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Caring like a state:

The elaboration of a care ideology in Peru and Sri Lanka in the 20th century

An Honors Paper for the Department of Sociology and Anthropology

By Katharine Herman

Bowdoin College, 2015

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For my mother, the constant academic
“Because we are Hanson women, and this is what we do”

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Chapter 1

Caring like a state

When I first began this project, my intention was to analyze the ways in which militant opposition groups - usually marked as terrorist groups - position themselves as legitimate political actors through the provision of care to those they claim to represent. While, as I discuss below, many analysts dismissed this provision of services as coercive strategy, when evaluated critically, this relatively recent development generates a number of questions. Is the provision of care essentially a coercive strategy? Is this perceived coercion a reflection of those who provide it, or the strategy itself? Could the provision of care by the state be considered similarly coercive? I began with Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in the Peruvian Andes and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. Both of these groups have received much attention, in the media and academia, for the extension of care and services to populations under their control, as well as increasingly institutionalizing the means to provide that care. During the height of their influence, both groups actively claimed the right to represent and care for populations formally excluded from the national narrative of the state in which they lived – Peruvian indigenous peasants and Sri Lankan Tamils, respectively. Following increasing political, economic, and social marginalization throughout the twentieth century, which was felt moreover in the *lapse* of government-provided services, these opposition groups defined themselves by entering the space the government had left, mimicking the form and function of governing structures as a form of resistance.

As I delved deeper into the complexities of these two cases, I became increasingly interested in the problem of care itself, and how it operates as a form of governance. While

the provision of care by oppositional groups must continually be explained and contested, the provision of care by the state is perceived as comparatively self-explanatory; both the provision of care and the material goods provided are deemed apolitical, and simply a matter of functioning governance. Noticing this, I then began theorizing the provision of care, not as a strategy of the state, but as a strategy of governing. The provision of care by opposition groups then represented a new perspective from which to view the provision of care as a strategy without the assumed attachment to the state. I had intended for my research question to begin here, at the significant disjuncture between the presumed coercive nature of provided care as a strategy of the opposition and the presumed neutrality of care provided by states. However, in trying to analyze the provision of care by opposition groups as something independent of the state's provision of care, I soon ran aground. The prominence of the state in defining the accepted form and method of care within the Peruvian and Sri Lankan contexts continued to shape my project, and, left unaddressed, distorted my analysis of the oppositional groups as dehistoricized and abbreviated.

Through observing what is reflected in the opposition's provision of care, I found that care is made an abstract principle through which a population can be aligned with its governing body. However, in assuming that "care" could be defined and identified independently of those who provide it, I had missed the crucial significance of oppositional groups mimicking the care provided by the state. In using the provision of care to reach out to a population, a relationship had been forged through a specific discourse, bound in symbols and associations that were culturally encoded. When care is understood as a culturally specific claim to authority, it can be understood, not only as a simple decision, but as a practice determined by that discourse. In trying to understand the presence of the state as

an ideological project within the discourse of care provided by other actors, I arrived at a wholly different project. The very nature of care as a “mundane practice” of governance had conveyed a depoliticized characterization of provided care – one that I argue is far removed from what care as a strategy is capable of accomplishing.

As noted in the work of James Ferguson (1994) and Miriam Ticktin (2011), the structures that provide for our preservation and care, an inherently political display of power, are misrecognized as the impersonal or antipolitical. Rather than seating the value of provided care in the relationship between a particular provider and recipient, I found that further analytical work could be done in decontextualizing the provision of care as a political strategy and then mapping that back onto the specific context of each case. In reviewing the provision of care as a strategy throughout the twentieth century in both Peru and Sri Lanka, I noted that care is not provided consistently or apolitically, but in extension and contraction based on political circumstance. The very political nature of care is then demonstrated in tracing the dynamics of provided care in relation to the relative inclusion and exclusion of certain populations – such as in extending irrigation to certain populations, while denying them to others, or in extending education predicated on the political alignment of recipient populations. By working in tandem to contextualize culturally and cross-culturally, the comparative cases that follow in subsequent chapters serve to outline the provision of care as a political strategy, as well as demonstrate the extent to which particular state ideology shapes the provision of that care.

As Timothy Mitchell notes, “The phenomenon we name ‘the state’ arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, non-material form” (1999: 77). Mitