the past half-century have touted the validity of democracy promotion in peace-building endeavors: "Since the time of Woodrow Wilson, idealists in the United States have envisioned a global transformation in which peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing."[67] Politicians have frequently cited the fact that "no mature democracies have ever fought a war against each other. Consequently, conventional wisdom holds that promoting the spread of democracy will promote world peace and security."[68]

Contrary to these beliefs, many political scientists have argued that instead of bringing peace and security, the process of democratization actually increases the probability of violence, particularly in states lacking a history of democratic practices and those with pre-existing ethnic, religious, and sectarian cleavages. While they acknowledge that "...over the long run, it is probably true that the further spread of democracy will promote global peace and stability...the beginning stages of transitions to democracy often give rise to war rather than peace...in the short run."[69] It is important to note that most U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion missions throughout the past half-century have involved underdeveloped nations lacking any history of democratic norms and institutions, such as El Salvador and Iraq. It appears that when it comes to immature democracies, policy-makers have assumed the efficacy of Euro-centric state-building frameworks and procedures only applicable to mature democracies.

---

[67] Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, August 2005. p. 1
[68] Mansfield and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 1
[69] Mansfield and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 2

In *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder underscore the ever-growing chasm between the behaviors of stable, established democracies and immature, incomplete democracies and the ways in which the latter have become increasingly prone to violence. In reconciling notions of the democratic peace theory with the disquieting instability of democratizing states, they clarify: "War has never happened between mature democracies, yet countries undertaking a transition toward democracy are quite war-prone towards regimes of all types."[70] In examining the transition from autocracy to democracy, Mansfield and Snyder emphasize the particularly volatile nature of mixed states: "Often, the demise of autocracy precipitates an incomplete democratic transition to a mixed regime that combines some features of autocracy and some of democracy in a distinctly explosive political cocktail."[71] Both theorists propose that the driving factor behind this susceptibility to violence is the existence of weak, vulnerable institutions, and a supporting (although not causal) factor is a lack of internalized liberal norms.

First and foremost, *Electing to Fight* argues that vulnerable, transitioning democracies possess "serious institutional deficits" which undermine the legitimacy and stability of the state, empower power-hungry elites, intensify domestic political competition and produce easily-exploitable security voids.[72] In contrast, effective and developed institutions "make the government accountable, through regular elections, to the average voter who bears the costs of risks of war."[73] In order to avoid an outbreak of violence, Mansfield and Snyder's "most general rule is to start the process by building the institutions that democracy requires, and then encouraging mass political participation and unfettered electoral competition only after these

[70] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 24
[71] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 53
[72] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 9
[73] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 23

institutions have begun to take root."[74] Consequently, Snyder and Mansfield refer to the "poorly defined sense of 'the nation,'" created by the absence of strong state institutions that typically "knit together the nation," as one of the most detrimental side effects of state weakness, as it exacerbates the security vacuum and encourages civilians to create their own definitions, often rooted in violence and division.[75]

Secondly, Mansfield and Snyder shed light on the importance of internalized liberal norms in democratizing states; they reference another scholar, Fareed Zakaria, who states that "'illiberal democracies' hold elections of dubious fairness, lack a strong commitment to liberal civic norms, and tend to become embroiled in military conflicts."[76] The lack of democratic accountability present enhances the capacity for corruption and misconduct in elections and democratic practices, each of which triggers destabilizing reverberations and the creation of opposition groups empowered to utilize violence.

In "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All—Post War Violence in Central America," Sabine Kurtenbach echoes many of Mansfield and Snyder's arguments, although she supplements their claims with a more nuanced argument: generally, she acknowledges that lower levels of violence impact state security just as much as war. According to Kurtenbach:

> "The non-recurrence of war is mostly considered as the main indicator for successful peace processes. Nevertheless, even in these post-war contexts, other forms of violence—i.e. state repression or homicide—have the potential to endanger the larger process of peace-building. Hence, the analysis of variations in post-war violence is important for the broader peace processes."[77]

---

[74] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 23
[75] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 10
[76] Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, November/December 1997, p. 22-43
[77] Kurtenbach, Sabine. "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All – Post War Violence in Central America." *Civil Wars*, vol. 15, no. 1, Apr. 2013, doi:10.1080/13698249.2013.850884., p. 105

Lesser forms of violence are largely ignored when examining the post-war state of security: "There is a general tendency to treat war and other forms of violence, e.g., repression or crime, as mutually independent. While the debate on 'new wars'...acknowledges the blurred line between political and criminal manifestations of violence, the debate on post-war violence is still dominated by this rather dichotomous distinction."[78] In her paper titled "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America," Kurtenbach goes further to assert that state-building can be influenced by broader elements as well: "State-building is a long and complex process influenced by historical developments and shaped by other factors related to violence, too: for example, the intensity of destruction or the legitimization of the use of force."[79] She references Charles Tilly, who argues that state agents execute four primary activities: (1) war-making, or eliminating rivals outside state borders; (2) state-making, or neutralizing rivals inside state borders; (3) protection, or eliminating enemies that threaten civilians; and (4) extraction, or acquiring the means to execute the first three activities.[80] While Kurtenbach observes the entrenchment of these activities in European cases, she also argues that the "replication of these processes in the developing countries of the second half of the twentieth century is difficult and unlikely...most developing countries 'lack comparable forms of social cohesion at the national level,'" often leading to revitalized forms of violence.[81]

Further, Kurtenbach asserts that other "risk factors" of violence materialize in susceptible, vulnerable transitional settings, many of which don't lead to full war but encourage spikes of unrest, crime, and insurgent activity. As demonstrated by the enduring doctrine of democracy promotion in the foreign policies of U.S. presidents, "the end of war is mostly

---

[78] Kurtenbach, "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All – Post War Violence in Central America," p. 105
[79] Kurtenbach, Sabine. "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America." *German Institute of Global and Area Studies*, vol. 181, Nov. 2011., p. 6
[80] Kurtenbach, "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America," p. 10
[81] Kurtenbach, "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America," p. 10

perceived as a window of opportunity for the pursuit of violence control and the reduction of insecurity."[82] However, Kurtenbach understands that the "transition out of war produces insecurity in the first place," thereby jeopardizing the stability of emergent democracies in interim stages.[83] Overall, Kurtenbach propounds the idea that "the patterns of war and violence termination are decisive for state-building across different forms of violence. The outcome can be conceptualized as a critical juncture as it shapes specific power relations, policy options, and time horizons for state-building."[84]

In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building*, Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk contend that successful transitions to democracy require "a minimum level of security and consensus on which territory and people constitutes the state."[85] In correspondence with arguments made above, Jarstad and Sisk assert that, despite the ostensible finality and legitimacy of peace negotiations and deals, "the legacies of war tend to linger. Insecurity and unsolved grievances mean that political elites, as well as civil society, remain polarized and that the basis for inclusive ideologies is weak."[86] The decimation of both the economy and invaluable infrastructure during the war further aggravates these legacies, leading to general societal degeneration and again, a lack of security.[87]

Many scholars concur with the arguments made above. In *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Michael Mann argues that "regimes newly embarked upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than are stable authoritarian regimes," further illuminating deficiencies in the security sector and judicial branch

---

[82] Kurtenbach, "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All – Post War Violence in Central America," p. 105
[83] Kurtenbach, "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All – Post War Violence in Central America," p. 105
[84] Kurtenbach, "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America," p. 6
[85] Jarstad, Anna, and Timothy D. Sisk. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building*. Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 28
[86] Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building*, p. 19
[87] Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building*, p. 19

in the post-war rebuilding era.[88] Similarly, Geoffrey Pridham affirms that "the weakening of state authority, combined with uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity that comes with democratization. This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, weak state authority, and rising nationalism."[89]

Other scholars have shed light on the fact that "The Fourth Wave" of democratization has encompassed "...more challenging cases: countries that are poorer, more ethnically divided, ideologically more resistant to democracy, with more entrenched authoritarian elites, and which a much frailer base of governmental institutions and citizen-skills."[90] Mousseau's article, titled "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" succinctly captures the highly representative inverted U-shape impact of democracy, which underscores the conditions under which political violence manifests:



Figure 1: The correlation between levels of violence and type of government, conceptually created from the U-Shaped scale referenced in Mousseau's "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?"[91]

---

[88] Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnical Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005., p. 4
[89] Pridham, Geoffrey. *The Dynamics of Democratization: a Comparative Approach*. Continuum New York, 2000., p. 23
[90] Karatnycky, Adrian, ed., *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001-2002* (New York: Freedom House, 2002), p. 11-15, 20-34
[91] Mousseau, Demet Yalcin. "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 5, 2001. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/424775., p. 550

The evidence outlined above lends credence to the reality that transitional, unstable democracies with weak institutions, existing cleavages, and transient liberal norms are likely to encounter heightened levels of violence, if not a regression into total war. The tension between the findings of political scientists mentioned above and U.S. foreign policy has become progressively more perceptible over the past few decades.

Since Vietnam, the United States has faced increased difficulty in translating political objectives via military means into stability and success. The colossal disparities between the United States' national strategic goals, particularly those pertaining to counterinsurgency missions, and their end results are demonstrative of the necessity to review post-war peace-building procedures. As both American policy-makers and political theorists tout security as a crucial building block in reference to both transitioning domestic states and the national security of the United States, we should continue to examine the ways in which the post-war security increases or decreases, and why.

Jus Post Bellum

In order to understand the significance of security and justice within the context of post-war rebuilding efforts, it is vital to examine the rising importance of Just War Theory, which is defined as a doctrine of military ethics, detailing the conditions under which it is morally acceptable to go to war, conduct war, and restore peace after war.[92] The theory can be divided into three distinct elements: *jus ad bellum*, or the "pre-engagement conduct of states and non-state actors that are considering whether to engage in war and armed conflict...concerned with the justification of and limits to the use of force;"[93] *jus in bello,* or the "body of legal norms

[92] "Just War Theory - International Relations ." Oxford Bibliographies, September 20, 2019.
[93] Allison, Jennifer. "Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello - Program on International Law and Armed Conflict." *Research Guides at Harvard Library*. 9 May 2019. Web. <http://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=310988&p=2079383>.

governing battle and occupation—the 'conduct of individuals and units toward combatants, non-combatants, property, and the environment;"[94] and finally, *jus post bellum,* or "the moral rules that should guide [the ways in which] wars are ended, specifically the political, social, and economic conditions left in the wake of the war."[95]

The origins of *Just War Theory* can be traced back Christian theologian St. Augustine of Hippo, who asserted that "war, though terrible, could be necessary in the face of certain dangers and lawful if conducted properly in the pursuit of peace."[96] Thomas Aquinas, utilizing St. Augustine's framework, later developed the founding conditions under which wars could be regarded as morally "just," many of which have become embedded into modern international law and theory, such as the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions.[97]

Since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, extensive scholarship has been published on the legal and strategic ramifications of adhering to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, the latter of which has become increasingly important in counterinsurgency missions. Both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* possess a broadly accepted set of distinct principles that allow states to uphold each indubitably: "Contemporary rules of armed force do not contain only prohibitions for states and armed forces; they channel armed violence and regulate the relations between different actors (military forces, civilians, ousted government) in situations of armed conflict. However, the classical concepts of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* contain gaps with respect to the management of post-conflict relations."[98]

---

[94] Allison, "Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello - Program on International Law and Armed Conflict."
[95] "Just War Theory - International Relations ." Oxford Bibliographies, September 20, 2019.
[96] Emba, Christine. "Just War Theory: A Primer." The Washington Post. WP Company LLC, November 30, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/11/30/just-war-theory-a-primer/.
[97] Davenport, John J. "Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Need for a Democratic Federation." *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 39, no. 3 (2011): 493-555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23020002., p. 509
[98] Stahn, Carsten. "'Jus Ad Bellum', 'Jus in Bello'...'Jus Post Bellum'? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force." *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 17, no. 5, 2007, doi:10.1093/ejil/chl037., p. 927

In accordance with this statement, I argue that the third and often overlooked component of Just War Theory, *jus post bellum*, is critical to the long term political and military success of the United States in military interventions for three reasons: (1) the battle for the hearts and minds of host nation civilians extends beyond the end of occupation and war; (2) the successful restoration of peace via stabilizing institutions and norms dampens the threat of reinvigorated insurgent forces, limiting insurgent capacity to convalesce; and (3) the successful implementation of *jus post bellum* strengthens integral alliances and American strategic positioning in contentious regions, thereby reinforcing U.S. national security.[99] Subsequently, understanding the strategic importance of *jus post bellum's* role in the tripartite theory through the lens of counterinsurgency missions is crucial to constructing security and therefore maintaining the victories that have been hard fought and won.

Although crucial, *jus post bellum* is a difficult venture for several reasons: first, the task of rebuilding and restoring peace to a nation is not only economically costly, but also produces few tangible benefits. Additionally, the methodology behind restoring justice after war is equivocal and morality is difficult to incentivize: "...most states do not want to take on the...responsibility [of restoring order after war], and when they do take it on, for whatever political reasons, they do not want to submit themselves to a set of moral rules."[100] Given the difficulties surrounding the stabilization of foreign regimes following military intervention, it is vital to examine *jus post bellum* and the ways in which the U.S has attempted to restore justice post-war. As the U.S. has become embroiled in more and more counterinsurgency missions and less and less conventional wars, it is next crucial to understand the nature of these insurgencies.

---

[99] Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, *American Society of Int'l Law*, Vol. 106, Confronting Complexity, 2012, p. 335-339
[100] Walzer, Michael, *The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success). Social Research* 69, no. 4 (2002): 925-44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971584., p. 939

Fourth Generation Warfare: It's Political

Most American counterinsurgency missions have been fought against insurgents employing tactics of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), the premise of which is foundationally constructed upon Mao Tse-Tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*. According to Mao, 4GW "uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for perceived benefit."[101] 4GW is characterized by adaptability and agility as dynamic forces of combat; simple and dependable weaponry designed to impair the enemy; the decentralization of command and control; and lastly, superior intelligence gathering, reliant on a network of military and civilian agents.[102] Many argue that successful execution of waging 4GW depends on winning the hearts and minds of local civilians, while others assert that brute force and coercion are the keys to success in counterinsurgency operations.

For the purposes of this paper, I am assuming that the basic premises of population-centric warfare are correct, as proponents of this model claim that winning the hearts and minds of the local population is crucial to success, particularly because reconstructing legitimacy and maintaining security in the post-war era depends on their support. According to Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, "the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success."[103] However, it is important to acknowledge that not all scholars in counterinsurgency agree on the soundness of population-focused approaches. As an example,

---

[101] Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. Manas Publishing, 2012., p. 2
[102] Vest, Jason. "Fourth-Generation Warfare ." *The Atlantic* . Dec 2001. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/12/fourth-generation-warfare/302368/>.
[103] Caldwell IV, William B., and Leonard, Steven M. "Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change," Military Review, 88 (July/August 2008), p. 6

renowned military historian Gian Gentile claims that population-centric counterinsurgency should be a tactic and not a strategy in and of itself, as it has limited American military mindsets and distracted from targeting the insurgents themselves: "The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan."[104]

The hearts and minds theory delineates the potential strategic importance of adhering to moral and ethical standards in and after conflict in order to win over civilians and gain their support for the counterinsurgent cause. The war in Vietnam is often cited as the most salient example of what can happen if ethical principles are neglected and the civilian population aligns with the insurgency, thus highlighting this necessity and laying the foundation for revamping American political and military posture in counterinsurgency missions going forward

As insurgents typically operate in smaller, decentralized cells and aim to acquire political legitimacy in order to win over the civilian population, establishing security via the coercive apparatus and entrenching norms pertaining to justice *must* take priority in the post-war era. In providing these necessary services via institutions, insurgents lack the political leverage and coercive strength to defeat counterinsurgents. Additionally, providing both security and justice discourages civilians from joining the insurgent cause, thereby delegitimizing it. The backbone of democracy rests on the state's monopoly on the use of force.

Analytical Methodology and Variables

In sum, the discrepancies between American foreign policy and the widely-accepted democratization literature (particularly salient through the lens of post-war counterinsurgency efforts) have produced critical questions regarding the role of electoral processes in post-war

---

[104] Gentile, Gian P. "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army." *Parameters 39*, Autumn 2009., p. 4

reconstruction efforts. To answer them, I will process-trace the post-war state of security as the dependent variable in my two case studies, El Salvador and Iraq, which possessed different electoral processes, varying levels of security, and radically distinct outcomes.[105] The independent variables are post-war democratic electoral processes, which encompasses factors ranging from political party inclusion to third-party monitoring programs.

In the El Salvador chapter, I will provide an overview of the Salvadoran Civil War, American military and political strategy, and the post-war peace process. Next, I will examine the state of security over the course of the post-war period, monitoring for fluctuations and delving into the factors that either increased or decreased security. In the Iraq Chapter, I will provide an overview of the American invasion in 2003, American military and political strategy, and the post-war peace process. Next, I will dive deeper into the elements contributing to the regression of Iraq into a state of anarchy and the sectarian violence that undermined strides made toward democracy. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the elements that have contributed to heightened vs. decreased security, I will be tracing and comparing the fluctuations of security in both cases with each other.

Case Studies: Iraq and El Salvador

In both Iraq and El Salvador, the United States' primary objectives were to promote democracy, extinguish insurgent power, provide support for local allies, and equip host nations with the tools to create stability and peace within each respective regime.[106] In each case, the United States faced a tumultuous political terrain, significant levels of internal turbulence

[105] When discussing the security sector, I will use definitions issued by the Stability Pact for South East Europe: "All those organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. It includes: (a) military and paramilitary forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards, customs services and corrections; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and oversight of the above."
[106] Mahmood, Mona, Maggie O'Kane, Chavala Madlena, Teresa Smith, Ben Ferguson, Patrick Farrelly, Guy Grandjean, Josh Toussaint-Strauss, and Irene Baqué. "From El Salvador to Iraq: Washington's Man behind Brutal Police Squads." The Guardian, March 6, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/06/el-salvador-iraq-police-squads-washington.

relating to ethno-religious and socio-economic cleavages, a plummeting GDP per capita, and a lack of stable bureaucratic institutions.

Neither country possessed a history of democracy or democratic procedures: El Salvador operated under a republican political system controlled by an oligarchical order of the landowning elite and influenced by external actors, which later transformed into a military-led dictatorship in the mid-20th century.[107] Similarly, Iraq's political history includes Britain's mandate, a Sunni-led monarchy, and the Ba'athist dictatorship led by totalitarian leader Saddam Hussein.[108]

Each state also possessed high levels of internal strife: conflict along the many lines of cleavage in Iraqi society has been dominated by rural vs. urban, Sunni vs. Shi'a, and Kurd vs. Arab friction.[109] El Salvador's long-standing elite oligarchical social strata has also played a key role in exacerbating socio-economic and racial conflict. Furthermore, both states experienced levels of terrorism, which played a large role in destabilizing each state's security institutions, delegitimizing emergent governments, and adding another layer to the multi-faceted arena of conflict during the war.

Despite these similarities, politicians around the world have exalted the post-war peace process in El Salvador, broadcasting it as a resounding success. In fact, when the war in Iraq erupted, military personnel and policy-makers proposed exporting the El Salvador case as the model by which to follow in the Middle East.[110] Conversely, the Iraq case is now considered one of the worst foreign policy disasters since the war in Vietnam. Although I will compare each

---

[107] "El Salvador | Freedom House." *Freedom House | Championing Democracy*. 2013. Web. <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/el-salvador>.
[108] Johnson, Constance A. *Iraq: Legal History and Traditions*. Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, 2004., p. 12
[109] Johnson, *Iraq: Legal History and Traditions*., p.. 7
[110] Greene, Samuel R. "Pathological Counterinsurgency: The Failure of Imposing Legitimacy in El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Iraq." Third World Quarterly 38 (3). 2017. p. 563–79.

case to itself in order to examine the changing nature of security over time, I will also attempt to understand why the outcomes of each case differed so drastically in my fourth and final chapter.

Next Steps

The relative success in El Salvador and the failure in Iraq both shed light on the fact that "there can be no development without security, but there can be no security without development either."[111] How, then, can we understand rebuilding security and justice in post-war eras, and how should this reconstruction interact with electoral processes? I contend that providing security for the populace must take precedence, followed by the erection of judicial institutions that enforce rules and hold law-breakers accountable, particularly in counterinsurgency efforts. In the next chapter, I will examine El Salvador's post-war case as I trace the state of security and justice before, during, and after elections.

[111] Jabareen, Yosef. "Conceptualizing 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction' and 'Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction' of Failed States." *Int J Polit Cult Soc* 26**,** 107–125, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-012-9118-3., p. 114

Chapter II: The Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1992)

In this chapter, I analyze the complexities pertaining to security and justice in the post-war rebuilding process, and the ways in which these intricacies changed over time and contributed to the notion of political and military success in the El Salvador case. In answering my research question, democratic elections had largely favorable effects on the state of security, primarily because stipulations in the Peace Accords incorporated former insurgents and combatants into the political process. However, additional factors contributed to increased security in the post-war era, thereby obscuring any causal link between electoral processes and heightened security.

Overall, I argue that the post-war peace process was mostly effective for four primary reasons: (1) the inclusion of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the political arena as a registered political party legitimized, validated and addressed the grievances of the marginalized peasant population; (2) the disarmament and disbandment of insurgent and state military forces and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life aided in maintaining the ceasefire; (3) the induction of civilian leaders into the military and police forces constrained their force-using capabilities; and (4) the involvement of international, third party actors increased the sense of accountability and guaranteed aid in the implementation of the Peace Accords. These successes, coupled with the fact that El Salvador never regressed into total war following the peace process, have been championed by democratic harbingers around the world.

Along with these successes, it is important to acknowledge the shortcomings of post-war reforms, particularly as the broad-based notion of "success" in El Salvador has largely overshadowed more recent setbacks that threaten the security and stability of the country today. Most notably, a rise in organized, unanswered crime and gang violence throughout recent

decades sheds light on a few crucial deficiencies, most of which pertain to gaps in the Peace Accords with regard to judicial reforms. The following sections will delve into the roots of the civil war, cleavages along socio-economic lines, the involvement of the United States and its support of the existing government, and the successes and limits to post-war reforms.

Key Terminology

Democracy Promotion: activities by external actors that seek to support democratization; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rules.

Nation-Building: the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict or war designed to underpin fundamental societal transformation, which includes comprehensive efforts targeted at engineering major social, political, and economic reconstruction.

La Matanza: meaning "the slaughter" in Spanish.

Security Gap: the absence of coercive authority and resources available to provide security, often in post-war or conflict settings.

A Historical Overview: The Roots of the Civil War

The Salvadoran Civil War can be traced back to the Spanish conquest of the 16th century, in which conquistadores implemented a land-division system hierarchically characterized by class and race. Independence changed little in the country; the Spanish transferred power to Salvadorans of European ancestry, while indigenous people and mestizos, who comprised 95 percent of the population, were reduced to "virtual serfdom."[112] Elite landowners in the country, also known as the Fourteen Families, reigned through a series of onerous military dictatorships that favored the wealthy and victimized the peasant population. The civil war in El Salvador, which spanned almost thirteen years from 1979 to 2012, was rooted in racial and socio-economic cleavages that continue to persist today.

[112] Buckman, Robert T. *Latin America 2012*. Stryker Post Publications, 2012., p. 189

Over the course of the 20th century, economic inequality became more perceptible; the top five percent of the population earned almost 40 percent of total income until the late 1970s, and less than two percent owned over 50 percent of the workable farmland.[113] While the upper echelons of El Salvador's socioeconomic strata possessed the majority of the wealth earned from exporting coffee and cotton, rural workers have long suffered greatly:

> "Malnutrition is endemic in El Salvador, and the infant mortality rate is twice that of Cuba, four times that of the United States. Functional illiteracy among the peasants approaches 95 percent. And some 60 percent of El Salvador's population is rural, living in isolated valleys or mountain hamlets.[114]

New York Times writer Raymond Bonner noted that poverty levels in El Salvador were comparable to those in Mexico and India, although the latter two nations possessed significantly lower levels of class strife. He asks, "Why in El Salvador?" According to his findings, "part of the answer can be found in the nation's failure to evolve even a flawed democratic process. That path to change has always been blocked - by the army."[115]

The Rise of Rural Insurgents

In 1932, labor leader Agustin Farabundo Martí spearheaded a peasant revolt against the ruling dictatorship and the Fourteen Families with the objective of earning minimum wage and employment benefits. The military swiftly extinguished the uprising, killing an estimated 30,000 civilians in what is now remembered as the *la matanza*. Since the uprising, El Salvador has been "the fiefdom of an oligarchy consisting of wealthy landowners and the army, with a military leader in the presidency."[116] Anger and dissatisfaction with the elitist government spurred the

---

[113] Seligson, Mitchell A. "Thirty Years of Transformation in the Agrarian Structure of El Salvador, 1961-1991." *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1995, pp. 43–74. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2503979., p. 46

[114] Bonner, Raymond. "The Agony of El Salvador." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Feb. 1981, www.nytimes.com/1981/02/22/magazine/the-agony-of-el-salvador.html.

[115] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.

[116] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.

rise of a left-wing coalition, an alliance that united farmers, intellectuals, and rural peasants against the right-wing government and aristocracy.

The deep-rooted conflict between the left and the right accelerated following military crackdowns against the peasant population; throughout the 1960s and 1970s, left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary death squads resorted to political violence and indiscriminate killings against each other.[117] In reference to the state of security in post-war counterinsurgency missions, it is important to note that the Salvadoran government possessed near monopoly over the use of force *before* the war began: "The Salvadoran security apparatus prevented the emergence of another massive uprising for several decades by instilling a climate of fear across the country...In the countryside, state terror targeted the 'local grassroots opinion leaders' who mobilized, organized, and provided political education to the majority of the population."[118] The state was able to maintain control over these local grassroots guerrillas until the late 1970's.

In 1977, armed leftist groups merged following an election favoring a moderate coalition which was subsequently blocked by the army, thus resulting in a "campaign of 'destabilization' that included strikes, street protests, and kidnappings."[119] Over the course of the next two years, political violence between the right and left escalated, resulting in an economic crisis and the deaths of thousands of unarmed civilians. In 1979, a coalition of young officers in the El Salvador Army banded together in an unsuccessful effort to persuade right-wing military dictator Carlos Humberto Romero to resign. Inspired by the Sandinista's guerrilla victory in Nicaragua, which engendered waves of social change, these officers successfully organized a coup.[120]

---

[117] Sharpe, Kenneth E., and Martin Diskin. "Facing Facts in El Salvador: Reconciliation or War." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1984. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40208954., p. 527

[118] D'Haeseleer, Brian. *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*. University Press of Kansas, 2017. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zgb398., p. 52

[119] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.

[120] Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict" available at *Global Security*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2 Apr. 1984, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SCO.htm.

Finally, on October 15th, 1979, moderate officers deposed Romero and assembled the Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG). The junta was headed by José Napoleón Duarte, the founder of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the winner of the 1972 presidential election, which was voided by the military. The new faction quickly faced instability and a new wave of violence:

> "The resulting junta, composed of three liberal civilians and two colonels, fell apart less than three months later; the civilians resigned after failing to oust the conservative Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia as Minister of Defense. Three other civilians were named in their stead, but one of them quit 10 weeks later to protest the accelerating political repression."[121]

As the JRG navigated the tumultuous political terrain, the guerrilla movement proliferated significantly: "A Communist leader had resigned from the party to form the Popular Forces of Liberation; the People's Revolutionary Army was attracting disillusioned young Catholics. The roots of the movement were primarily among peasants and workers, with student support."[122] In response to the growing guerrilla presence, right-wing forces began employing a variety of violent tactics, including bombings, kidnappings and murder against the new government.[123] According to reports, the U.S. State Department simultaneously received warnings that the right-wing death squads had formed an alliance with the military against the JRG.[124] On March 24, 1980, a military intelligence officer aligned with the right-wing paramilitary groups shot and killed Archbishop Romero, perhaps the most prominent and outspoken voice against the wave of violence that had engulfed the state.[125] His assassination transformed the intermittent violence

---

[121] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.
[122] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.
[123] Ensalaco, Mark. "Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment." *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1994, pp. 656–675. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/762563., p. 672
[124] "Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.
[125] Gibb, Tom. "The Killing of Archbishop Oscar Romero Was One of the Most Notorious Crimes of the Cold War. Was the CIA to Blame?" *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 23 Mar. 2000, www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2000/mar/23/features11.g21.

between the right- and left-wings into a full-fledged civil war.[126] When reflecting upon the roots of the civil war, Duarte proposed the following:

> "'This is a history of people starving to death, living in misery. For 50 years, the same people had all the power, all the money, all the opportunities. Those who did not have anything tried to take it away from those who had everything. But there were no democratic systems available to them, so they have radicalized themselves, have resorted to violence. And of course this second group, the rich, do not want to give up anything, so they are fighting.'"[127]

The Civil War

In September of 1980, major leftist groups unified in an effort to consolidate power, resulting in the establishment of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its respective guerrilla army. In response to the consolidation of guerrilla power, army and security forces began "surrounding villages and slaughtering any villagers they suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers."[128] In December, four American missionaries were raped and murdered by military and paramilitary forces, prompting President Jimmy Carter to order the temporary severance of military aid and the imposition of economic sanctions against the government.[129] The Carter Administration additionally demanded a restructuring of the government in order to "guarantee enough civilian control of the armed forces to reduce the violence."[130] At this point, "the junta itself declared that these murders were the acts of groups in the security forces that were not under its control. This statement was a clear confession of weakness by the junta. The left realized that neither they, nor the right, nor the armed forces were taking the junta seriously."[131]

---

[126] "Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.
[127] Crandall, Russell. *The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992*. Cambridge University Press, 2016., p. 468
[128] Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict." *Global Security*.
[129] "Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.
[130] Bonner, "The Agony of El Salvador." The New York Times.
[131] Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict." *Global Security*.

The ensuing chaos prompted a reversal in U.S. policy, and the Carter Administration lifted sanctions two weeks later. Carter's policy

> "…attempted a rather delicate balancing act: providing military and security aid and training to a repressive force while improving its professionalization...U.S. strategists had to marginalize the extremist elements responsible for human rights abuses. Washington's policy was predicated on the presumption that generous aid would provide the United States leverage over the Salvadoran military."[132]

Shortly thereafter, the Reagan Administration's induction into the White House represented a stark turning point in U.S. policy and involvement in the civil war: "Asserting a hemispheric-wide national security strategy, the Reagan administration considered the Salvadoran government–its atrocities notwithstanding–a friend in the Cold War."[133] Carter's focus on curbing the capabilities of the Salvadoran military in order to reduce human rights violations was not reciprocated by Reagan; in fact, his administration turned a blind eye to the multitude of atrocities that were committed over the subsequent twelve years. His security strategy was focused primarily on containing communism, and included the establishment of an alliance between the military, members of the PDC, and the United States in order to combat the "deepening insurgent threat."[134] Over the course of the civil war, Reagan siphoned approximately five billion dollars of aid into the hands of the Salvadoran government and security forces.[135]

On January 10th, 1981, the FMLN commenced what was known as "the final offensive" against the existing government, prompting full-fledged American involvement in the conflict. The FMLN's military factions were known as the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL) and the

---

[132] D'Haeseleer, *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*, p. 56
[133] "Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.
[134] Wood, Elisabeth Jean. "Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador." *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, edited by Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 10
[135] Greene, Samuel R. "Pathological Counterinsurgency: How Flawed Thinking about Elections Leads to Counterinsurgency Failure." *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2018, *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/26627196., p. 98

Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), both of which orchestrated the attacks and coordinated long-term guerrilla strategies: "Anti-government violence erupted in the form of occupations of radio stations, bombings of newspapers (La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy), abductions, executions and attacks on military targets."[136] The FMLN also employed economic sabotage as a tactic to undermine the stability of the government.

The Reagan administration organized a campaign of military aid and sent advisors to the government in an effort to keep them afloat. The majority of this aid "went to the formation of the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalions, the same groups identified by the UN Truth Commission as 'the primary agents of war crimes.'"[137] The Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency operations supported by the U.S. utilized indiscriminate violence, death squads, and mass displacement as fear tactics against the civilian population. Several documented massacres against unarmed peasants resulted in charges of atrocious human rights abuses. As a result, state-sanctioned indiscriminate violence "fueled the guerrilla insurgency, whose capacity grew to rival that of the military."[138] After the attempted final offensive collapsed a few months later, "the guerrilla organizations consolidated their forces in the countryside. For the first few years of the war, the FMLN maintained a significant presence in widespread areas and developed a rural intelligence capacity that radically outperformed that of the government."[139] Despite being outnumbered one to four by government and paramilitary forces, the FMLN was able to maintain control over the countryside for the majority of the civil war.[140]

---

[136] "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." United Nations Doc. S/25500, p. 20
[137] United States, Congress, "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." United Nations Doc. S/25500, April 1. 1993
[138] "El Salvador." *Mass Atrocity Endings*, World Peace Association, 7 Aug. 2015, sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/el-salvador/.
[139] Wood, Elisabeth Jean. "Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador." p. 11
[140] Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict." *Global Security*.

Elections held in 1982 resulted in the formation of a constituent assembly, a provisional government and the outline of a new constitution, which was disseminated in 1983.[141] The FMLN pressured peasants into abstaining from voting in the elections, and the general command sent a letter to President Reagan expressing disdain at the soaring level of corruption and repression present in electoral processes:

> "To pretend that the solution to the Salvadoran conflict is the March elections is...outside reality. How can a democratic process be guaranteed in the context of indiscriminate repression? If you can decide the destiny of the United States, it is because you hold your office by virtue of free elections."[142]

Duarte was elected the first civilian president the following March in the country's first democratic election in several decades, which was monitored by third party observers.[143] In the fall of 1984, he met with guerrilla leaders in an effort to negotiate the end of the civil war, which proved unsuccessful.

Despite his best efforts, Duarte faced massive setbacks and challenges during his term in office. He made little headway in his attempts to promote and install social and economic reforms, and seemed unable to curb the flow of indiscriminate violence from government and paramilitary forces. In 1989, Duarte was succeeded by Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) candidate Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, under whom the civil war ultimately concluded as both sides reached a stalemate. The ten years of civil strife wearied both sides, and over time, the government began to realize that "ongoing insurgent political mobilization and the FMLN's military capacity gradually constituted the FMLN leadership as an insurgent counter-elite: the

---

[141] Pastor, Robert. "Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: Carter and Reagan on El Salvador." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1984, pp. 175–190. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3323931., p. 181
[142] Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict." *Global Security*.
[143] "El Salvador." *Mass Atrocity Endings*, sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/el-salvador/.

war and its ongoing political crisis could not be resolved without their participation at the negotiating table."[144]

On September 15, 1989, the government and the FMLN initiated peace negotiations, and signed the Geneva Agreement mediated by the United Nations six months later. Four months after that, government and FMLN representatives signed the Agreement on Human Rights, which licensed the United Nations to monitor human rights conditions through the *United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador* (ONUSAL).[145] In January of 1992, the United Nations Security Council erected the ONUSAL-Military Division and the ONUSAL-Civilian Police Division to oversee the disarmament process and provide resources to facilitate the creation of a national police force.[146] Government and FMLN representatives officially signed the peace agreement in Mexico City on January 16, 1992.

Over the course of the civil war, over 70,000 individuals were killed via summary executions, landmine explosions, indiscriminate bombings and torture; over 500,000 individuals were internally displaced; and roughly 1 million individuals escaped the country as refugees.[147] The conflict produced systematic human rights violations, disappearances, bombings, mutilation, extrajudicial murder and mass rape, particularly at the hands of government-sanctioned security and military forces.[148] In the post-war era, the World Bank contributed to the rebuilding process through reconstruction assistance from 1991 to 2002. Third party observers continued to monitor electoral processes in the country for years thereafter. Under the Mexico Peace Agreements, United Nations officials sponsored the *Commission on the Truth for El Salvador* titled "From

---

[144] Wood, Elisabeth Jean. "Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador." p. 12
[145] "El Salvador (1927 - Present)." *Political Science*, University of Central Arkansas, 2020, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.
[146] "El Salvador (1927 - Present)." *Political Science*, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.
[147] "El Salvador (1927 - Present)." *Political Science*, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.
[148] "Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.

Madness to Hope," an eight month mission to investigate the acts and effects of violence over the course of the civil war and to recommend a national reconciliation process.[149] According to the report, the commission investigated 22,000 complaints of atrocities and attributed 85 percent of them to Salvadoran security forces and right-wing death squads.[150] It attributed roughly five percent to guerrilla forces directed by the FMLN.[151]

American Political and Military Strategy in El Salvador

In the height of the Cold War, the United States sought to expand their domain of influence in an effort to maintain its hegemonic status and prevent communist expansion. In the eyes of the Reagan administration, the first step in achieving these objectives rested upon exercising control of America's "backyard." American policymakers, including Secretary of State Alexander Haig, saw the necessity of "drawing the line against communist aggression," starting in Central America:[152]

> "At first blush, it is hard to conceive of any Central American nation presenting a test of U.S. credibility. The gross national product of any of these countries is a poor match for the annual sales of one of our supermarket chains. In territory, Oregon is larger than Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala combined...U.S. credibility is implicated in Central America not because of what these countries are but presumably because of where they are located...For a superpower not to intervene to obtain at least the appearance of success within its own sphere of influence is thought to communicate incompetence or loss of nerve. Allies and enemies in distant lands will think us weak if we do not impose our will."[153]

In order to obtain control over their Central American sphere of influence, U.S. policymakers applied a counterinsurgency strategy rooted in providing U.S. aid, military training, and advisors

---

[149] "Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." *United States Institute of Peace*, 1 July 1992, www.usip.org/publications/1992/07/truth-commission-el-salvador.
[150] Gugliotta, Guy, and Douglas Farah. "12 Years of Tortured Truth on El Salvador." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 21 Mar. 1993.
[151] Gugliotta and Farah, "12 Years of Tortured Truth on El Salvador," *The Washington Post*.
[152] LeoGrande, William. "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 1, Summer 1981, p. 27
[153] Kenworthy, Eldon. "Central America: Beyond the Credibility Trap." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1983, pp. 181–200. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40208933., p. 195

to impede guerrilla activity and subversion in both El Salvador and Latin America broadly.[154]

This strategy was derived from low-intensity conflict doctrine, which is defined as:

> "The political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of...political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized...but contain regional and global security implications."[155]

Low-intensity conflict doctrine is divided into four mission categories: (1) "counterinsurgency slash insurgency," (2) "terrorism counteraction," (3) "peacetime contingency," and (4) "peacekeeping."[156] The following figure, adopted from Colonel Lee Dixon's briefing, delineate crucial components of low-intensity conflict doctrine and the ways in which it can be understood within the context of counterinsurgency and the changing nature of warfare:



Figure 2: Examples of Assistance Given to Strategic Allies Situated on Probability and Intensity Scale.[157]

---

[154] D'Haeseleer. *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*, p. 2

[155] Briefing given by Colonel Lee Dixon, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, *Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions, and Policy Concerns*, May 12, 1989, p. 23

[156] Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project. *Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict*, Vol I. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, August 1986.

[157] "Security Assistance" is portrayed as one of the primary sources of assistance given in counterinsurgency missions pertaining to low intensity conflict doctrine.

In applying low-intensity conflict doctrine to counterinsurgency strategy, the United States constructed a two-pronged policy: first, "fortify the Salvadoran armed forces to wear down the rebels in combat, and [second], bolster democracy so as to weaken the rebels' claims to political legitimacy."[158] The ultimate goals of this policy were the establishment of a "responsive, legitimate government and the winning of the voluntary support of the population through [land] redistribution and reform…[without] main-force military operations."[159] In order to achieve these objectives, policymakers and top military personnel agreed that "democratic institutions must be strengthened, a working judicial system must emerge, political violence must end, and the Salvadoran military must unequivocally submit to civilian authority."[160]

The American effort focused on executing the following targets in order to propel El Salvador toward these sweeping changes: (1) the reform of the Salvadoran armed forces; (2) the redistribution of land, particularly that of the peasant population; and (3) the democratization of political institutions.[161] Complicating factors, such as endemic corruption in the Salvadoran armed forces, sustained human rights abuses, and resistance against agrarian reforms inhibited U.S. abilities to realize these objectives. In fact, these factors further reinforced "...the cause of the very insurgents the armed forces [were] trying to counter, since many Salvadorans [had] become convinced that it [was] useless to try to change their authoritarian and stratified society through nonviolent efforts."[162] The primary driver of these sentiments was the indiscriminate violence employed by state-sponsored paramilitary troops; according to the UN-sanctioned Truth

---

[158] Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. p. V
[159] Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation-Building*, p. X
[160] Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation-Building*, p. VIII
[161] Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation-Building*, p. VI
[162] Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation-Building*, p. VII

Commission, "organized terrorism, in the form of the so-called "death squads," became the most aberrant manifestation of the escalation of violence. Civilian and military groups engaged in a systematic murder campaign with total impunity, while state institutions turned a blind eye."[163] In their campaign to blindly support the democratic development of El Salvador, the United States ignored innumerable pieces of evidence pointing to these atrocious human rights committed by their allies. The following figure depicts El Salvador's positioning on the Political Terror Scale from 1975 to 2017:



Figure 3: The Political Terror Scale above draws on reports by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International; PTS codes denote *state-perpetrated* human rights violations, which include killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment. Each country is scored on a five-point scale.[164]

From 1980 to 1992, El Salvador occupied the fourth and fifth levels on the Political Terror Scale: level four is characterized by "civil and political rights violations [that] have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest

[163] "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." United Nations Doc. S/25500, p. 20
[164] "The Political Terror Scale Data Set." *Political Terror Scale*, www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Datatable.html.

themselves in politics or ideas."[165] Level five is categorized by the expansion of terror throughout "the whole population…The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals."[166] The Reagan administration in particular ignored these atrocities:

> "Prior to Duarte's election as president in 1984, the Reagan administration routinely maintained that its ally had made dramatic strides in improving its human rights record. The White House's supporters offered several different justifications to support their claims, including a drop in death-squad violence, Constituent Assembly and presidential elections, and ongoing 'progress' in criminal cases in which violence had been committed against U.S. citizens."[167]

Despite the U.S.'s failed attempts to curb human rights violations at the hands of state-sponsored actors, American advisors understood that their counterinsurgency policy and strategy must be rooted in fostering legitimacy: "Political reform in COIN is meant to create institutions that build foundations of support among the people. Its ultimate goal is to bestow national and international legitimacy upon the government. In El Salvador, the strategy involved holding elections and establishing a viable, moderate political center against the extreme left and right."[168] Despite these objectives, many elections excluded the FMLN and smaller leftist parties in the country, resulting in continued turmoil and elongating the civil war.[169] As a by-product, the security status of most civilians remained precarious, particularly as the lack of accountability permitted the continuation of atrocities committed on both sides.

The following tables delineate presidential, parliamentary and congressional elections in El Salvador from roughly 1962 to 1992 in order to demonstrate the ways in which various

---

[165] "The Political Terror Scale Data Set." *Political Terror Scale*, www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Datatable.html.
[166] "The Political Terror Scale Data Set." *Political Terror Scale*, www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Datatable.html.
[167] D'Haeseleer, *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*., p. 124
[168] D'Haeseleer, *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*., p. 74
[169] D'Haeseleer, *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*., p. 74

political parties rose to power and provide further detail on the response of insurgent and government groups following key elections during the civil war:

Date	***Presidential Election Outcome***	***Additional Details and Facts***
4/29/1962	Winner: Colonel Adalberto Rivera Represented Party: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	Opposition political parties boycotted the presidential election.
3/5/1967	Winner: Colonel Fidel Sanchez Hernandez Represented Party: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	
2/20/1972	Winner: Colonel Arturo Armando Molina Represented Party: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	Opposition political parties claimed election fraud. After the election, The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) was established in opposition to the government. Cuba sent military assistance to ERP.
2/20/1977	Winner: General Carlos Humberto Romero Mena Represented Party: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	Opposition political parties claimed election fraud. 50,000+ individuals protested against the government after the election. Eight demonstrators died in political violence between 2/26 and 2/28/1977.
10/15/1979	Coup D'état - N/A	President Romero Mena was deposed in a military coup headed by reformist officers. 15+ individuals were killed in political violence on 10/17/1979.
10/17/1979	Coup D'état - N/A	A five-member civil/military junta gained control of the government and dissolved the National Assembly. Violence erupted as government troops and demonstrators clashed, resulting in the deaths of 50+ individuals.
1/3/1980	N/A	The three civilian members of the junta resigned and were replaced by members of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
3/3/1980	N/A	Jose Napoleon Duarte of the PDC was appointed to the junta.
12/22/1980	N/A	Jose Napoleon Duarte was appointed as president of the junta.
4/29/1982	Winner: Alvaro Magana Represented Party: Democratic Action (AD)	Alvaro Magana was elected interim president by the Constituent Assembly.
5/6/1984	Winner: Jose Napoleon Duarte Represented Party: Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	The Organization of American States (OAS) sent two observers to monitor elections. FMLN guerrillas besieged the Cerron Grande hydroelectric station, resulting in 90+ deaths.
3/19/1989	Winner: Alfredo Cristiani Burkard Represented Party: Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	Under Cristiani's leadership, the conflict ended via UN-brokered peace negotiations that began on 9/15/1989. The civil war officially concluded on 1/16/1992.

Table 1: A Thirty Year Overview of Presidential Elections and Politics from 1962-1992.[170]

[170] Ciment, James. *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II*. Routledge, 2015., p. 416; Álvarez, Alberto M. and Eudald C. Orero. "The Genesis and Internal Dynamics of El Salvadaor's People's Revolutionary Army, 1970-1976," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, V. 46, 2014. p. 663; "El Salvador (1927 - Present)." *Political Science*, University of Central Arkansas, 2020, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.; "Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: El Salvador." *From Insurgency to Stability: Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies*, by Angel Rabasa et al., RAND Corporation, 2011. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1111-2osd.12., p. 92

Date	*Parliamentary and Congressional Election Outcomes*	*Additional Details and Facts*
3/13/1966	Type: Congressional Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 32 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won 15 seats.
3/12/1968	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 27 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. The PDC won 19 seats.
3/8/1970	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 34 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. The PDC won 16 seats.
3/12/1972	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 38 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. The National Opposition Union (UNO) won 7 seats.
3/10/1974	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 32 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. The PDC won 14 seats. The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) was established in opposition to the government in 1975.
3/14/1976	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 52 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. Opposition political parties boycotted the parliamentary elections.
3/18/1978	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN)	The PCN won 50 out of 54 seats in the National Assembly. Opposition political parties boycotted the parliamentary elections.
3/28/1982	Type: Constituent Assembly Elections Majority: Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	The PDC won 24 out of 60 seats in the Constituent Assembly. The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) won 19 seats. The Organization of American States (OAS) sent three observers to monitor the elections.
3/31/1985	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	The PDC won 33 out of 60 seats in the National Assembly. OAS observers monitored the elections.
3/20/1988	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	ARENA won 30 out of 60 seats in the National Assembly. The PDC won 23 seats. OAS observers monitored the elections.
3/10/1991	Type: Parliamentary Elections Majority: Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	ARENA won 39 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly. The OAS sent 85 observers to monitor the election process from January to March, and reported that the elections were free and fair.

Table 2: A Twenty-Five Year Overview of Parliamentary and Congressional Elections and Politics from 1966-1991.[171]

As demonstrated by the tables above, "the trappings of democracy co-existed with authoritarianism...periodic, flawed elections occurred under a constitution between 1948 and

[171] "El Salvador (1927 - Present)." *Political Science*, University of Central Arkansas, 2020, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.; Karl, Terry Lynn. "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/20045130., p. 159; Elections and Events 1980-1989, library.ucsd.edu/research-and-collections/collections/notable-collections/latin-american-elections-statistics/El Salvador/elections-and-events-1980-1989.html.

1979, in which military officers usually won the presidency."[172] Left-wingers boycotted many elections due to the military and political hegemony of the elites, who, more often than not, nullified elections and tampered with results. Despite this legacy of corruption, the conclusion of the Salvadoran civil war elicited significant military and political forms.

The Post-War Peace Process

The Chapultepec Peace Accords, signed in January of 1992, outlined the reconstruction of the Salvadoran state and introduced a social contract hinged upon obeying the rules of representative democracy.[173] The leaders of the FMLN and the negotiating team of the Salvadoran government, along with ARENA President Alfredo Cristiani, were joined by United Nations mediators who supervised much of the peace process. The following provisions and reforms were explicitly prescribed in the Accords:

I. Ceasefire, Demobilization and Disarmament

A formal ceasefire was ordered and effectuated on February 1, 1992, two weeks after the signing of the Accords. FMLN combatants were ordered to concentrate all arms, munitions and personnel in fifteen sites around the nation. Similarly, the right-wing armed forces assembled in sixty-two barracks. Following the congregation of forces, twenty percent of FMLN combatants were able to reintegrate into civilian life throughout predetermined periods over the coming weeks, resulting in the end of demobilization on October 31, 1992.[174] They had "several options with respect to their reintegration: joining the new National Civil Police, participating in the land

[172] Call, Charles T. "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4, 2003, pp. 827–862. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3875834., p. 830
[173] Ramos, Carlos Guillermo, Roberto Oswaldo López & Carolina Quinteros. *The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?* Inclusive Political Settlements Papers 13, June 2015. Berlin: Berghof Foundation, p. 1
[174] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 832

transfer programme, receiving training in order to set up their own businesses, getting involved in the work of NGOs, or working in the structuring of FMLN cadres."[175]

II. Political Reforms

Perhaps the most integral aspect of the Accords was the formal inclusion of the FMLN, led by former combatants and leaders, as a registered, legitimate political party. The Accords "did not seek to overcome the causes of the social conflict or existing inequality, but rather focused on a legal-institutional reform in which the political parties would be the protagonists of the new forms of struggle for state power."[176] Despite the Accords' shortcomings relating to addressing the social and economic problems that precipitated the start of the civil war, it appears that the inclusion of the guerrilla group was enough to maintain the post-war peace, particularly as they realized their voices could be used to enact changes via political institutions. The creation of a new electoral and party system enabled full political representation, which had long been inaccessible for left-wingers and representatives of the lower-class, peasant population. In fact, the FMLN has become an increasingly successful political party, closely contending for the greatest number of seats in the National Assembly against ARENA:[177]

[175] Ramos, López, Quinteros, *The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?*, p. 9
[176] Ramos, López, Quinteros, *The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?*, p. 10
[177] Ramos, López, Quinteros, *The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?*, p. 1



Figure 4: Since 1991, the FMLN has emerged as one of the most highly represented parties in the National Assembly, vying against ARENA for the top number of seats since the early 2000s.[178]

III. Military and Intelligence Reforms

The Accords placed a strong emphasis upon annihilating the barbaric reputation associated with most military factions and groups. Therefore, all parties agreed to the significant reduction of military personnel and the surrender of all internal security functions. The three existing security forces—the Treasury Police, the National Guard, and the National Police—were disbanded as well.[179] Army counterinsurgency units were dissolved, forced recruitment was suspended, and human rights issues brought to the forefront of national security priorities were subsequently incorporated into the Accords. Lastly, the military-owned National Intelligence Directorate was superseded by the State Intelligence Office (OIE), which was supervised by a coalition of civilians reporting directly to the president and managed by the legislative branch.[180]

---

[178] I created this graph from data compiled by: "El Salvador: Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results." *IPU PARLINE Database: El Salvador, Election Archives*, 2015, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2099_arc.htm.
[179] Juhn, Tricia. *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War*. 1st ed., MacMillan Press, 1998., p 62
[180] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 832

Initially, the induction of civilian leaders into groups monopolizing the use of force transformed the reputation and efficacy of the military. However, over the course of time, corruption and a systemic absence of accountability hindered these improvements.

IV. Police Force Reforms

In an effort to concentrate many of the bureaucratic institutions pertaining to security in the hands of civilians, the Accords erected the National Civilian Police (PNC), the only national-level public security force, as a branch of the Defense Ministry. Roughly 60 percent of both officer level and basic agent personnel of the PNC were to be civil applicants; in other words, people who have never served as combatants before.[181] Their primary functions included maintaining order and protecting civilians.[182] The legislative branch held the power to discharge the director of the PNC for human rights abuses committed by the force at any time, thereby installing a preliminary system of checks and balances.[183] Lastly, the Accords abolished the draft law and outlined a mandatory entrance exam. As demonstrated by reforms regarding the military, adjustments made to the police forces succeeded on a surface-level only. Over time, waves of crime permeated the new system as it became clear that the judicial branch lacked the necessary structure and backbone to provide accountability.

V. Human Rights and Judicial Politics

Rectifying the human rights violations and atrocities committed during the war was a crucial aspect of the Accords, which mandated the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to review military officer files and recommend names to be purged from military institutions.[184] The

---

[181] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 834
[182] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 833
[183] Bruneau, Thomas C. and Florina Cristiana. "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization*, (CRIS) Matei 15:5, 2008, DOI: 10.1080/13510340802362505, p. 917
[184] Holiday, David, and William Stanley. "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24357142., p. 427

United Nations supervised a Truth Commission, which prepared a report designed to hold the members of the right-wing military forces and FMLN combatants accountable for the atrocities committed, particularly those against civilians. Although the Accords largely glossed over judicial reforms, they did grant increased autonomy of the National Judicial Council from the Supreme Court, which resulted in fewer conflict-of-interest cases and created a more even balance of power.[185] Generally, the absence of reforms to the judiciary set the stage for a fragmented security sector able to provide the necessary force to limit violence, but disinclined to hold offenders accountable for their actions.

VI. Implementation

In order to ensure that the reforms mentioned above came to fruition, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was "responsible for overseeing the implementation of all political agreements reached by the parties."[186] COPAZ consisted of two representatives each from the government and the FMLN, plus one representative from each established political party so as to guarantee accountability and the inclusion of all sides. COPAZ was largely successful; neither side ever broke the ceasefire, COPAZ served as an intermediary when questions or resistance surfaced, and smooth reintegration and civilianization were predominantly successful for former combatants on both sides.[187]

Post-War Democratic Electoral Processes

In December of 1992, the transition to democracy officially occurred and the FMLN became a formally registered political party, therefore legitimizing their participation in subsequent elections. The Electoral Division of ONUSAL was established in September of 1993,

[185] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 833
[186] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 834
[187] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 835

"with a mandate to observe the electoral process before, during and after the elections under the following terms of reference:

> (a) to observe that measures and decisions made by all electoral authorities were impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections;
> (b) to observe that appropriate steps were taken to ensure that eligible voters were included in the electoral rolls, thus enabling them to exercise their right to vote;
> (c) to observe that mechanisms were in place effectively to prevent multiple voting, given that a complete screening of the electoral rolls prior to the elections was not feasible;
> (d) to observe that freedom of expression, organization, movement and assembly were respected without restrictions;
> (e) to observe that potential voters had sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms for participating in the election;
> (f) to examine, analyse and assess criticisms made, objections raised and attempts undertaken to delegitimize the electoral process and, if required, to convey such information to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal;
> (g) to inform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of complaints received regarding irregularities in electoral advertising or possible interference with the electoral process; when appropriate, to request information on corrective measures taken by the Tribunal;
> (h) to place observers at all polling sites on election day to verify that the right to vote was fully respected."[188]

In 1994, municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections took place; ARENA won the presidency and a majority of both legislative seats and municipal governments, but a party coalition spearheaded by the FMLN forced ARENA into a second round of voting for the presidency.[189] According to state-collected consensus results, "the first post-war elections had a generally positive effect on party development…El Salvador's party scene expanded beyond the three-party clique of the 'official' PCN, the opposition PDC and ARENA to include the rebel movement-turned-political party FMLN, as well as the new United Democratic Centre (CDU)."[190] Additionally, the secretary-general acknowledged positive improvements in the expansion of the electoral roles, participation by the political parties throughout the whole

---

[188] "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)" *UN Peacekeeping*, United Nations, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html.
[189] De Zeeuw, Jeroen. *Sons of War: Parties and Party Systems in Post-War El Salvador and Cambodia, Democratization*, 17:6, 1176-1201, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.520549, p. 1182
[190] De Zeeuw, *Sons of War: Parties and Party Systems in Post-War El Salvador and Cambodia*, p. 1182

process, the peaceful exercise of the right to organize, the right of assembly, and freedom of expression, the lack of violent incidents, and the successes of the security and armed forces in protecting civilians and their rights.[191] ONUSAL observers did not record any fraudulent or illicit practices that meaningfully impacted the results of all elections.[192]

Over the course of the subsequent decade, the FMLN became the second most powerful party in the country; despite losing the presidential elections to ARENA in 1999, they were able to gain a plurality of seats in the legislature in 2000 and 2003.[193] Further success was exemplified in the elections of the early 2000s, as other left-wing groups gained traction as well:

> "In subsequent elections between 1997 and 2006, some of the new left-wing parties proved able to challenge the much older, 'traditional' parties, which led to the decline of the once-powerful PCN and PDC. ARENA consolidated, the CD/CDU entered as a small centre-left opposition party, and the FMLN became the strongest left-wing opposition party."[194]

Lasting Legacies

The lack of violence surrounding democratic and electoral processes can likely be attributed at least in part to the inclusion of former guerrillas into the political sphere, the disbandment of armed forces and insurgents coupled with their reintegration into society, and the presence of a supervising third-party. The representation of formerly excluded and marginalized members of the population created a peaceful means to express discontent, rather than resorting to the use of violence. Additionally, the structure of the Accords facilitated peace for a variety of reasons: (1) despite the prominence of the United Nations in mediating, the Accords heralded practices that were integrable into domestic political, military and social institutions, as opposed

---

[191] "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)" *UN Peacekeeping*, United Nations, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html.
[192] "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)" *UN Peacekeeping*, United Nations, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html.
[193] Holiday and Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador," p. 433
[194] De Zeeuw, *Sons of War: Parties and Party Systems in Post-War El Salvador and Cambodia*, p. 1182

to ones that were partial to the desires of external actors; (2) the reintegration of former combatants proved vital in reviving a sense of normalcy and discouraging any further use of violence; (3) the absence of the United States in the negotiating and peace process was likely a contributing factor. Their involvement in the war via complicity in the protraction of state-sanctioned violence and their association with self-interested state-building would have likely angered Salvadorans.

Today, El Salvador's post-war rebuilding process has been championed by democratic crusaders all over the world, who cite the reconstruction era as one of the most successful and lasting examples of democratization:

> "El Salvador is now considered among the most successful instances of implementation of a negotiated peace agreement in the post-Cold War period. The cease-fire between the two sides was never broken. By 1994, guerrilla forces were demobilised and reconstituted as a political party; significant demilitarisation of society and the state had taken place; and elections had transpired through which the former guerrillas became the second most powerful party in the country. The peace accords were the catalyst for the incipient institutionalisation of political democracy in El Salvador."[195]

Furthermore, "international actors remained enamoured with improved human rights performance, enhanced civilian control, and reduced threats to internal and international security."[196] Despite these successes, many Salvadorans themselves have shed light on the shortcomings of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, and the ensuing political and social gaps that have manifested themselves throughout the past three decades. Although levels of violence remained low surrounding electoral and democratic processes, other forms of violence manifested throughout the post-war period and compromised the security of civilians. Gang violence and organized crime rates continue to remain lofty today. The final pages of this chapter

[195] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 833
[196] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 829

will reconcile these conflicting narratives through the examination of post-war security institutions and practices.

Post-War Security and Justice

Post-conflict reconstruction is particularly important with regard to the restoration and establishment of the coercive apparatus. A condition known as "the security gap" can undermine the process of democratization and the legitimacy of the incumbent regime:

> "When indigenous military or security forces are dismantled and new civilian police forces have not yet been recruited, trained, and deployed, international peacekeepers, military personnel, or other types of monitors frequently exercise temporary control over the immediate security situation until new police, trained by internationals, begin their deployment. This period is always the most dangerous both for order and security and for state legitimacy...unchecked, these environments are the perfect soil for spoilers with strong incentives and means to destabilize and discredit new governments."[197]

Thus, provisions outlined in the Accords placed heavy emphasis on the erection of security-enhancing institutions and rules of law. Due to the exorbitant levels of violence against civilians during the war, human rights became the forerunner of international discourse and national reforms. As demonstrated above, much of the peace agreement was centered around obstructing the recurrence of these atrocities; however, the provisions focused more on the "security arena and on redressing past abuses than on constructing a reformed judiciary."[198]

The complicity of the judicial branch in both war-time human rights abuses and post-war corruption is often obscured by the culpability of the military forces, but remains no less significant. Many even cite the abuse of power and lack of accountability as one of the primary drivers behind the civil war.[199] Those who were excluded from fair judicial proceedings before

---

[197] Lyday, Corbin, and Jan Stromsem. "Rebuilding the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Environments." *United States Agency for International Development*, May 2005.
[198] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 847
[199] Jackson, D. W., et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 18, no. 4, 1999. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3339198., p. 417

the war continued to be excluded following the war: "The justice system, so frequently cited as key in the post-war period, has struggled to establish itself as a fully independent and credible institution, capable of imparting justice to all, regardless of social or political position..."[200] Accordingly, many of the reforms outlined in the Accords fell short of instituting lasting change with regards to the judiciary:

> "In contrast to the judiciary's nonparticipation in the negotiations, representatives of the armed forces were at the negotiating table and played a crucial role in ensuring a successful outcome. On a formal level, the armed forces are part of the executive branch and subordinate to the president; the Supreme Court is not."[201]

These shortcomings, coupled with societal and cultural resistance to several security reforms laid out in the Accords, resulted in the reappearance of violence of staggering proportions following the war. In some categories, El Salvador eclipsed Colombia and vied with South Africa as "the homicide capital of the world."[202]

In democracies, a properly functioning judiciary should sanction the illegal use of violence by "monitor[ing] state institutions in the security sector and beyond. Independence and autonomy of the judiciary should promote the accountability of the police and the military to the rule of law."[203] Unfortunately, the reforms included in the Accords did not engender the accountability and security necessary to curb unchecked violence and crime. The following series of phases demarcate the waves of crime and spikes in violence that engulfed the state following the termination of the war:

In the first phase, from 1991 to 1995, the transition of power from military to civilian forces during demobilization and the ceasefire resulted in a power vacuum that many took

---

[200] Popkin, Margaret. *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000., p. 8
[201] Popkin, *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*, p. 8
[202] Popkin, *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*, p. 8
[203] Kurtenbach, Sabine. "Judicial Reform – A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 13:1, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1517112, p. 60

advantage of in order to commit violent crime.[204] While the reforms laid out in the Accords were particularly successful with respect to political integration and civilianization, they failed to predict the law-enforcing void left in the wake of demobilization and the purging of military forces.

In the second phase, between 1995 and 1997, most of the reforms had been implemented but crime remained at lofty levels. The population perceived the inability of the government and security forces to "deliver and security," and roughly 45 percent "believed in 1996 that people had a right to take justice into their own hands. In some cases, people bypassed the judicial system."[205] Nevertheless, "El Salvador continued to serve as a model for international post-conflict police reform. By the late 1990s, the contrast was striking between the positive international opinion of security sector reforms in El Salvador and the decidedly more mixed domestic opinion."[206]

In the third phase, from 1997 into the early 2000s, crime decreased due to the consolidation and increased efficacy of police and security forces, a common pattern following democratization.[207] A survey conducted in 2001 demonstrated that, by a margin of roughly two to one, "respondents believed the PNC to be more efficient, professional, rights-respecting and honest than five years earlier. Once past the initial transition period, policing practice demonstrated a greater capacity to approximate formal doctrine, and reform patterns resembled those of stable democracies."[208] However, of the crime that did occur during this period, much of it attributed to this phase was perpetrated by members of the PNC, in which "repeated revelation

[204] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 841
[205] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 842
[206] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 848
[207] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 848
[208] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 848

of PNC agents' involvement in organised kidnappings and robberies" came to light.[209] These levels of corruption shed light on enduring institutional deficiencies.

As stated above, the limited reforms pertaining to the judiciary depended heavily upon international support, primarily that of the United Nations.[210] While international actors contributed considerably to the Truth Commission, Salvadorans had limited success in the construction of new laws and the erection of new institutions. According to scholars, the process of national reconciliation that involves the acknowledgement of responsibility for human rights abuses cannot be imposed or administered by international actors.[211] In fact, external efforts may actually be detrimental to the rebuilding process, as they can provoke adverse responses from nationalists. As mentioned above, the involvement of the United States in the post-war peace process would have likely resulted in renewed violence, especially given that "changing entrenched attitudes and practices is far more difficult than outside actors tend to appreciate."[212] Furthermore,

> "unless domestic civil society is deeply involved in the process of establishing accountability for past injustices and in building durable legal codes, courts, and police systems, international assistance, even in the best of circumstances, will leave democracy unconsolidated and vulnerable to the return of abusive past practices."[213]

The combination of external support for judicial reforms and the lack of civilian involvement at the negotiating table resulted in shortcomings pertaining to the judiciary. In a national opinion survey conducted between July and August of 1996, researchers conducted the following research regarding law, the Supreme Court and the Constitution:

---

[209] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 848
[210] Jackson, et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador," p. 405
[211] Popkin, *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*, p. 189
[212] Schmidt, Arthur. *Review: Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*. By Margaret Popkin. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. *The Americas*, vol. 59, no. 1, 2002, p. 137
[213] Popkin, *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*, p. 12

Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly disagree
a. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the decisions of the Salvadoran Supreme Court, everyone ought to obey them				
31.9%	28.0%	7.9%	14.1%	18.2%
b. The decisions of the Supreme Court are made in a just manner				
16.9%	23.6%	14.9%	17.6%	27.0%
c. If the Supreme Court begins to take actions that most of the people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court				
38.4%	21.9%	5.4%	13.3%	21.0%
d. The Constitution and laws give the Supreme Court too much power				
41.5%	30.0%	5.6%	10.8%	12.1%

Figure 5: Questions posed to the Salvadoran population regarding the Supreme Court and the Constitution.[214]

Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
a. *Sometimes it is better to ignore the law and resolve problems immediately rather than waiting for legal solutions*				
30.5%	22.3%	6.3%	13.0%	27.9%
b. *It is necessary to obey a law that you consider unjust*				
22.9%	17.1%	4.0%	15.4%	40.6%
c. *If you don't agree with a law, it is all right to break it*				
22.0%	19.9%	6.7%	16.5%	34.9%
d. *In times of emergency the government ought to be able to adjust the law in order to resolve social and political problems*				
5.3%	5.0%	4.3%	31.1%	54.3%
e. *My interests are rarely represented in the law; usually the law reflects the interests of those who want to control*				
46.2%	26.8%	7.8%	10.8%	8.3%
f. *The ultimate basis of the law should be the values of the people as a whole, not the values of the dominant political, economic and social powers*				
64.5%	24.3%	5.1%	2.5%	3.6%
g. *If the government does not provide justice and security, the people have the right to take justice into their own hands*				
26.3%	22.3%	4.7%	14.0%	32.7%

Figure 6: Questions posed to the Salvadoran population in order to gauge attitudes toward law.[215]

	n	Per cent
Honest	139	11.6
Corrupt	565	47.1
A little of both	385	32.1
Don't know	110	9.2

Figure 7: Responses to the question, *which of the following best describes the Salvadoran judicial system?*[216]

[214] Jackson, et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador," p. 411
[215] Jackson, et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador," p. 411
[216] Jackson, et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador," p. 411

In a question regarding institutional power, over 70 percent of the Salvadoran population agreed that the Constitution and national laws granted the Supreme Court too much power. This, in combination with the fact that "it proved easier to change institutions than to change state-society relations, and civilianisation brought only a partial redefinition of police-society relations," resulted in the crime wave referenced above.[217] The relations between the Supreme Court and the PNC with society did not exhibit the degree of trust and integration present in most established democracies, thus enabling gangs to employ violent tactics, often unanswered, at their leisure.

Conclusions

The political stipulations defined in the Accords were largely successful with regard to curtailing violence associated with electoral processes and preventing a regression back to civil war. As mentioned above, the integration of the FMLN into the political arena distilled many of the tensions and sentiments of unequal representation during the pre-war era. Despite these successes, the state of security in other spheres remained compromised, particularly with regard to organized crime and corruption in the judicial sector. This public security gap has been exploited by ordinary civilians *due to* the lack of judicial reform that continues to subvert the safety and security of the population. The lack of accountability has contributed to diminished perceptions of state legitimacy, as civilians consistently do not believe the judicial branch will uphold the law.

[217] Call, "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," p. 844

Chapter III: The Iraq War (2003-2011)

Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the drastic discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-war rebuilding efforts, many of which deteriorated under the ensuing security vacuum, sectarian violence and the rise of terrorist organizations. In answering my research question, democratic elections and electoral processes often had detrimental effects on the state of security, particularly due to the underrepresentation and exclusion of particular ethnic and religious groups in political processes. With that said, it is difficult to causally link the two; many contributing factors played a role in spikes of violence.

I argue that the post-invasion peace process was hindered by three primary factors: (1) the exclusion of Sunni Arabs, who represented former elites, from the political arena fueled the insurgency, thereby compromising crucial rebuilding processes and inciting sectarian divisions; (2) coalition forces and Iraqi politicians prioritized electoral processes ahead of the re-establishment of the coercive apparatus and institutions, which undermined the security of civilians, many of whom turned to insurgents for protection; (3) the eight-year American occupation encouraged the emergence of anti-western terrorist groups that further compromised stability and threatened democratic procedures.

These failures, coupled with the regional turmoil that has threatened the stability of most Middle Eastern nations, has left Iraq bureaucratically shattered, militarily weak, and internally divided. The following sections provide an overview of 20th century state-building, which played a large role in curtailing democratic success; the invasion and subsequent discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-war rebuilding; and resulting bureaucratic voids that enabled

the pervasion of multi-faceted violence. I will examine the January 2005 elections, the December 2005 elections, and the March 2010 elections in conjunction with security.

Key Terminology

Sectarianism: excessive devotion to a particular sect, usually pertaining to religion.
Shi'ism: a branch of Islam which holds that the Islamic prophet Muhammad designated Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor, or Caliph. Shi'a Islam primarily contrasts with Sunni Islam, whose adherents maintain that Muhammad did not appoint a successor.
Sunnism: the largest denomination of Islam. The differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims resulted from a disagreement over the choice of Muhammad's successor and subsequently acquired broader political, theological and juridical differences.
Ba'athism: an nationalist, secular ideology promoting a type of pan-Arab socialism.
Federalism: a system possessing at least two levels of government, typically federal and regional, with separate powers allocated to each level by means of a written constitution.
Closed-List Voting System: voters select a party, not a candidate, they support on polling day.
Compensatory Seats: seats given to lists that do not win any seat in any province but have a collective number of votes that exceed the national threshold.
National Seats: seats distributed among the winners at the provincial level, according to how many votes or seats they receive nation-wide.
Threshold: the minimum number of votes that political entities should win in order to gain one or more seats.

A Historical Overview: The Roots of the Invasion and Subsequent Civil War

In order to understand the rise of the insurgency entrenched in ethnic and sectarian divides in Iraq's current political makeup, it is first important to analyze the roots of Iraq's modern political system and the evolution of Sunni-Shi'a-Kurdish relations. The following introductory section will illustrate this evolution by investigating modern Iraqi history, which can be divided into five distinct phases: (1) World War I state formation; (2) traditional constitutional monarchy; (3) military authoritarian regime; (4) totalitarian Ba'ath regime; (5) post-invasion state reconstruction.[218]

[218] Nazir, Muntazra. "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq." *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 59, no. 3, 2006. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41394370., p. 47

1916-1920: WWI State Formation

During World War I, British bureaucrats promised independence to many Middle Eastern states under Ottoman Rule. The government's Arab bureau in Cairo "issued letters and proclamations" detailing "the vision of an independent pan-Arab state, stretching from the Persian frontier to the Suez Canal."[219] Money proved consequential in "buying tribal allegiance," and soon thereafter, the British organized "bands of Arab fighters as guerrillas to destroy railroads and attack enemy outposts" against Ottoman Turks.[220] Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the scores of Arab guerrillas fighting on behalf of the Allied Powers, policy-makers in Europe drew up arrangements for the division of the Ottoman Empire among the French, British and Imperial Russians.

Following the end of World War I, in April of 1920, the British government reneged on their promises of independence and "formally accepted responsibility for building an Iraqi state out of the post-war wreckage of the Ottoman Empire."[221] Of the Middle Eastern states, only Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen obtained true sovereignty; in contrast, "the remaining states, owing their borders to the arbitrary actions of distant British and French bureaucrats drawing maps to reflect their nations' respective interests, fell under either the new League of Nations mandate system or direct British or French colonial administration."[222] British Officer T.E. Lawrence implored policy-makers to grant sovereignty:

> "There has been a deplorable contrast between our profession and our practice...We said we went to Mesopotamia to defeat Turkey. We said we stayed to deliver the Arabs from the oppression of the Turkish Government, and to make available for the world its

---

[219] Walker, Martin. "The Making of Modern Iraq." *The Wilson Quarterly (1976-)*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40261182., p. 29
[220] Allison, William Thomas. *The Gulf War: 1990-91*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012., p. 8
[221] Dodge, Toby. "The British Mandate in Iraq, 1914-1932." Gale Cengage Learning. www.gale.cengage.com/pdf/whitepapers/gdc/TheBritishMandate.pdf., p. 1
[222] Allison, *The Gulf War: 1990-91*, p. 11

> resources of corn and oil. We spent nearly a million men and nearly a thousand million of money to keep these ends...Our government is worse than the old Turkish system."[223]

1920-1958: Traditional Constitutional Monarchy

T.E. Lawrence's words went unheeded, and Britain sent financial aid and military personnel to Iraq, signifying the beginning of their domain. Angered Iraqi tribes, resentful toward yet another imperial power, revolted against British rule in the summer of 1920. The rebellion achieved a mixed outcome: on the one hand, it failed in that it was violently suppressed by British troops and bombers, but on the other, it succeeded in convincing policy-makers in London that direct rule would be unfeasibly costly.[224] A solution was found in Prince Faisal, the second son of the Sharif of Mecca and "newly exiled" from a temporary throne in Syria under the French.[225] Prince Faisal became a pro-British, Sunni monarch installed to preside over Iraq; in order to provide the facade of democracy, "Sir Percy Cox, the new British high commissioner in Baghdad, had Faisal's main rival deported...and arranged for a plebiscite of the adult male population."[226] Just years after the conclusion of World War I, Iraq became a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, and King Faisal took the throne with 96 percent of the vote in what became a "clearly rigged referendum."[227]

Unifying Iraq under its newly delineated (and illogical) borders proved challenging, particularly with regard to sectarian and religious considerations. The Ottoman Empire had divided modern-day Iraq into three regions, each under the control of a separate governor with "little in common with the other two."[228] Throughout his reign, King Faisal propounded a pan-Arab ideology bent on consolidating an expansive yet unified state across the region, which

---

[223] Lawrence, T. E. *Lawrence of Arabia: Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Easton Press, 1992., p. 34
[224] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 30
[225] Simon, Reeva Spector. *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*. 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, 2004., p. 1
[226] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 30
[227] Allison, *The Gulf War: 1990-91*, p. 12
[228] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 30

inspired a cohort of Arab intellectuals who flocked to Iraq to join him. These lofty blueprints were never achieved, however, because British officials occupied the majority of posts in key ministries, military forces, and controlled all aspects of foreign policy and security matters. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, King Faisal served as a puppet to British string-pullers, possessing no real power.

In 1932, due to economic struggles and new leadership in London, the British gave up its mandate, instead granting sovereignty to Iraq as a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, an institutionalized legal system and its own armed forces.[229] Despite the facade of stability, the newly founded Iraqi state was decentralized, segregated and lacked institutional legitimacy. The "democratic credentials" of parliament were restricted, urban leaders were isolated from rural tribes, and the constituent assembly granted the king significant capabilities, thus leading to a dangerous consolidation of power.[230] In a 1917 report titled "Faisal's Table Talk," King Faisal referred to Iraqis as "unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any national consciousness or sense of unity, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, receptive to evil, prone to anarchy and always willing to rise against the government."[231] In an effort to strengthen his regime, King Faisal appointed a coalition of Sunni elitists and intellectuals to top positions within his government, despite the fact that Sunnis represented a minority within the country. The Sunni population had largely accepted Ottoman rule during the Empire, gravitated toward major cities, and therefore dominated politics in Baghdad and occupied positions within the bureaucracy and the officer corps.[232]

---

[229] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 33
[230] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 33
[231] Cante, Freddy, and Hartmut Quehl. *Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace-Building in Turbulent Regions*. Information Science Reference, 2016., p. 235
[232] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 34

Despite this Sunni-based consolidation of power, King Faisal strove to unify the country under the pan-Arab ideology. His campaign largely failed, however, due to "tribal tensions and the increasingly stratified class system" rooted in Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divisions and ethnic discord between Arabs and non-Arabs.[233] The following pie chart depicts the approximate ethno-religious composition of the roughly 3 million Iraqi inhabitants at the beginning of the mandate period:



Figure 8: The break-down of religious affiliation in the pre-Mandate era, conceptually created from Pederson's analysis in "Getting out of Iraq."[234]

The National Assembly consistently reflected the interests of the property-owning population, while the property-less, which encompassed mostly Shi'as, Kurds, Jews and Yazidis, became more and more marginalized by political policies.[235] The anticipated "boom" from oil revenues failed to surface until decades later, further exacerbating tensions and inequality among socio-economic classes.[236] Additionally, King Faisal banned political parties that opposed the

[233] Allison, *The Gulf War: 1990-91*, p. 14
[234] Pedersen, Susan. "Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood." *The American Historical Review*, vol. 115, no. 4, 2010, pp. 975–1000. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/23303209., p. 992
[235] Pedersen, "Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood," p. 993
[236] Allison, *The Gulf War: 1990-91*, p. 14

monarchy and Iraq's dependence on Britain, thus consolidating Sunni-based rule and further disenfranchising the under-represented Shi'a majority and other sects: "To the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds of the north, the nominally national Iraqi government in Baghdad looked increasingly like Sunni domination."[237]

In 1933, King Faisal died and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who was "openly anti-British and a fervent believer in the pan-Arab cause."[238] He possessed marginal political power over rural regions and tribesmen, instead utilizing the army to suppress inklings of discontent. Over the next decade, the army became "a central actor in a tangled political process that set Left against Right, the cities against the tribes, pan-Arabists against nationalists, Sunni against Shi'a and Kurd."[239] The consolidation of Iraqi power and heightened anti-British sentiment increased when Ghazi died in 1939 and a pro-British prime minister named Nuri Said was installed.[240]

Within a year, Rashid Ali, an extreme "Anglo-phobe," had seized power and launched a coup d'état against the monarchy. With Hitler's support, he attempted to rid Iraq of British influence and personnel, but to no avail: "At war's end, little seemed to have changed in the Middle East. Britain continued to run the Suez Canal. It based troops in, and exerted massive influence on, the nominally independent states of Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan."[241] In 1948, Iraq was engulfed in violence again when Iraqis protested against the Portsmouth Treaty, yet another British attempt to exercise control over Iraq. In response to uprisings, Said banned political

---

[237] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 35
[238] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 35
[239] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 35
[240] Roberts, Priscilla Mary, and Spencer Tucker. *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts*. ABC-CLIO, 2010., p. 939
[241] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 36

parties, closed newspapers, publicly executed prominent Communists, and expanded the police and military presence.[242] He also refused to hold elections in 1952.[243]

1958-1968: Military Authoritarian Regime

While his iron fist was initially successful in repressing dissenters, it failed in 1958 when Said was ousted in a military coup d'état by General Abd el-Karim Qasim, who transformed Iraq from a monarchy to a republic.[244] This transition was representative of resistance against imperialist elites, and wrought stark changes to institutions and internal politics:

> "The downfall of the monarchy in July 1958 was a revolt against the social structure dominated by the pro-British ruling class and elite of the society. The middle class and military dominated, populist and authoritarian regimes assumed power. They abolished the legislative and legal institutions and a new system was established, with no institutionalized constitutional process and accountability."[245]

Although Qasim received broader popular support than Said, his administration continued to further marginalize Shi'a and Kurdish populations, excluding them almost entirely from political decision-making processes.[246] This era sowed the seeds for the beginning of sectarian activism: "The state's ever-increasing authoritarianism was accompanied by an intensification of Shi'a activism...This resulted in the sharpening of the state's suspicions of political Shiism and of the mobilization of Shi'a identity that in turn served to deepen Shi'a resentment and broaden support for Shi'a-centric movements."[247] In response, Qasim employed violent tactics in an effort to consolidate power and increased the responsibilities and presence of military officers, a legacy that continued until the American invasion in 2003. Despite Qasim's near monopoly over the use

---

[242] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 37
[243] Grassmuck, George. "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1960. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4323287., p. 398
[244] Hashim, Ahmed S. "Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq." *Middle East Policy Council*, mepc.org/journal/military-power-and-state-formation-modern-iraq.
[245] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 48
[246] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 48
[247] Haddad, Fanar. *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13030., p. 11

of force via the heightening of military power, the era was characterized by political instability; from 1958 to 1968, the political system suffered four military takeovers, numerous failed assassination attempts and rapid transitions of power from president to president.[248]

Lastly, Qasim was opposed by the Ba'athist Party, which was established in 1941 in Syria and promoted secularism, socialism and pan-Arabism.[249] To the dismay of members of the Ba'athist party, Qasim felt that strengthening Iraq internally took precedence over the establishment of a cross-national Arab state.[250] In 1963, the Ba'athists successfully overthrew Qasim and consolidated power by 1968, "thanks in part to the ruthless efficiency of the secret police chief, Saddam Hussein."[251]

1968-2003: Totalitarian Ba'athist Regime

In 1968, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president of Iraq, aided by Saddam Hussein who, at the time, headed the internal intelligence and security agencies.[252] In 1972, President Bakr announced the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company industry under the slogan, "Arab oil for the Arabs."[253] Fuel prices spiked significantly over the following months, quadrupling Iraq's oil revenues.[254] While the Ba'athist regime siphoned much of this newfound wealth into the military and security apparati, it also invested heavily in education and infrastructure.[255] Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq's middle class ballooned, its infrastructure developed, and schools expanded to accommodate swaths of formerly illiterate people. This facade of modernization masked internal political turbulence, however; in 1979, Saddam Hussein forcibly

---

[248] Amirsadeghi, Hossein. *The Security of the Persian Gulf*. Vol. 26, Routledge, 2011., p. 200
[249] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 48
[250] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 38
[251] Walker, "The Making of Modern Iraq," p. 39
[252] Macfarquhar, Neil. "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 30 Dec. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html.
[253] Dietrich, Christopher R. W. "Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs: Raw Material Sovereignty, Cold War Boundaries, and the Nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967–1973." Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:3, 2011.
[254] "History of Iraq Part II: The Rise of Saddam Hussein." *Public Radio International*, www.pri.org/stories/2003-02-12/history-iraq-part-ii-rise-saddam-hussein.
[255] "History of Iraq Part II: The Rise of Saddam Hussein." *Public Radio International*.

ascended to the presidency and purged many members of the party's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in an unflinching show of power. The following years were characterized by further consolidations of power and the centralization of the state bureaucracy:

> "The rise of a totalitarian, patrimonial political system established by the Ba'ath Party was a response to the need for a stable political system. A highly centralized system was established under the Ba'ath Party...The executive, legislative and judicial departments were all merged under the tight control of a self-defined body, the Revolutionary Command Council. Under it, a formidable controlling machine was established; bureaucracy, the military and security agencies expanded their role massively."[256]

Saddam's "stable political system" was undermined by his frequent military ventures outside of Iraq. In 1980, Hussein attempted to topple the new Islamic, Shi'a-dominated government in neighboring Iran; a military stalemate in 1988 ended the conflict, which ravaged both countries economically and left over 200,000 Iraqis dead.[257] Debt from the war, which exceeded $70 billion, embroiled Iraq further in tensions with surrounding countries.[258] When Iraq's wealthy neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded financial reimbursement for their aid during the war, Saddam responded by invading Kuwait in August of 1990 under the guise of protecting Iraqi oil reserves.[259] He was swiftly defeated by an American-led coalition seven months later and challenged by Iraqis who internalized American appeals to revolt against Saddam's ruthless administration.[260] In the wake of national humiliation and the diminution of Saddam's political legitimacy, empowered members of the Shi'a and Kurdish populations revolted against Hussein's brutal regime:[261]

> "Within a few days of the February 28 ceasefire...led by Kurdish forces in the north and Shi'as in the south, uprisings broke out in 17 of Iraq's 18 provinces. These uprisings

---

[256] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 49
[257] Macfarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." The New York Times.
[258] Boustany, Nora. "Doctrine, Dreams Drive Saddam Hussein." *The Washington Post*, Washington Post Foreign Service, 12 Aug. 1990, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/keyplayers/saddam081290.htm.
[259] Macfarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." The New York Times.
[260] Yetiv, Steve A. "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 107, no. 2, 1992, pp. 195–212. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2152655., p. 205
[261] Macfarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." The New York Times.

> would have profound implications for the second Gulf War. The uprisings in southern Iraq seem to have been driven by urban Shi'ites tired of Sunni Ba'athist rule, often joined by disaffected members of the Iraqi military as it retreated from Kuwait."[262]

Unfortunately, these uprisings were unsuccessful; Saddam extinguished them mercilessly. An estimated 45,000 Shi'as were killed ruthlessly, and over 1.5 million Kurds were displaced as they fled Saddam's widely feared Republican Guard.[263] In the wake of this humanitarian crisis, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, which demanded an "immediate end" to the repression of Iraqi civilians and "immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq."[264]

The combination of war, economic distress, and the increased interest of foreign patrons in groups opposing Saddam's reign contributed to the quiet rise of sect-centric politics throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Shi'a Arabs, in particular, believed that they were "uniquely victimized by the regime...coupled with an equally strong sense of entitlement based on their demographic weight."[265] Their inclination toward sect-centric politics and the acceleration of outright opposition to Saddam was emboldened by the following: (1) the disintegration of pan-Arab ideology and the demise of the communist party; (2) the politicization of Shi'ism in Iran following the revolutions of 1979; (3) the Gulf War and subsequent uprisings; and (4) amplified democracy promotion rhetoric and the encouragement of opposition groups by military powers like the United States.[266] While undoubtedly much of this sectarianism rose from extreme resentment regarding Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States played a significant role in stoking the flames of discontent:

---

[262] Perry, Walter L., et al., editors. *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace*. RAND Corporation, 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19w72gs, p. 12
[263] Perry et al., *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace*, p. 12
[264] United Nations, "UN Security Council Resolution 688," April 5, 1991.
[265] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 12
[266] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 12

> "The major players in the Iraqi opposition had adopted the principle of ethno-sectarian quotas as the arbiter of political representation and entitlement...as early as 1992. There have been criticisms singling out the United States as the mastermind behind the divisive policy and...the political elevation of ethno-sectarian identities more generally..."[267]

Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, Saddam's administration refused United Nations weapons inspectors the access necessary to register and destroy unconventional weapons, a stipulation specifically outlined in the Gulf War ceasefire agreement.[268] A series of economic sanctions dispensed by the U.N. battered Iraq's economy, devastating the Iraqi populace but allowing Saddam to reap the benefits of off the record oil trades.[269] Covertly, the U.S. began funding various opposition groups, such as the Iraqi National Congress and the Kurdish Democratic Party, the ultimate objective being the deposition of Saddam Hussein.[270] By early 2001, President George W. Bush and his administration openly supported regime change in Iraq.

The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, executed by terrorist organization al Qaeda, and the corresponding war on terror rapidly accelerated the Bush administration's plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein, particularly as restricting the possibility of future attacks shifted to the forefront of American foreign policy. Over the following months, Bush constructed a national security strategy driven by concern over the possibility of two primary activities: (1) the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies; and (2) Iraqi state sponsorship of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.[271] President Bush, reminded of months

---

[267] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 13
[268] Macfarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." The New York Times.
[269] Sachs, Susan. "Hussein's Regime Skimmed Billions From Aid Program." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 29 Feb. 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/02/29/world/hussein-s-regime-skimmed-billions-from-aid-program.html.
[270] Perry et al., *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace*, p. 25
[271] Perry et al., *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace*, p. 28

of Iraqi non-compliance with United Nation regulations and standards relating to illicit weapons, introduced a doctrine of preemption, which set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.[272]

On March 17th, President Bush issued a press release outlining the case for military action and provided Saddam Hussein and his two sons a 48-hour window to leave Iraq.[273] Over the course of the next two days, it became clear that Iraq's unyielding leader would not comply with American demands.[274] Subsequently, Operation Iraqi Freedom was initiated on March 19th, 2003, a campaign intended to destroy Iraq's supposed cache of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), overthrow Saddam Hussein, and install a democratic, pro-American regime in the heart of the Middle East.[275] American, British, and other coalition forces quickly overwhelmed Hussein's forces, seizing control of Baghdad and other major cities in a matter of weeks.

On April 9, 2003, a crowd of Iraqi civilians and American troops destroyed a statue of Hussein in Baghdad's Firdos Square, a symbolic triumph over Saddam's dictatorial regime.[276] On April 10, President Bush delivered an address to the Iraqi people outlining the objectives of the coalition, emphasizing its short timeline and democratic goals in the post-war rebuilding process. Three weeks later, on May 1, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq.[277]

2003-Present: Post-Invasion State Reconstruction

In examining the reconstruction effort, it is first important to acknowledge the discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-war realities. The Bush administration

---

[272] Gompert, David C., et al. "The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003" in *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn*, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.21., p. 165

[273] White House, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours," Press Release, March 17, 2003.

[274] Lambeth, Benjamin S. "Operation Iraqi Freedom." In *American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century*. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2005. Accessed March 10, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg404navy.10., p. 40

[275] "Timeline: Iraq War." *BBC News*, 5 July 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36702957.

[276] "The Iraq War." *Council on Foreign Relations*, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

[277] Cline, Seth. "The Other Symbol of George W. Bush's Legacy." *U.S. News & World Report*, https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/05/01/the-other-symbol-of-george-w-bushs-legacy.

undertook extensive measures to ensure the peaceful and seamless transition of power from provisional authorities to elected Iraqi leadership, many of which failed to anticipate post-war realities and the proliferation of insurgent forces.

Pre-war planning for post-war governance began in 1998 with the Iraqi Liberation Act, which allocated $98 million for the training of Iraqi exiles and opposition groups but was confined to nonlethal means.[278] In 2001, the Bush administration initiated military planning; U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Tommy Franks presented an initial concept of operations to Secretary Rumsfield, encompassing a four-phase course of action. Phase IV, which was undertaken by Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), "covered 'post-hostility operations,' [and] was intended to produce a representative Iraqi government."[279] Retrospectively, many of these plans neglected to address alternative realities to the following:

> "Planners assumed that military operations would have a clear and decisive end, in other words that there would not be extensive post-war resistance by Iraqi forces; that the coalition would have to deal with serious humanitarian crises, including flows of refugees and internally displaced people; that the coalition could rapidly hand over civil governance to robust Iraqi governing institutions such as the line ministries and the police; and that most Iraqis would embrace the political transition to a 'new Iraq' and actively support democratization of the political system."[280]

In October of 2002, President Bush allocated $92 million to train Iraqi exile militias and armed opposition groups outside of Iraq; over the following months, CIA operatives became active inside Iraq as well, training Kurdish fighters in the north, Shi'as in the south, and "buying loyalty" from exiled Iraqi politicians and elites.[281] The rationale behind the provision of aid and training was concentrated on the notion that Iraqi exiles and Kurds would play leading roles in

---

[278] Gilman, Benjamin A. "105th Congress (1997-1998): Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." *Congress.gov*, 31 Oct. 1998, www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/4655.
[279] Rathmell, Andrew. "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" *International Affairs*, Volume 81, Issue 5, October 2005, p. 1013–1038, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00500.x, p. 1021
[280] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1022
[281] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1018

Iraq's post-war transition to democratic governance, which additionally "rested on the assumption that the population would accept exiles as legitimate leaders, Iraq's governmental infrastructure would be easily transferred to new leadership, and overall political transformation would be rapid and relatively easy."[282] In the summer of 2002, the Bush administration initiated an interagency planning process under the National Security Council's Executive Steering Group (ESG), which was established and supported by an Iraq Political-Military Cell; it was designed to provide post-war relief, security sector reform, and an outline for state reconstruction.[283] In January of 2003, President Bush gave the Department of Defense (DoD) the lead role in post-war planning, which consequently established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). Along with the State Department, the DoD and OHRA coordinated plans to de-Ba'athify bureaucratic institutions and reinstate reformed Iraqi armed forces.

Prior to the start of combat operations in March of 2003, the U.S. government anticipated a post-war political transition managed by Iraqi exiles, many of which had been involved in the pre-war planning effort as demonstrated above. According to various media reports, "several Iraqi exiles lobbied Congress and the White House years before the commencement of combat operations in Iraq and...certain individuals had developed influential relationships with different branches and agencies in the U.S. government."[284] It became clear that this meticulously planned transition of power possessed gaps from the beginning of American occupation of Baghdad:

> "As U.S. troops moved into Baghdad, the city quickly fell into a state of anarchy. Angry citizens stormed through Baghdad's neighborhoods, looting and destroying buildings associated with Saddam's rule. The destruction caused by weeks of lawlessness in the city created several problems for political transition. First, looters took property that was essential infrastructure for running a government, including computers, phones, copy machines, and even desks and chairs. These items needed to be replaced before ministries

[282] Bensahel, Nora, et al. *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*. 1st ed., RAND Corporation, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg642a., p. 160
[283] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1021
[284] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 159

> could function again. Second, many government buildings were burned or demolished, destroying important documents necessary for running the government. Third, the sense of lawlessness had a negative psychological impact on the city, which made coalition forces' efforts to gain the public's trust more difficult. All these factors hindered the development of national governance structures."[285]

In addition to the post-war destruction, pre-war Iraq lacked the institutional strength and bureaucratic capacity to provide a baseline for nation-building endeavors. Despite its facade of modernization, Iraq failed to develop the "substance" of a modern state under Saddam Hussein's repressive reign: it faced economic distress and high levels of debt, the military possessed extensive powers, and the state lacked any form of civil society.[286] Perhaps most important of all, Iraqi society under Saddam Hussein and his predecessors had long championed the fusion of politics and violence, which has had lasting and detrimental effects on post-war nation-building efforts.

President Bush's vision for the restoration of governing forces consisted of three phases: first, he planned the establishment of a transitional government by the end of May, 2003, that would have "power over 'non-sensitive' government ministries such as education and health care."[287] This transitional government would be succeeded by a provisional government between six months and two years after the interim authority was established; this government would have "greater powers than its predecessor and be tasked with writing a constitution."[288] Finally, this transitional stage would culminate in formal, national elections for permanent government positions. Within weeks of the American seizure of Baghdad, a myriad of fledgling political groups, independent candidates, and tribal leaders came forward, each with their own blueprints

---

[285] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 161
[286] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1018
[287] Jehl, Douglas and Eric Schmitt. "U.S. Reported to Push for Iraqi Government, with Pentagon Prevailing," *New York Times*, April 30, 2003.
[288] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1020

for a new and improved Iraq.[289] Some sources estimate that roughly 100 political parties emerged during the initial weeks and months of liberation, six of which formed the crux of the Iraqi political arena:[290]

Political Party Name	**Affiliation**
Iraqi National Congress (INC)	Shi'a exile group
Iraqi National Accord (INA)	Shi'a exile group
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	Kurdish organization
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)	Kurdish organization
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	Shi'a organization
Da'wa	Shi'a organization

Table 3: The six major political organizations that emerged following the fall of Saddam Hussein.

While political parties formed, British and American forces decided they would officially spearhead the political transformation effort before handing the reins to an Iraqi interim authority. In early April, 2003, the Bush administration announced plans to hold a series of summits with potential Iraqi leaders to deliberate over plans for a democratic, representative government.[291] On April 15th, a thirteen-point memorandum was produced from one of these summits, outlining the stipulations for a new Iraq; point seven was particularly paramount, and asserted that "Iraqis must choose their leaders [and] not have them imposed from the outside."[292] Despite the ostensible success of these meetings, a growing point of contention arose in the inclusion of Iraqi exiles, backed by the United States, in the political plans, in contrast to the

[289] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 161
[290] Basu, Monica. "Iraqi Political Parties Vie to Fill Postwar Void." *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 8, 2003; Ford, Peter. "Democracy Begins to Sprout in Iraq." *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 2003.
[291] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 162
[292] "13-Point Statement on a Democratic Iraq." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 16 Apr. 2003, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/16/iraq.

exclusion of leaders from Saddam's administration who remained in Iraq.[293] These tensions intensified over the coming months, particularly during the reign of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Between May of 2003 and June of 2004, the CPA, headed by American Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, attempted to restore order before handing power over to Iraqi candidates. In CPA Orders Number 1 and Number 2, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi armed forces and later purged a high volume of Ba'athists from the ravaged government.[294] Although originally deemed a necessary measure to maintain security and prevent the reorganization of opposition forces loyal to Saddam Hussein, the disintegration of the armed forces and civil services had two lasting, destructive effects: first, roughly 250,000 civil servants and members of the armed forces were left unemployed, creating a shortage of qualified officials to provide valuable guidance throughout the reconstruction era. Second, the dissolution of these positions triggered a wave of discontent, fueling both the insurgency and sweeping anti-American sentiment.

In July of 2003, Bremer announced the selection of an Iraqi interim authority, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which consisted of the six major political organizations referenced in Table 3, in addition to minor parties and independent candidates.[295] The IGC lacked any official governing powers at the time, merely acting as the Iraqi face of American authority. It consisted of twenty-five members and was explicitly sectarian: it possessed thirteen Shi'a representatives, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkman and one Assyrian.[296] Of these twenty-five members, sixteen either came from outside the country or from the north, resulting in both a lack of

---

[293] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 163
[294] Gordon, Michael R. "Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 17 Mar. 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/world/middleeast/17bremer.html?login=email&auth=login-email.
[295] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 161
[296] Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. *Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017., p. 90

recognition and trust from the general Iraqi public.[297] Additionally and perhaps most notably, Sunni Arabs were hit hardest during this time, first from Bremer's orders to disband civil servants and armed forces, and second from their exclusion from the political process.

The stark contrast between their treatment in the former regime—which consisted of promotions to prominent positions within the government and the allocation of resources and wealth—and their post-war disenfranchisement radicalized many Sunnis. In fact, Sunni insurgents challenged the legitimacy of the IGC almost immediately, accusing the assembly of collaborating too closely with the United States.[298] A wave of violence aimed at the IGC and other politicians involved in the creation and promotion of Iraqi democracy resulted in the deaths of high-profile figures.[299] Sunni Arabs, who held power throughout most of the 20th century, feared majority tyranny over minority groups like themselves: "Not surprisingly, minorities often fight democratization because they fear that majority rule would install in power a permanent elected majority that would never allow the minority a voice in decision-making."[300]

By November of 2003, the Iraqi public had become increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress with regard to an elected government and security improvements. Most of this frustration was directed toward the CPA, U.S. officials and Bremer himself. According to a leaked CIA document dated November 10th, Iraqi citizens were losing faith generally in the U.S., and this lack of confidence was materializing in the form of an armed insurgency.[301] In December of 2003, Sunni Arabs organized their own political party, titled the State Council for the Sunnis, which united three subdivisions: the Sufis, the Salafis, and the left-leaning Muslim

---

[297] "The Iraqi Council," *Washington Post,* July 14, 2003; "Iraqi Governing Council Members," *BBC News Online*, July 14, 2003; "A Look at New Iraqi Leaders," *Baltimore Sun*, July 16, 2003.
[298] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 168
[299] Dreazen, Yochi J. "Insurgents Turn Guns on Iraqis Backing Democracy." *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2003.
[300] Byman, Daniel. "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities." *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4137575., p. 53
[301] Jehl, Douglas. "CIA Report Suggests Iraqis Are Losing Faith in U.S. Efforts," *New York Times*, November 13, 2003.

Brotherhood.[302] Together, they demanded political representation in the new Iraq. Other Sunnis banded together, particularly across the "Sunni Triangle"—which includes Fallujah, Tikrit, Ramadi and Samara—calling for "jihad against the United States and for Arab Sunnis to rise up and overthrow their occupiers. Throughout CPA's tenure, an increasingly well-organized insurgency against coalition forces grew in the Sunni Triangle."[303]

By the spring of 2004, the United States began conducting large-scale counterinsurgency operations against Sunni Arab insurgents in Fallujah and an emergent Shi'a militia led by nationalist Muqtada al-Sadr.[304] Because coalition forces had not anticipated the necessity of resuming military operations, they lacked "a clear overall COIN strategy…[and] coalition forces focused on tactical matters, executing door-to-door raids mixed with presence patrols in Baghdad and other cities; both approaches proved increasingly intermittent and ineffective over time."[305] During April and May of 2004 in particular, U.S. forces in Iraq felt compelled to divert resources and energy away from reconstruction efforts in order to combat the growing, multi-faceted insurgency and sectarian violence. Insurgents in the "Sunni Triangle" found U.S. forces' limited tactical intelligence, their lack of familiarity with the region and an inadequate counterinsurgency strategy particularly easy to exploit; by the summer of 2004, Sunni insurgents began targeting main supply routes, often detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which not only killed coalition forces, but restricted the flow of supplies to areas in need of aid.[306]

One of the primary grievances of Sunni Arabs was the over-presence of Americans in the new political process. In an attempt to quell the rising insurgency, American officials sought to

---

[302] Wong, Edward. "Sunnis in Iraq Form Own Political Council." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 26 Dec. 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/12/26/world/sunnis-in-iraq-form-own-political-council.html.
[303] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 165
[304] Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2*. RAND Corporation, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg595-3osd., p. 11
[305] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 11
[306] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 11

transfer power to the Iraqis as soon as possible. Various setbacks hindered this process, particularly with regard to drafting the constitution; many Iraqis and coalition leaders alike grappled with issues like religion in politics, the reconciliation of Iraqi exiles with Iraqi locals and former members of the regime, the question of enhancing security, and the reduction the role of the United States in the political realm.[307] On March 1, 2004, the IGC agreed to a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which enshrined individual rights, incorporated Islam, designated twenty-five percent of parliament's seats for women, and conditioned that elections for a 275-member assembly would be held in January of 2005.[308] Iraqis were largely angered at the prospect of waiting almost another year for elections, sparking fears that the United States would never leave. However, the main rationale behind delaying elections was the "poor security environment" that had the potential to endanger the success of elections:

> "The UN envoy argued that elections would not be feasible if security could not be ensured at voting stations. Thus, continued violence helped to delay one of the key demands of most Iraqis—to select their leaders through popular votes. The failure of coalition forces to improve the security environment adversely affected the safety and productivity of the Iraqi Interim Government. It also damaged Iraqi perceptions of the occupying powers' motives and intentions toward the country."[309]

While many cited this weakness in the security sector as potentially catastrophic, the Bush administration decided that postponing elections would fuel the insurgent cause, and proceeded to make extensive arrangements for the first official electoral processes. During the months of preparation, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi proclaimed his allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Their respective terrorist organizations merged, and al-Zarqawi officially launched al Qaeda in Iraq, which began orchestrating and managing small, decentralized cells.

---

[307] Patrick, Tyler E. "Iraqi Groups Badly Divided over How to Draft a Charter." *New York Times*, September 20, 2003; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "Iraqis Call U.S. Goal on Constitution Impossible," *Washington Post*, September 30, 2003.
[308] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 181
[309] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 188

Retrospectively, glaring holes in Iraq's security sector, including a lack of organizational and detection capabilities, easily facilitated the group's pervasion. By the time January's elections came around, AQI had already established strong footholds across major cities and rural areas.

January 2005 Elections

On January 30th, 2005, more than 8.5 million of 14.7 million registered voters flocked to the polls to vote on a 275-seat transitional National Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq's eighteen provinces, and for a Kurdistan regional assembly. These preliminary elections represented the first steps of a year-long process to institute a new government, ratify and agree upon an official constitution, and hold elections for a constitutional government.[310] More than 8.5 million of 14.7 (fifty-three percent) registered voters cast their ballots according to the proportional representation, or closed list, electoral system, in which voters chose among political entities. The following table depicts the election results for the National Assembly:

[310] "Iraq: Elections Held in 2005." *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm.

Political Party	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage of Votes
United Iraqi Alliance	140	4,075,295	48.19
Kurdish Alliance	75	2,175,551	25.73
Iraqi List of Iyad Allawi	40	1,168,943	13.82
Iraqis	5	150,680	1.78
Turkomen Iraqi Front	3	93,480	1.11
National Independent Elites and Cadres Party	3	69,938	0.83
Communist Party	2	69,920	0.83
Islamic Kurdish Society	2	60,592	0.72
Islamic Labor Movement in Iraq	2	43,205	0.51
National Democratic Alliance	1	36,795	0.44
National Rafidain List	1	36,255	0.43
Reconciliation and Liberation Entity	1	30,796	0.36

Table 4: Electoral results from the January 30th, 2005 Transitional National Assembly elections.[311]

Notably, the top three groups, comprising only Shi'a Arabs and Kurds, occupied 255 seats. Sunni Arabs, who represented roughly twenty percent of the total population, held only seventeen seats, or roughly six percent of total seats.[312] The conspicuous absence of Sunnis can, in part, be attributed to their boycott of the elections, organized in November of 2004 by an influential Sunni clerics' group, the Association of Muslim Scholars.[313] This, coupled with the fact that "insurgents repeatedly targeted polling stations and threatened to kill anyone who voted," resulted in low Sunni voter turnout.[314] According to an opinion poll conducted in early January of 2005, only nine percent of Sunnis said they were likely to or would definitely vote, whereas

[311] Katzman, Kenneth. "Iraq: Elections and New Government." *CRS Report for Congress*, May 11, 2005 p. 6; Paya, Ali, and John L. Esposito. *Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World*. Vol. 18, Taylor & Francis, 2011., p. 57
[312] Katzman, "Iraq: Elections and New Government," p. 5
[313] "Iraq: Elections Held in 2005." *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm.
[314] Katzman, Kenneth. *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 2009, p. 1

eighty and fifty-seven percent of Shi'as and Kurds intended to vote.[315] On election day, sixteen insurgent-directed attacks were recorded across Iraq, killing at least twenty-five people.[316] Generally, the lack of Sunni representation and the over-representation of other groups, like the Kurds, sowed the seeds for greater discontent and fueled the insurgency throughout the subsequent months:

> "Whether through principled opposition to foreign occupation, fear of insurgent reprisals, or unwillingness to participate in a losing venture, the vast majority of Sunni Arabs opted not to exercise their democratic right to vote. The marginalization of Sunni Arabs from the political process (self-imposed or otherwise) and the virtual exclusion of their representatives from the National Assembly [created] a serious problem for future political stability."[317]

The first duty of the elected Assembly was appointing an interim President; they selected Jalal Talabani, a Kurd. The second duty of the elected Assembly was the drafting and ratification of a constitution. On May 10, 2005, a fifty-five member drafting committee was appointed, although only two of these members were Sunni Arabs.[318] Many provisions outlined in the new constitution received widespread backlash, such as the stipulation permitting two or more provinces together to form new autonomous regions, each with their own independent, internal security forces (Article 117).[319] Sunnis registered in large numbers in an attempt to defeat the constitution, although they ultimately failed in procuring the two-thirds veto majority necessary per province.[320] These developments—the lack of representation in the interim National Assembly and stipulations laid out in the constitution that clashed with Sunni interests—had two profound, yet conflicting, effects: first, Sunni under-representation and marginalization fueled the insurgency and a "violent opposition to the new Iraqi political order," and second, it

---

[315] "Iraq: Elections Held in 2005." *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm.
[316] "Iraq: Elections Held in 2005." *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm.
[317] Anderson and Stansfield, "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model," p. 365
[318] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 1
[319] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 2
[320] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 2

"communicated the message to many Sunnis that their withdrawal from the political process – and the boycott of the January 2005 elections in particular – did not stop the consolidation of the new Iraqi political order as many seemed to hope it would."[321] This combination contributed to the enhanced participation of broad sections of the Sunni community in the December 2005 parliamentary elections.

December 2005 Elections

On December 15th, 2005, registered voters cast their ballots in a closed-list electoral system for the first full term 275-member Council of Representatives. Forty-five seats (roughly sixteen percent) were designated compensatory or national seats, or seats allocated among parties who won seats on the provincial level according to the number of votes they received overall.[322] This election was crucial in three primary ways: first, it equipped Iraq with its first full-fledged legislature since the invasion, representative of the changeover of power from American-led coalition forces to the Iraqi people. Second, the 275 legislators were to serve a four-year term, choose a lasting government, and tackle unresolved issues in the constitution. Lastly, it would begin to facilitate the withdrawal process of the United States.[323] Of the roughly 15.5 million registered voters, 12.1 million cast votes (seventy-eight percent) across eighteen electoral districts. The following table depicts the results from the elections for the National Assembly:

[321] O'Sullivan and Al-Saiedi, *Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications*, p. 18
[322] O'Sullivan and Al-Saiedi, *Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications*, p. 18
[323] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 58

Political Party	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage of Votes
United Iraqi Alliance	128	5,021,137	41.19
Kurdistan Alliance	53	2,642,172	21.67
Iraqi Accord Front	44	1,840,216	15.09
Iraqi National List	25	977,325	8.02
Iraqi National Dialogue	11	499,963	4.10
Islamic Union of Kurdistan	5	157,688	1.29
Progressives	2	145,028	1.19
Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc	3	129,847	1.07
Iraqi Turkmen Front	1	87,993	0.72
Al Rafidain List	1	47,263	0.39
Mithal Al-Alousi List For Iraqi Nation	1	32,245	0.26
Al-Ezediah Movement	1	21,908	0.18

Table 5: Electoral results from the December 15th, 2005 Council of Representatives elections.[324]

The polls largely reflected the sectarian division of votes. The Shi'a dominated United Iraqi Alliance held onto its lead, comprising roughly forty-five percent of the total seats; next, the Kurdistan Alliance remained steadfast, holding on to roughly twenty percent of seats; lastly, the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Accord Front and the Iraqi National List trailed behind.[325] Although this election was promising in that it reflected the interests of at least part of the Sunni population, it also "showed increasing sectarian politics in Iraq. There was no candidate or political party with a definite political philosophy or political agenda, just religious and ethnic

[324] O'Sullivan and Al-Saiedi, *Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications*, p. 19; Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 59; "Iraq Parliamentary Elections: 15 December 2005." *IFES Election Guide*, www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1431/.
[325] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 58

entities. The electoral campaign also fanned sectarianism rather than [contributed] to national unity and liberation."[326]

While relatively few attacks were carried out by insurgents during election day, the December 2005 elections had profound effects on the proliferation and transformation of the insurgent cause. On one hand, specific factions of the insurgency disappeared as many Sunni clerics in hotbeds like Anbar and Fallujah instructed their congregations to vote in order to facilitate greater representation in the government.[327] On the other, emerging groups like AQI terrorized politicians and voters alike with death threats.[328] The group, thought to be financed by supporting factions in Saudi Arabia and neighboring Syria, mushroomed significantly in the subsequent months.

The general tone of the insurgency also underwent a transformation: before the elections, roughly eighty percent of attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated areas in central Iraq against coalition forces, whereas predominantly Kurdish and Shi'a cities and regions remained relatively peaceful.[329] Former members of Saddam's regime comprised "the core of the insurgency."[330] However, after the December 2005 elections, Islamic fundamentalists, exploiting Iraq's security vacuum and the lack of centralized control, joined the cause, ushering in heightened anti-American and anti-secular rhetoric. In particular, "the election results cemented ethnic and sectarian divisions within Iraqi society...Coalition forces and foreign personnel [were] not the primary targets; instead, the events of targeting religious figures and indiscriminate killings on the occasion of religious gatherings [became] a common phenomenon."[331]

---

[326] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 58
[327] Wong, Edward. "Turnout in the Iraqi Election Is Reported at 70 Percent." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Dec. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/12/22/world/middleeast/turnout-in-the-iraqi-election-is-reported-at-70-percent.html.
[328] Wong, "Turnout in the Iraqi Election Is Reported at 70 Percent," The New York Times
[329] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 61
[330] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 61
[331] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 61

In April of 2006, the Parliament officially elected incumbent President Jalal Talabani for a four-year term.[332] Talabani appointed Nouri Jawad al-Maliki, a Shi'a member of Parliament (MP), to preside over the new government as Prime Minister, and he took office in May of 2006.[333] In a balancing act, Parliament also elected Mahmoud Dawud al-Mashhadani, a Sunni Arab, as Speaker of the Parliament.[334] The government's new cabinet also reflected equalizing efforts to incorporate members pertaining to each major sect: in the distribution of ministerial posts, twenty-one went to Shi'a Arabs, eight to Sunni Arabs, seven to Kurds, and one to a Christian.[335] These attempts, although ostensibly unifying, seem to have underlying divisive effects:

> "Most groups joining the government are still likely to view the ministries they have been allocated as vehicles for patronage. The main Shi'a alliance retains the Oil Ministry. They will also control most of the 'service ministries,' including health, education, transport and promote themselves as the main benefactor. The Kurds not only hold the Presidency, they also keep the Foreign Ministry. Here it is interesting to note that while Shia and Sunni Arabs remained arguing bitterly over the shape and control of Iraq, the Kurds were steadily entrenching their autonomy in the north."[336]

The following months saw greater and greater levels of mistrust between members of the new government, increasingly sect-based politics, and rising levels of violence as foreign terrorists continued to permeate the weak fabric of Iraqi society. In the spring of 2006, foreign extremists destroyed the golden dome of the Ali al-Hadi Mosque, sixty miles north of Baghdad.[337] Two tombs in the mosque were greatly revered by Shi'as, and their destruction provoked retaliatory attacks against Sunni mosques in Baghdad and Basra. Shi'a Ayatollah al-Sistani released a statement saying: "If the government's security forces cannot provide the necessary protection,

---

[332] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 62
[333] Hahn, Peter L. *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016., p. 28
[334] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 62
[335] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 15
[336] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 62
[337] Worth, Robert F. "Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Feb. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys-shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html.

the believers will do it."[338] On August 3, 2006, the U.S. Central Command commander, General John Abizaid, said in congressional testimony: "I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I've seen it in Baghdad in particular, and that, if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war."[339]

Meanwhile, AQI transformed into ISIS. On October 15th, 2005, members of the leadership announced the formation of an Islamic State comprising the provinces of al Anbar, Kirkuk, SalahadDin, Diyala, and portions of Babel and Wasit.[340] The inception of ISIS only augmented sectarian violence, and seemed to cement sect-centric politics as well:

> "[ISIS] claimed to be [forming] in response to Kurds and Shi'a Arabs securing semi-autonomous regions within Iraq. Islamic extremists continued attacking Shi'a Arabs, whom they portrayed as apostates in league with foreign occupiers. By early 2006, sectarian violence was escalating in areas where Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs were mixed, especially the Baghdad area. In some neighborhoods, Iraqis relied on militias and less-formal organizations for security; however, these were increasingly outlawed by U.S. and Iraqi security forces. In several areas, Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs began to relocate along sectarian lines, amid violence reminiscent of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the Balkans, especially Bosnia."[341]

Throughout 2006, U.S. officials estimated that Shi'a militias killed more people than Sunni insurgents; they represented a particular issue as the militias were "represented politically within the government, and they infiltrated Iraqi police forces."[342] As sectarian strife reached all-time highs, Prime Minister al-Maliki composed a national reconciliation plan aimed at "defusing the insurgency and tackling the sectarian violence."[343]

---

[338] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 16
[339] Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., August 3, 2006. General Abizaid was responding to a question from Senator Carl Levin (Democrat, Michigan) as to whether Iraq might be sliding toward civil war.
[340] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 15
[341] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 16
[342] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 16
[343] Nazir, "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq," p. 63

By August of 2006, top Iraqi politicians and coalition forces consolidated a series of benchmarks in an effort to achieve political reconciliation.[344] In addition to providing financial aid, the United States sent roughly 30,000 additional forces to Iraq in early 2007 in what became known as "the surge." It was "intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of extremist groups. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that was attributed to surge—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing."[345] However, coalition forces advocated for the continued entrenchment of adopted laws, institutions, norms, and compromises among ethno-religious factions in order to fully quash the insurgency. Throughout 2008 and 2009, Maliki's growing strength and authority over the nation increased levels of optimism, although it became clear that the 2010 elections would represent the ultimate test.

March 2010 Elections

The March 2010 elections represented the final probe into Iraq's stability, the last stepping stone in coalition efforts to build democracy before the withdrawal of American forces: "The short and fierce political campaign could end up either solidifying Iraq's nascent democracy or leaving the country fractured along ethnic and sectarian lines."[346] Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds alike turned out in full force to vote for a 325-member Parliament, which possessed seven national seats and eight seats reserved for religious minorities.[347] The Parliament would

[344] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 3
[345] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 3
[346] Myers, Steven Lee. "As Iraq Tallies Vote, U.S. Says Pullout Plans Are 'On Track.'" *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html.
[347] O'Sullivan and Al-Saiedi, *Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications*, p. 23

choose the full-term government, with the majority exercising significant power to select a prime minister.

According to a New York Times article, the elections were "arguably the most open, most competitive election in the nation's long history of colonial rule, dictatorship and war."[348] Despite this ringing endorsement, insurgents still managed to inflict serious damage. On March 3rd, just days before the elections, a series of suicide bombings north of Baghdad killed over thirty-two people and injured more than forty.[349] While Iraqi politicians and American forces touted the progress made across the security sector since 2005, analysts continued to point out that "forces wishing to disrupt the political process have shown that they are still capable of mounting serious attacks."[350] Additionally, legislation passed regarding candidate eligibility angered many Sunnis, as the Justice and Accountability Commission invalidated the candidacies of almost 500 contenders, most of which were Sunni Arabs and possessed ties to Saddam's regime.

When the polls closed at the end of the day on March 7th, 2010, party leaders announced that two coalitions performed best: first, the Iraqi List led by Ayad Allawi, who promised to take steps to reconcile sectarian divisions, and second, the State of the Law coalition led by Prime Minister al-Maliki, who campaigned on enhanced security.[351] Neither coalition secured an outright majority, which resulted in ambiguity surrounding al-Maliki's potential second term as Prime Minister. The following table depicts the results from the parliamentary elections:

---

[348] Myers, "As Iraq Tallies Vote, U.S. Says Pullout Plans Are 'On Track.'" *The New York Times*.
[349] Smith, Ben. "The Parliamentary Election in Iraq, March 2010." *House of Common, International, Affairs and Defence Section*, Library 11, May 2010, p. 3
[350] Smith, "The Parliamentary Election in Iraq, March 2010," p. 3
[351] Myers, "As Iraq Tallies Vote, U.S. Says Pullout Plans Are 'On Track.'" *The New York Times*.

Political Party	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage of Votes
Iraqi List of Ayad Allawi	91	2,849,612	24.72
State of the Law List	89	2,792,083	24.22
Iraqi National Alliance	70	2,092,066	18.15
Kurdistan Alliance	43	1,681,714	14.59
Iraqi Consensus Front	8	476,478	4.13
The Unity of Iraq Coalition	4	306,647	2.66
The Changing List	6	298,226	2.59
Islamic Union of Kurdistan	4	243,720	2.12
Kurdistan Islamic Group	2	152,530	1.32
Minorities	8	61,153	-

Table 6: Electoral results from the March 7th, 2010 Parliamentary elections.[352]

Allawi's faction, which held the greatest number of seats, jeopardized al-Maliki's chances to extend his premiership to a second term. On April 19th, a panel of Iraqi judges ordered the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to conduct a recount in Baghdad after alleged evidence demonstrating irregularities in the Baghdad count surfaced.[353] Several international observers rendered the recount invalid, as there was little substantiation pointing to electoral fraud.[354] Ultimately, the recount did not result in an alteration of seat-party allocations.

The widely sectarian and faction-centric parliament, however, did create issues of its own. The newly-elected Council of Representatives met on June 15th, 2010 to select a leadership team. The forum lasted eighteen minutes; because of political deadlock, Parliament did not elect a leadership team and remained inactive for many months.[355] With the U.S. combat mission

[352] Smith, "The Parliamentary Election in Iraq, March 2010," p. 8; "Iraqi Council of Representatives." *IPU Parline Database: IRAQ, ELECTIONS IN 2010*, Inter-Parliamentary Union, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_10.htm.; Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 25
[353] Smith, "The Parliamentary Election in Iraq, March 2010," p. 8
[354] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 12
[355] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 13

nearing completion, the United States intervened once again in mediating the hotly contested political standstill. Finally, on October 1st, al-Maliki received the necessary support from the Council of Representatives deputies, bringing him within range of obtaining another term.[356]

On February 1st, 2011, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffries testified that the new Iraqi government represented a triumph for U.S. foreign policy in that centered heavily on power-sharing.[357] However, ethno-sectarian divisions continue to persist, often manifesting themselves in violent outbreaks and mass protests. The Iraqi security forces, largely inadequate to handle the ramp up of ISIS as it grew and conquered vast swaths of territory from 2011 to 2016, lacked authority and the resources necessary to keep the order. Violence and instability in neighboring countries, including Syria and Iran, has also compromised the security of Iraqi civilians across the country.

Conclusions

In summary, the invasion in March of 2003, the demise of Saddam Hussein's half-century-long totalitarian reign, and the collapse of most bureaucratic organizations produced considerable socio-political changes. The coercive apparatus crumbled, high-ranking individuals connected to the Sunni-dominated Ba'ath party were deposed and stripped of power, and power relations reversed, with Shi'a Arabs and Kurds finally exercising control in the political arena. However, the establishment of new political parties, governing systems, and a constitution could not compensate for the general destruction of law and order, which created not only a security vacuum, but a breeding ground for terrorist groups and insurgencies. Sunni Arabs in particular have largely backed multiple insurgencies and have resisted the new Iraqi order, which

[356] Siddique, Haroon. "Nouri Al-Maliki Offered New Term as Iraqi Prime Minister." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 25 Nov. 2010, www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/25/nouri-al-maliki-iraqi-prime-minister.
[357] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 16

represented a fall from the privileged positions they enjoyed during Saddam's rule. In response, violent Shi'a militias have emerged to combat Sunni organizations, many of which have been able to penetrate the political arena and Iraqi security forces, which has led to widespread corruption. AQI and ISIS have taken advantage of the absence of a centralized, capable security force in order to execute their own agendas, bringing with them widespread destruction and the necessity for individuals to take security into their own hands.

From these seeds of unrest, instability and sect-centric divisions, we can discern three primary lessons relating to Iraq's regression into near anarchy. First, exclusionary politics, exhibited by the under-representation and omission of former elites in electoral processes, played a significant role in the escalation of violence. Second, as demonstrated by the literature propounding a correlation between democratization and violence, Iraq backslid into anarchy because necessary institutions pertaining particularly to security and the coercive apparatus did not take precedence in post-war rebuilding processes. Third, American forces of Iraq sparked nationalistic backlash against occupation, which increased when it became clear that the U.S. intended to install a pro-American, pro-western leader.

I. Exclusionary Politics

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, British colonialists first drew illogical borders, encompassing a number of ethno-religious groups with little in common, and then installed Sunni Arabs as proxy leaders following World War I. The lack of social cohesion, shared values, and equal representation set the stage for a tumultuous transition of power:

> "...the congruence – or at least the compatibility – between territorial borders with patterns of social cohesion and legitimacy is essential for successful state-building. But state-building is a non-linear process in permanent motion on a continuum between fragile/weak and strong state images and practices. These rely not just on territorial

> control but also on financial resources as well as the establishment of a minimum of social cohesion and legitimacy."[358]

Following the Ba'ath party's consolidation of power, Saddam Hussein largely filled high-ranking positions within his government with Sunni Arabs. While Shi'a Arabs represented the majority in the country, Saddam's "repressive ways were credited with keeping the fractious population of 26 million—including 20 percent Sunni Muslims, who dominated; 55 percent Shiite Muslims; 20 percent Kurds plus several tiny minorities including Christians—from shattering along ethnic lines."[359] Thus, for roughly eighty years, Shi'a Arabs were marginalized and excluded from politics, although unable to successfully challenge the existing power structure due to Saddam's highly capable and violent coercive apparatus.

The invasion of 2003 "marked the empowerment of sect-centric political actors and the political institutionalization of Iraq's sectarian and other communal divides; in Arab Iraq, it marked the beginning of the contest between Shi'a-centric state building and Sunni rejection."[360] The exclusion and widespread boycott of Sunni Arabs in early electoral processes possessed enduring effects on the ensuing insurgency and rampant use of violence for two primary reasons. First, as demonstrated in the El Salvador case, the inclusion of *all* factions in post-war politics is essential to maintaining the peace, as actors feel they have the opportunity to address the grievances of members of the population. Second, by excluding Sunni Arabs, the CPA and interim authorities not only neglected a significant portion of the population, but they also marginalized former elites who had the power, resources, and long-standing military operational experience to contest the new-found political order.

---

[358] Kurtenbach, "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America," p. 10
[359] Macfarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." The New York Times.
[360] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 8

New studies assert that "whether a post-war state emerges as democratic or not depends to a large extent on the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders."[361] For Sunni Arabs, this bargaining process was essentially non-existent. When examining the ramifications, it is first important to note that domestic elites indispensable to the post-war rebuilding process do not come exclusively from the political arena.[362] Instead, elites spanning all functional aspects of society play a significant role in reconstruction:

> "Economic elites play an enormous role in transition, generating and providing the financial resources necessary for (post-conflict) democratisation, while security elites control the security forces (both regular forces, such as the military and the police, and irregular forces, such as criminal networks and rebel groups) and can therefore easily return a post-conflict country to a state of turmoil. Another important role of elites is to interpret and define social reality and thereby influence public opinion and the preference-formation of large parts of the society. Accordingly, civil society elites (that is, leaders of civil society organisations, popular writers, artists and intellectuals, but also religious elites and elders) can also play such a role, challenging incumbent political elites through their activities."[363]

Consensus between elites, peace-builders and new political forces is essential to achieving peaceful democratization, institutional reform, and norm-building. In particular, domestic elites' stamps of approval may provide the stability necessary for a peaceful transition: "Elite consensus is an expression of commitment to the democratic rules of the game. Once the political elites abide by those rules, the electorate is likely to accept democracy as a legitimate political system."[364] Furthermore, the establishment of these rules and norms from the beginning is preeminent in discouraging the use of violence. As demonstrated above, the decisive exclusion of domestic elites from the post-war reconstruction process forced many Sunnis to resort to resistance via violent tactics.

---

[361] Grimm, Sonja and Brigitte Weiffen. "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact." *Conflict, Security & Development*, 18:4, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2018.1483556, p. 270
[362] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 262
[363] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 262
[364] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 263

The two predominant catalysts for resistance were the disbandment of Iraqi armed forces and de-Ba'athification, which had profound effects on Sunni Arabs. As mentioned above, the dissolution of the army and military not only created a security gap, but also left hundreds of thousands of men unemployed, embittered and fundamentally opposed to American occupation and Shi'a political dominance. De-Ba'athification, which was originally justifiable due to security concerns and Shi'a complaints of extensive suffering at the hands of the party, had a similar effect, stripping former elites of their power. After the January 2005 elections, one Sunni religious leader reportedly stated: "They have destroyed our institutions, our people and our security. They have totally erased us."[365] Feeling sidelined and deprived of their former status, many Sunni Arabs felt they had no choice but to support the nascent insurgency, which originally targeted the "occupiers" but later victimized Shi'as.[366]

It was not until six months after coalition forces toppled Saddam's regime that Sunni Arabs successfully organized their own political party.[367] Exiled Shi'as and Kurds, who began organizing their own political factions long before the invasion, possessed a distinct advantage in electoral processes, particularly as they had the time, resources, and American sponsorship to campaign effectively. Shi'as in particular championed the reversal of the political order:

> "Politically, the fact that identity politics and Shi'a-centric state building resonated with a significant body of Shi'a opinion was reflected in the electoral process. For a certain constituency, regime change provided a unique opportunity through which to guarantee the empowerment of Shi'a political actors, thereby validating their sense of entitlement, their sense of victimhood, and their demographic weight. This partly explains the sweeping success of the UIA—the grand Shi'a electoral coalition—in the December 2005 election."[368]

---

[365] Hashim, Ahmed S. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Cornell University Press, 2006. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf8c5d., p. 20

[366] Moaddel, Mansoor, et al. "Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 123, no. 4, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25655568., p 632

[367] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 189

[368] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 14

Electoral processes particularly represent the solidification and validity of a new social and political order, which is partly why we see significant upsurges in violence on or just before election days. In this case, electoral processes *decreased* the state of security, as insurgents and former elites attempted to outwardly reject and disrupt the most fundamental element of democracy:

> "Some argue that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the new-found subordination of the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shi'a militia factions to counter the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing."[369]

Sect-centric and exclusionary politics paved the way for what many denominate now as "the wars of all against all," or the internal strife between Coalition forces and Sunni insurgents, foreign terrorist groups, and Shi'a based militia members; Sunni Arabs against Shi'a Arabs; and terrorist organizations against Shi'as, Kurds and foreign workers.[370] Generally, political theorists agree that a transfer of power from one faction to another tends to generate conflict.[371] This transferal extended beyond politicians, including the general public as well, as Shi'as and Kurds rose in status above newly-marginalized Sunnis. Violence took on an increasingly multi-faceted nature, resulting in extreme difficulty in coordinating a centralized, effective response:

> "The insurgents' success had both political and military effects. The growing insurgency prevented the Iraqi government from exerting its writ of control across Iraq. The relationship between insurgent groups remains to this day a complex milieu of Sunni Arab insurgents, Shi'a militia, criminal gangs, foreigners, and other opportunists who conduct business at a transactional level—which is why U.S. efforts to split or wedge these groups and their leaders from one another have proven so difficult."[372]

---

[369] Katzman, *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, p. 3
[370] Moaddel et al, "Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys," p. 624
[371] Moaddel et al, "Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys," p. 632
[372] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, p. 15

Zarqawi and subsequent ISIS leaders, taking advantage of existing sectarian schisms, "set a strategic goal of making Iraq ungovernable by unleashing a wave of sectarian killings designed to foment civil war between Sunni and Shi'a."[373] In his teachings, Zarqawi declared that there could be no "'total victory' over the Jews and Christians without a 'total annihilation' of the Shi'a, whom he called the secret agents of Islam's enemies."[374]

At the root of the virulent insurgency, the ensuing emergence of faction-based militias, and the pervasion of terrorist organizations is Iraq's inability to effectively manage communal pluralism.[375] Many of these challenges stem from the arbitrary borders British imperialists drew up following World War I, which created states without a common identity or sense of unity. Since power-sharing was non-existent during Saddam's reign, incorporating voices from all ethno-religious groups has been an unfamiliar, difficult process. However, had the CPA and interim authorities adopted greater measures to encourage the inclusion of Sunnis and, more specifically, former elites in the post-war rebuilding process, incentives for the use of violence may have decreased. Instead, the unchecked use of violence, force and destabilizing forces was enabled by the absence of an operative, effective coercive apparatus.

II. Institutional Deficiencies

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-war actualities resulted in a lack of strong, functioning bureaucratic institutions. As propounded by Mansfield and Snyder, institutions enhance the legitimacy and stability of the state, abate domestic political competition, and strengthen security.[376] Additionally, particularly for nations

---

[373] Walker, Martin. "The Revenge of the Shia." *The Wilson Quarterly*, 2006., p. 18
[374] Walker, "The Revenge of the Shia," p. 18
[375] Haddad, *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, p. 8
[376] Mansfield and Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 9

lacking unity, institutions contribute in "knitting" together a common identity and shared sense of values.[377]

In post-2003 assessments on the current state of affairs, many American military and political personnel noted the "top-down paralysis" of governing institutions, placing particular emphasis on the decay of law and order structures. Commander of the U.S. Army's 5th Corps Lieutenant-General William Wallace stated: "What in fact happened, which was unanticipated at least in [my mind], is that when [we] decapitated the regime, everything below it fell apart."[378] With regard to security, pre-war planners had envisaged that Iraqi armed forces would undergo a process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), while continuing to provide the necessary security to oversee a peaceful transitional period. The post-war reality, however, was drastically different: "The Iraqi security sector...disappeared—army conscripts deserted, army officers and police personnel left their posts, and members of the security services went underground. Where they did not voluntarily disappear, local police officers were often removed either by the advancing coalition forces or by anti-regime militias."[379]

The collapse of the security sector was largely emblematic of the "paralysis" of all bureaucratic institutions that existed in the pre-invasion era.[380] Saddam's highly-centralized, hierarchical chain of command did not permit the transferal of power and authority from one civil servant to the next; when one fell, the rest did, too. As a result, coalition forces wasted precious time and energy starting from square one, often building institutions from scratch. The deficiencies with regard to the coercive apparatus and security were particularly devastating:

> "Beginning with rampant looting and violence throughout the country following the fall of Baghdad on April 9, coalition forces lost time and the trust of the population by failing

[377] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 10
[378] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1023
[379] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1023
[380] Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1024

> to control the security environment. The looting caused substantial damage to the government's infrastructure—including the destruction of most federal buildings and police stations, and many museums, schools, and hospitals—which, in turn, required coalition authorities to rebuild many of these institutions from the ground up, thus delaying political development. Furthermore, rampant unchecked looting made the population question coalition forces' capabilities and intentions in invading and occupying the country, including coalition plans to create a new Iraqi government."[381]

As referenced in the section on exclusionary politics, the U.S. failure to protect the Iraqi population played an extraordinary role in the emergence of the insurgency and ethno-sectarian violence. Civilians in particular were forced to take security matters into their own hands: "In the security vacuum that ensued, Iraqi citizens were forced to engage in a Faustian bargain—often looking to bad actors for protection—in order to survive."[382]

The consolidation of ISIS has been cited as one of the more prominent manifestations of security sector deficiencies in Iraq. As the terrorist organization controlled roughly forty percent of Iraq's territory at its peak in 2014, it wreaked havoc on other institutions and bureaucratic processes, jeopardizing Iraq's fragile democracy:[383] "Terrorism impeded reconstruction in several ways. It drove most of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) out of Iraq, prompted donor countries to reconsider making contributions, discouraged private companies from investing, [and] compelled the United States to divert funds toward security."[384] Thus, while the Iraq case demonstrates the importance of constructing institutions generally *before* holding elections or establishing any form of government, it highlights the primacy of establishing an effective, just and strong security sector.

---

[381] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 188
[382] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2*, p. iii
[383] "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State." *Wilson Center*, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.
[384] Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2*, p. 12

III. Nationalist and Jihadist Backlash

The eight-year American occupation of Iraq received two, dichotomous responses: the dominant came from Iraqi nationalists and Americans alike, both of whom advocated for the withdrawal of U.S. forces for different reasons. Social scientists have largely concluded that foreign occupation elicits a type of nationalist awareness, culminating in the "desire for liberation."[385] The assumption of authority by an intervening power, one that has been widely perceived as an imperialist, colonialist, self-serving entity, did not sit well with many Iraqis, particularly Sunnis. This discontent had broader effects: (1) political candidates associated with the U.S. were perceived as traitors, thus inhibiting electoral processes; (2) terrorist organizations like AQI and ISIS exploited anti-American sentiment in their recruiting efforts and use of violence; (3) the reconstruction process, which was largely driven by the U.S., lacked a coherent understanding of Iraq's culture and distinct ethno-religious history, much of which has compromised security today.

The other response, however, was rooted in the idea that if democracy were to survive and flourish in Iraq, it would require significant resources, aid and personnel from the U.S. and other intervening forces. Many asserted that organizing elections will not transform Iraq into a democracy. Rather,

> "Iraq's transition to a truly healthy functioning democracy will require educating the population, both formally and informally, to accept democratic values, norms, and institutions and encouraging the growth of civil associations, which could take a decade or longer to foster. Iraq cannot establish these values and institutions alone. The task may require a sustained commitment from the United States, its partners, and the international community, if Iraq is to become a stable and lasting democracy."[386]

---

[385] Moaddel et al, "Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys," p. 632
[386] Bensahel et al, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, p. 193

Additionally, others argued that early American withdrawal would make Iraq vulnerable to the self-serving agendas of neighboring countries like Iran, Turkey or Syria.[387] Further, they contend that many of the barriers to democracy relate to security, which the U.S. would be able to provide by deploying a large number of forces to Iraq: "In particular, intervening powers can help quell internal unrest and deter adventurism from neighboring powers.[388] Regardless of these responses, extended American occupation in Iraq had detrimental effects on the reconstruction era, particularly because the U.S. failed to capitalize on their powers as an intervening force, was unsuccessful in providing security for the populace, and wrongly encouraged sect-centric politics.

[387] Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," p. 49
[388] Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," p. 49

Chapter IV: Conclusions

As the United States has faced greater difficulties in maintaining hard fought foreign policy victories in the past half-century, adhering to the three strands of Just War Theory has become progressively more decisive. The most under-examined element in the tripartite theory, *jus post bellum*, has gained greater recognition in recent years as political scientists acknowledge its lasting effects on post-war peace. Accordingly, I found that security is a necessary prerequisite for stability in the post-war era; as such, I argue that *jus post bellum* is less about providing justice in the immediate aftermath of war, and more about establishing a foundation upon which to reconstruct a stable bureaucratic system equipped to execute its basic functions. As mentioned in the first chapter, I have aligned with the basic premises of population-centric warfare, which propounds the necessity of incorporating the domestic populace into the reconstruction process and winning over their hearts and minds. Without security, the populace remains incapacitated, unable to properly partake in electoral processes, and at risk of turning to insurgent forces for protection.

For the purposes of this study, the evolution of security in the *post bellum* era serves as a microcosmic indicator of national stability and transitional peace, both of which relate directly to waging and concluding a "just" war. While security sector institutions and programs can lay the groundwork for institutional and bureaucratic strength, we cannot conclusively draw a causal connection between democratic processes and heightened or decreased levels security. In both Iraq and El Salvador, other factors contributed to the evolution of security over the course of the post-war period, many of which pertained to political inclusion, cultural factors, and distinctive peace processes.

Democracy and Insecurity: Two Sides of the Same Coin

I have drawn several general conclusions from examining the post-war security sector over time in both El Salvador and Iraq. First, it is essential to acknowledge that no "cookie-cutter" mold exists with regard to creating "better" security in emergent democracies. In fact, a number of elements, often rooted in highly-contextualized factors like historical and cultural particularities, have driven states toward more lasting, stable peace and vice versa. For example, differences in factors like timing, geographic dispositions, ethnic and religious compositions, electoral systems, and threats have made it exceedingly difficult to juxtapose cases and distinguish elements that promote stability. Second, oversimplifying any causality between democracy and peace has had damaging repercussions. Even the "best case" scenario, El Salvador, possessed significant gaps with regard to post-war judicial reform, thereby jeopardizing civilian perceptions of state legitimacy and the efficacy of both the law and the judiciary. Spikes in unanswered gang violence and organized crime further underscored shortcomings in recreating effective security forces. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iraq's security vacuum enabled the proliferation of non-state actors to wreak havoc on the compromised infrastructure that remained, thereby subverting bureaucratic reconstruction efforts. While both cases differed greatly, both have illuminated the fundamental tension between the process of democratization, particularly in underdeveloped states, and security.

With that said, my second and third chapters underscored a few important (albeit imperfect) lessons we can examine when looking at security sector reconstruction in the *post bellum* era. Again, various circumstantial disparities between El Salvador and Iraq have made it difficult to compare cases directly. For example, El Salvador's military stalemate likely possessed psychological effects on insurgent and government forces alike, forcing them to accept

the fact that the use of violence would not yield desired political outcomes. In contrast, the insurgency in Iraq rose from the instability created by the transition from autocracy to democracy, and the absence of a comprehensive peace process facilitated disorganized chaos in the aftermath.

Situational considerations aside, and with full acknowledgement that extracting lessons from two completely different cases could not possibly encapsulate the intricacies of reconstructing the security sector, my analysis highlights four key takeaways: (1) in accordance with Mansfield and Snyder's argument, establishing operative institutions, particularly those relating to the coercive apparatus, must take precedence over electoral processes; (2) the inclusion of former combatants, insurgents, political elites, and members of the armed forces into the political process may discourage the use of violence, facilitate the rebuilding process, and entrench democratic norms more quickly; (3) multilateral organizations overseeing reconstruction efforts may sustain less hostility and resistance than unilateral actors like the United States, which has often been perceived as pursuing self-seeking interests; and (4) reconstructing the security sector, which includes all aspects of the coercive apparatus, must incorporate the establishment of effective penal systems. The following sections provide an in-depth explanation of each takeaway:

I. Institutional Strength

In accordance with arguments laid out by Mansfield and Snyder, institutional strength, particularly pertaining to the coercive apparatus, is paramount in providing necessary democratic foundations. According to the U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, the first of six indicators of legitimacy used to analyze threats to stability and peace is "the ability to provide

security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats)."[389] Furthermore, the crux of any counterinsurgency effort is "establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible."[390]

In cases of successful democracies, most have "had well-developed state institutions, particularly administrative bureaucracies that functioned in a reasonably efficient way to advance state objectives with minimal corruption."[391] Further, "where...strong democratic institutions emerged quickly, democracy was fairly easily consolidated, and the transition was largely peaceful…"[392] In contrast, the existence of weak institutions often correlates with spikes in violence throughout the rebuilding era: "It is often a strategic mistake for an institutionally weak state that is handing over power to the mass public to initiate war, and yet such states often do exactly this. Why? Such states face a gap between rising demands for broad participation in politics and inadequate institutions to manage those popular demands."[393] In his famous work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington also demonstrated how increased political participation leads to conflict and instability in states with weak political institutions. Inadequate institutions have three profound effects on the reconstruction era: first, without an effective coercive apparatus, members of the populace and political leaders alike become more inclined to resort to violence; second, weak institutions enable corrupt leaders to use coercive tactics in their quest for power; third, a strong correlation between institutional strength and perceptions of

---

[389] United States Department of the Army. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: The U.S. Army Field Manual No.* 3-24, pg. 1-21
[390] United States Department of the Army. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: The U.S. Army Field Manual No.* 3-24, pg. 1-23
[391] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 8
[392] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 8
[393] Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, p. 9

legitimacy seems to exist in emergent democracies, facilitating the rapid consolidation of government power.

Both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case underscore the importance of institutional strength in the rebuilding process; however, it is important to recognize Iraq's foundational deficiencies, many of which can be attributed to Saddam's top-down hierarchical structure, Iraq's history of political exclusion, and the destruction of infrastructure in the 2003 invasion. Therefore, while it's easy to suggest that institutional strength lays the foundation for more peaceful transitions, the process of establishing these institutions is quite difficult, especially in states with tumultuous histories. Another facet that strained the construction of institutions in Iraq can be attributed to ethno-sectarian divisions: "A democracy with high institutional quality, characterized by a high level of civil liberties, can emerge in equilibrium if, and only if, it is optimal for all groups," which connects to the second takeaway.[394]

II. Decision-Making: Political Inclusion

As demonstrated by both the El Salvador and Iraq cases, the inclusion of former combatants, insurgents, and political elites in the reconstruction process is crucial for three reasons: first, to ensure that those with residual power direct their efforts toward rebuilding bureaucratic institutions and stabilizing the political arena, both of which require experience and domestic knowledge. Second, elites and former combatants often possess vestigial authority and can sway the populace toward aligning with nationalistic interests if the reconstruction process does not include them:

> "...Democratization often fosters belligerent nationalism [because] the breakup of authoritarian regimes threatens powerful interests, including military bureaucracies and economic actors that derive a parochial benefit from war and empire. To salvage their position, threatened interests frequently try to recruit mass support, typically by resorting

[394] Cervellati, Matteo, et al. "Violence During Democratization and the Quality of Democratic Institutions." *European Economic Review*, vol. 66, 2014, doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.12.001., p. 2

> to nationalist appeals that allow them to claim to in the name of the people, but without instituting full democratic accountability to the average voter. Exploiting what remains of their governmental, economic, media power, these elites may succeed in establishing terms of inclusion in politics that force opposition groups to accept nationalism as the common currency of public discourse."[395]

Third, both El Salvador and Iraq, in different ways, demonstrated the necessity of incorporating varied groups in the political arena. For El Salvador, the integration of the FMLN into the electoral process not only brought the concerns of marginalized peasants to light, but also dissuaded the use of violence in achieving political objectives. In contrast, the exclusion of the formerly empowered Sunni Arabs had calamitous ramifications: first, the reconstruction process was made much more difficult without the expertise and support of the Sunnis, and second, their exclusion encouraged the use of subversive tactics and violence in an effort to sabotage political progress. In effect, "the politically (and economically) deprived segments of the population can trigger violent conflicts to obtain control over the state apparatus."[396]

III. Multilateral Involvement

A fine balance lies between too much external support, which can perpetuate a cycle of financial and military dependence or anger domestic elites, and too little external support, which can leave emergent democracies fragile and floundering without the necessary assistance. However, both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case point to the fact that multilateral organizations like the United Nations can have successes less likely to manifest under unilateral intervention for several reasons: first, domestic elites can perceive multilateral bodies as more legitimate than a single, foreign state. Second, multilateral organizations can possess additional financial, administrative and military capabilities, thereby facilitating the democratization

---

[395] Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization*, vol. 56, no. 2, 2002. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3078607., p. 299

[396] Cervellati, et al., "Violence During Democratization and the Quality of Democratic Institutions," p. 2

process and directing supplementary resources toward maintaining peace. Third, multilateral organizations are more likely to press for the implementation of democratic reforms, rather than be seen as seeking to influence the outcomes of electoral processes.

With that said, external support in any form may *still* disrupt the reconstruction process. According to Grimm and Weiffen, "both highly intrusive 'heavy footprint' missions (e.g. UN interim administrations as in Kosovo and supervision missions by an ad hoc coalition as in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and less intrusive 'light footprint' monitoring missions (e.g. Afghanistan) struggle with local resistance against external interference and 'resilience of the local political culture in the face of foreign norms.'"[397] Further, "international interference suffers from a legitimacy deficit, given that external actors [can] use undemocratic means to promote or even impose democratic institutions."[398] In light of these challenges, "there is increasing acknowledgement among researchers and practitioners that there are no quick fixes or blueprint solutions, that the international community must be more sensitive to the specific context in which it is intervening, and that there is a need to gather more profound knowledge about the history of targeted countries and to engage domestic actors in the peace- and state-building process."[399]

In accordance with the statements made above, I argue that the Salvadoran case was largely successful because the *United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador* (ONUSAL) monitored the implementation of reforms, rather than made decisions regarding the reconstruction process. ONUSAL brokered peace talks, logistically contributed to rebuilding crucial infrastructure and coordinating elections, and oversaw the disarmament process, but did

[397] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 260
[398] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 260
[399] Grimm and Weiffen, "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact," p. 260-261

not involve itself in making crucial political decisions. In contrast, American intervention in the Iraq case was met with violent backlash for two primary reasons: first, policy-makers and on-the-ground troops did not have a clear understanding of Iraqi culture and history, thereby failing to consider the importance of including former elites and Sunnis in the political arena. Second, in making both political and logistical decisions that furthered self-seeking interests, American advisors failed to address the grievances of the Iraqi populace, thereby enabling the proliferation of insurgent forces and non-state terrorists.

IV. Security and Justice

Despite the primacy of fostering security in post-war settings, it is a necessary but insufficient measure to ensure the lasting peace and stability of a transitioning nation. One crucial, yet often overlooked piece of the puzzle is the establishment and participation of a judiciary committed to providing accountability and justice for wrong-doers. Many peace processes focus heavily on the demilitarization of former combatants and the inclusion of civilians into police and military forces, often inadvertently neglecting reforms to the judiciary, which are crucial in constructing state legitimacy and the state monopoly over the use of force. According to one scholar, keeping post-war violence in check depends just as much on the coercive apparatus as it does on the judicial branch:

> "Military forces are the ultimate 'veto players' in a new democracy. Thus, the task of keeping them in the barracks should be paramount in the minds of civilian leaders. Yet raising the costs of violent competition requires measures that extend beyond changes in the military as an institution. The perpetrators of violence in troubled democracies often come from outside the official armed forces. Democratic elites must make every effort to neutralize violent groups of all sorts."[400]

[400] Bermeo, Nancy. "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization." *Global Governance*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/27800473., p. 165

According to Bermeo, two forms of neutralization are essential: first, police forces and the judiciary must take "swift action against individuals who engage in political violence—regardless of ideology or social identity. If police and the judiciary fail to neutralize violent actors through jail sentences, they provide compelling rationales for counter violence and further lawlessness."[401] Secondly, elected officials must not only distance themselves from the purveyors of violence, but they must also condemn the perpetuation of violence by groups that align with the politician's political values; failure to do so "exaggerates the image of the violent group's support, sows panic in the minds of enemy groups, provides another rationale for counter violence, and contributes to the likelihood of military intervention."[402] El Salvador serves as a particularly salient example; while its reformed military and police forces were successful initially, their efficacy abated as Salvadoran penal systems failed to both hold lawbreakers accountable and curb corruption. This idea also connects back to the importance of institutional strength propounded by Mansfield and Snyder; an effective judicial branch would have likely mitigated many of the unintended consequences that jeopardized the success of reforms.

The rule of law viewed under the lens of judicial enforcement helps the newly democratic state make strides in two crucial areas, particularly via the creation of democratic norms: "(1) the realization of a clear break with the past, and (2) the development of a constitutional culture which teaches state actors that the legal bounds of the system cannot be transgressed for the achievement of partisan political gains."[403] The result is two-fold: the application of judicial and constitutional review submits both violent actors, who may break the law to commit crime or utilize violence as a means, and political actors, who may attempt to exercise arbitrary power

---

[401] Bermeo, "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization," p. 165
[402] Bermeo, "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization," p. 165
[403] Larkins, Christopher M. "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis." *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1996. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/840623., p. 606

over citizens, to the law in an equal manner.[404] Subsequently, the accompanying threat of punishment via prison sentences or fines curbs the use of violent or subversive tactics, thus upholding underlying democratic principles and norms.

The El Salvador case illuminates the fact that the establishment of an effective judiciary is essential to rounding out an operational security sector. The Iraq case, however, demonstrates that the coercive apparatus, which includes the military, police forces and intelligence services, must be reconstructed *first*. Iraq's decrepit security forces, which lacked cohesion and coordination, enabled non-state actors like Sunni insurgents and ISIS to monopolize the use of force. An effective judiciary would have done little to combat the proliferation of uncurbed violence.

Concluding Thoughts

While delving into retrospective lessons from counterinsurgency missions can be useful in ensuring we learn from past mistakes, it is equally important to question American involvement in these cases in the first place. Although this study focuses heavily on security sector reconstruction through a post-war lens, it is crucial to remember *jus post bellum* remains heavily interconnected with *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* as well. Therefore, in applying the lessons from both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case, we should continue to question both the rationale in going to war and conduct in war, as both influence the outcome of the post-war rebuilding process as well.

With that said, it remains important to acknowledge that making simple assumptions regarding both intervention and democracy promotion in counterinsurgency cases has had calamitous ramifications not only for American national security, but also legitimacy abroad.

---

[404] Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," p. 606

The emergence of non-state actors and unconventional warfare have, in particular, challenged the technological and financial advantage that the U.S. has long possessed in war. As the U.S. will become embroiled in more 4GW conflicts, adapting to rapidly changing situations both in and after war will likely have decisive effects on American victories abroad. More specifically, providing effective security for the populace will become an increasingly critical juncture in constructing legitimacy and dampening the threat of reinvigorated insurgent forces.

Works Cited

"13-Point Statement on a Democratic Iraq." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 16 Apr. 2003, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/16/iraq.

"Aid and Democracy Promotion in American Foreign Policy." Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/aid-and-democracy-promotion-american-foreign-policy.

al-Hamid, Raed. "The American Withdrawal from Iraq: Ways and Means for Remaining Behind," Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5:2, p. 230-251, 2012, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.669094.

Allison, Jennifer. "Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello - Program on International Law and Armed Conflict." *Research Guides at Harvard Library*. 9 May 2019. Web. http://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=310988&p=2079383.

Allison, William Thomas. *The Gulf War: 1990-91*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Almohammad, Asaad. "New Caliph, Same Old Problems." Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 3 Jan. 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2020-01-01/new-caliph-same-old-problems.

"A Look at New Iraqi Leaders," *Baltimore Sun*, July 16, 2003.

Álvarez, Alberto M. and Eudald C. Orero. "The Genesis and Internal Dynamics of El Salvadaor's People's Revolutionary Army, 1970-1976," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, V. 46, 2014.

Amirsadeghi, Hossein. *The Security of the Persian Gulf*. Vol. 26, Routledge, 2011.

Anderson, Liam, and Gareth Stansfield. "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model." Publius, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4624718.

"Annual Report on El Salvador." *The Center for Justice and Accountability*, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/.

Basu, Monica. "Iraqi Political Parties Vie to Fill Postwar Void." *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 8, 2003.

Bensahel, Nora, et al. *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*. 1st ed., RAND Corporation, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg642a.

Bermeo, Nancy. "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization." *Global Governance*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/27800473.

Bonner, Raymond. "The Agony of El Salvador." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Feb. 1981, www.nytimes.com/1981/02/22/magazine/the-agony-of-el-salvador.html.

Bouchet, Nicolas, et al. US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama. Routledge, 2013.

Boustany, Nora. "Doctrine, Dreams Drive Saddam Hussein." *The Washington Post*, Washington Post Foreign Service, 12 Aug. 1990, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/keyplayers/saddam081290.htm.

Briefing given by Colonel Lee Dixon, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, *Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions, and Policy Concerns*, May 12, 1989.

Bruneau, Thomas C. and Florina Cristiana. "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization*, (CRIS) Matei 15:5, 2008, DOI: 10.1080/13510340802362505.

Buckman, Robert T. *Latin America 2012*. Stryker Post Publications, 2012.

Burns, John F. "The Vote, and Democracy Itself, Leave Anxious Iraqis Divided." The New York Times, The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/washington/world/the-iraqi-election-the-process-the-vote-and-democracy.html.

Byman, Daniel. "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities." *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4137575.

Caldwell IV, William B., and Leonard, Steven M. "Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change," Military Review, 88, July/August 2008.

Call, Charles T. "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4, 2003, pp. 827–862. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3875834.

Cante, Freddy, and Hartmut Quehl. *Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace-Building in Turbulent Regions*. Information Science Reference, 2016.

Cervellati, Matteo, et al. "Violence During Democratization and the Quality of Democratic Institutions." *European Economic Review*, vol. 66, 2014, doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.12.001.

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "Iraqis Call U.S. Goal on Constitution Impossible," *Washington Post*, September 30, 2003.

Ciment, James. *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II*. Routledge, 2015.

Cline, Seth. "The Other Symbol of George W. Bush's Legacy." *U.S. News & World Report*, https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/05/01/the-other-symbol-of-george-w-bushs-legacy.

Coker, Margaret, and Falih Hassan. "ISIS Is Weakened, but Iraq Election Could Unravel Hard-Won Stability." The New York Times, The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/middleeast/iraq-election-abadi.html.

"Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." *United States Institute of Peace*, 1 July 1992, www.usip.org/publications/1992/07/truth-commission-el-salvador.

Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 14, 2006.

"Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: El Salvador." *From Insurgency to Stability: Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies*, by Angel Rabasa et al., RAND Corporation, 2011. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1111-2osd.12.

Crandall, Russell. *The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Davenport, John J. "Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Need for a Democratic Federation." *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 39, no. 3 (2011): 493-555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23020002.

De Zeeuw, Jeroen. *Sons of War: Parties and Party Systems in Post-War El Salvador and Cambodia, Democratization*, 17:6, p. 1176-1201, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.520549.

D'Haeseleer, Brian. *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*. University Press of Kansas, 2017. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zgb398.

Dietrich, Christopher R. W. "Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs: Raw Material Sovereignty, Cold War Boundaries, and the Nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967–1973." Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:3, 2011.

Dodge, Toby. "The British Mandate in Iraq, 1914-1932." Gale Cengage Learning. www.gale.cengage.com/pdf/whitepapers/gdc/TheBritishMandate.pdf.

Dreazen, Yochi J. "Insurgents Turn Guns on Iraqis Backing Democracy." *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2003.

Elections and Events 1980-1989, library.ucsd.edu/research-and-collections/collections/notable-collections/latin-american-elections-statistics/El Salvador/elections-and-events-1980-1989.html.

Elman, Colin. “Introduction: History, Theory, and the Democratic Peace.” The International History Review, vol. 23, no. 4, 2001. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40108832., p. 760

“El Salvador (1927 - Present).” *Political Science*, University of Central Arkansas, 2020, uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/el-salvador-1927-present/.

“El Salvador | Freedom House.” *Freedom House | Championing Democracy*. 2013. Web. <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/el-salvador>.

“El Salvador: Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results.” *IPU PARLINE Database: El Salvador, Election Archives*, 2015, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2099_arc.htm.

“El Salvador.” *Mass Atrocity Endings*, World Peace Association, 7 Aug. 2015, sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/el-salvador/.

Emba, Christine. “Just War Theory: A Primer.” The Washington Post. WP Company LLC, November 30, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/11/30/just-war-theory-a-primer/.

Engel, Jeffrey A. “A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On.” Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 25–46. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24916032.

Ensalaco, Mark. “Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1994, pp. 656–675. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/762563.

“Excerpts From President Clinton's Message on the State of the Union.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 26 Jan. 1994, www.nytimes.com/1994/01/26/us/state-union-excerpts-president-clinton-s-message-state-union.html.

Ford, Peter. “Democracy Begins to Sprout in Iraq.” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 2003.

“From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador.” United Nations Doc. S/25500.

Gat, Azar. “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity.” World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40060125.

Gentile, Gian P. “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army.” *Parameters 39*, Autumn 2009.

George W. Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 12, 2002, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: George W. Bush*, Vol. 2.

Gibb, Tom. "The Killing of Archbishop Oscar Romero Was One of the Most Notorious Crimes of the Cold War. Was the CIA to Blame?" *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 23 Mar. 2000, www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2000/mar/23/features11.g21.

Gilman, Benjamin A. "105th Congress (1997-1998): Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." *Congress.gov*, 31 Oct. 1998, www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/4655.

Gompert, David C., et al. "The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003" in *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn*, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.21.

Gordon, Michael R. "Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 17 Mar. 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/world/middleeast/17bremer.html?login=email&auth=login-email.

Gordon, Philip H., and Daniel Rosenblum. "The FREEDOM Support Act: 20th Anniversary." U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 21 Sept. 2012, 2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/198152.htm.

Grassmuck, George. "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1960. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4323287.

Greene, Samuel R. "Pathological Counterinsurgency: How Flawed Thinking about Elections Leads to Counterinsurgency Failure." *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2018, *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/26627196.

Greene, Samuel R. "Pathological Counterinsurgency: The Failure of Imposing Legitimacy in El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Iraq." *Third World Quarterly* 38 (3). 2017.

Grimm, Sonja and Brigitte Weiffen. "Domestic Elites and External Actors in Post-Conflict Democratisation: Mapping Interactions and Their Impact." *Conflict, Security & Development*, 18:4, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2018.1483556.

Gugliotta, Guy, and Douglas Farah. "12 Years of Tortured Truth on El Salvador." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 21 Mar. 1993.

Haddad, Fanar. *Shia-Centric State-Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13030.

Hahn, Peter L. *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. Manas Publishing, 2012.

Hashim, Ahmed S. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Cornell University Press, 2006. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf8c5d.

Hashim, Ahmed S. "Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq." *Middle East Policy Council*, mepc.org/journal/military-power-and-state-formation-modern-iraq.

"History of Iraq Part II: The Rise of Saddam Hussein." *Public Radio International*, www.pri.org/stories/2003-02-12/history-iraq-part-ii-rise-saddam-hussein.

Holiday, David, and William Stanley. "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24357142.

"Iraq: Elections Held in 2005." *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm.

"Iraqi Council of Representatives." *IPU Parline Database: IRAQ, ELECTIONS IN 2010*, Inter-Parliamentary Union, archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_10.htm.

"Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005." U.S. Department of State Archives, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/41206.htm.

"Iraq Parliamentary Elections: 15 December 2005." *IFES Election Guide*, www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1431/.

Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. *Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

Jabareen, Yosef. "Conceptualizing 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction' and 'Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction' of Failed States." *Int J Polit Cult Soc* 26**,** 107–125, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-012-9118-3.

Jackson, D. W., et al. "Protecting Human Rights: The Legitimacy of Judicial System Reforms in El Salvador." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 18, no. 4, 1999. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3339198.

Jarstad, Anna, and Timothy D. Sisk. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Jehl, Douglas and Eric Schmitt. "U.S. Reported to Push for Iraqi Government, with Pentagon Prevailing," *New York Times*, April 30, 2003.

Jehl, Douglas. "CIA Report Suggests Iraqis Are Losing Faith in U.S. Efforts," *New York Times*, November 13, 2003.

Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project. *Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict*, Vol I. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, August 1986.

Johnson, Constance A. *Iraq: Legal History and Traditions*. Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, 2004.

Juhn, Tricia. *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War*. 1st ed., MacMillan Press, 1998.

"Just War Theory - International Relations." Oxford Bibliographies, September 20, 2019.

Karatnycky, Adrian, ed., *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001-2002*, New York: Freedom House, 2002.

Karl, Terry Lynn. "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/20045130.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Iraq: Elections and New Government." *CRS Report for Congress*, May 11, 2005.

Katzman, Kenneth. *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 2009.

Kenworthy, Eldon. "Central America: Beyond the Credibility Trap." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1983, pp. 181–200. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40208933.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Knott, Stephen. "George H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs." Miller Center, 1 Aug. 2017, millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs.

Kubbig, Bernd W., et al. "The Primacy of Unilateralism: The American Superpower and the International Organizations in the Clinton Era." Amerikastudien / American Studies, vol. 46, no. 4, 2001. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41157686.

Kurtenbach, Sabine. "Judicial Reform – A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 13:1, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1517112.

Kurtenbach, Sabine. "The 'Happy Outcomes' May Not Come at All – Post War Violence in Central America." *Civil Wars*, vol. 15, no. 1, Apr. 2013, doi:10.1080/13698249.2013.850884.

Kurtenbach, Sabine. "State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America." *German Institute of Global and Area Studies*, vol. 181, Nov. 2011.

Lagon, Mark. "Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community." *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 2011.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. "Operation Iraqi Freedom." In *American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century*. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2005. Accessed March 10, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg404navy.10.

Larkins, Christopher M. "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis." *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1996. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/840623.

Lawrence, T. E. *Lawrence of Arabia: Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Easton Press, 1992.

Leeson, Peter T., and Andrea M. Dean. "The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation." American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, no. 3, 2009. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25548136.

LeoGrande, William. "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 1, Summer 1981.

Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb Cambridge, Mass., 1989.

Lyday, Corbin, and Jan Stromsem. "Rebuilding the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Environments." *United States Agency for International Development*, May 2005.

Macfarquhar, Neil. "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 30 Dec. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html.

MacKinnon, Michael G. The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fair Weather Friend? F. Cass, 2000.

Mahmood, Mona, et al. "From El Salvador to Iraq: Washington's Man behind Brutal Police Squads." The Guardian, March 6, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/06/el-salvador-iraq-police-squads-washington.

Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnical Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization*, vol. 56, no. 2, 2002. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3078607.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, August 2005.

Martin, Michaela, and Hussein Solomon. "Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding." Contemporary Review of the Middle East, vol. 4, no. 1, 2017, doi:10.1177/2347798916681319.

Moaddel, Mansoor, et al. "Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 123, no. 4, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25655568.

Mousseau, Demet Yalcin. "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 5, 2001. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/424775.

Myers, Steven Lee. "As Iraq Tallies Vote, U.S. Says Pullout Plans Are 'On Track'." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html.

Nau, Henry R. Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Nazir, Muntazra. "Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq." *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 59, no. 3, 2006. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41394370.

O'Sullivan, Meghan, and Razzaq al-Saiedi. "Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications." Belfer Center Discussion Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2014.

Pastor, Robert. "Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: Carter and Reagan on El Salvador." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1984, pp. 175–190. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3323931.

Patrick, Tyler E. "Iraqi Groups Badly Divided over How to Draft a Charter." *New York Times*, September 20, 2003.

Paya, Ali, and John L. Esposito. *Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World*. Vol. 18, Taylor & Francis, 2011.

Pedersen, Susan. "Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood." *The American Historical Review*, vol. 115, no. 4, 2010, pp. 975–1000. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/23303209.

Perry, Walter L., et al., editors. *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace*. RAND Corporation, 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19w72gs.

Pfiffner, James P. US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army, Intelligence and National Security, 25:1, 2010. DOI: 10.1080/02684521003588120.

Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2*. RAND Corporation, 2008. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg595-3osd.

Popkin, Margaret. *Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Pressman, Jeremy. "Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East." International Security, vol. 33, no. 4, 2009. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40207155.

Pridham, Geoffrey. *The Dynamics of Democratization: a Comparative Approach*. Continuum New York, 2000.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, *American Society of Int'l Law*, Vol. 106, Confronting Complexity, 2012.

Ramos, Carlos Guillermo, Roberto Oswaldo López & Carolina Quinteros. *The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?* Inclusive Political Settlements Papers 13, June 2015. Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

Rathmell, Andrew. "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" *International Affairs*, Volume 81, Issue 5, October 2005, p. 1013–1038, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00500.x.

Roberts, Priscilla Mary, and Spencer Tucker. *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts*. ABC-CLIO, 2010.

Rosati, Jerel A. "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy over the Carter Administration." Political Psychology, vol. 9, no. 3, 1988, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3791726.

Russett, Bruce, et al. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton University Press, 1993. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rqf6.

Sachs, Susan. "Hussein's Regime Skimmed Billions From Aid Program." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 29 Feb. 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/02/29/world/hussein-s-regime-skimmed-billions-from-aid-program.html.

Schmidt, Arthur. *Review: Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador*. By Margaret Popkin. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. *The Americas*, vol. 59, no. 1, 2002.

Schwarz, Benjamin C. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991.

Seligson, Mitchell A. "Thirty Years of Transformation in the Agrarian Structure of El Salvador, 1961-1991." *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1995, pp. 43–74. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2503979.

Sharpe, Kenneth E., and Martin Diskin. "Facing Facts in El Salvador: Reconciliation or War." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1984. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40208954.

Siddique, Haroon. "Nouri Al-Maliki Offered New Term as Iraqi Prime Minister." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 25 Nov. 2010, www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/25/nouri-al-maliki-iraqi-prime-minister.

Simon, Reeva Spector. *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*. 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, 2004.

Skipper, Charles O. "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict" available at *Global Security*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2 Apr. 1984, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SCO.htm.

Smith, Ben. "The Parliamentary Election in Iraq, March 2010." *House of Common, International, Affairs and Defence Section*, Library 11, May 2010.

Spanger, Hans-Joachim. *Transformational Diplomacy: Democracy Promotion in Practice*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, in *Between Ground Zero and Square One: How George W. Bush Failed on Russia*, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14489.6.

Stahn, Carsten. "'Jus Ad Bellum', 'Jus in Bello'...'Jus Post Bellum'? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force." *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 17, no. 5, 2007, doi:10.1093/ejil/chl037.

"The Iraqi Council," *The Washington Post,* July 14, 2003.

"Iraqi Governing Council Members," *BBC News Online*, July 14, 2003.

"The Iraq War." *Council on Foreign Relations*, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

"The Political Terror Scale Data Set." *Political Terror Scale*, www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Datatable.html.

"The World Factbook: Iraq." Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_iz.html.

"Timeline: Iraq War." *BBC News*, 5 July 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36702957.

"Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State." Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.

"Transcript of Bush Address on Iraq Election." CNN, Cable News Network, 30 Jan. 2005, www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/30/bush.transcript/.

"Transcript of President Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War." The New York Times, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 1991, www.nytimes.com/1991/03/07/us/after-war-president-transcript-president-bush-s-address-end-gulf-war.html.

"United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)" *UN Peacekeeping* , United Nations, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html.

United Nations, "UN Security Council Resolution 688," April 5, 1991.

United States, Congress, "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." United Nations Doc. S/25500, April 1. 1993.

United States, Congress, "Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002." Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, I-A and I-B, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2003.

United States, Congress, Lawson, Marian Leonardo, and Susan B. Epstein. "Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance." Congressional Research Service, 4 Jan. 2019. https://crsreports.congress.gov/R44858.

United States Department of the Army. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: The U.S. Army Field Manual No.* 3-24.

Vest, Jason. "Fourth-Generation Warfare ." *The Atlantic* . Dec 2001. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/12/fourth-generation-warfare/302368/>.

Walker, Martin. "The Making of Modern Iraq." *The Wilson Quarterly (1976-)*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2003. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/40261182.

Walker, Martin. "The Revenge of the Shia." *The Wilson Quarterly*, 2006.

Walzer, Michael, "The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)." *Social Research* 69, no. 4, p. 925-44, 2002. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971584.

White House, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours," Press Release, March 17, 2003.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. "Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador." *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, edited by Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Wong, Edward. "Sunnis in Iraq Form Own Political Council." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 26 Dec. 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/12/26/world/sunnis-in-iraq-form-own-political-council.html.

Wong, Edward. "Turnout in the Iraqi Election Is Reported at 70 Percent." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Dec. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/12/22/world/middleeast/turnout-in-the-iraqi-election-is-reported-at-70-percent.html.

Worth, Robert F. "Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 22 Feb. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys-shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html.

Yetiv, Steve A. "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 107, no. 2, 1992, pp. 195–212. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2152655.

Yosufi, Abdul Basir. "The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict." Connections, vol. 15, no. 4, 2016. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26326461.

Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, November/December 1997.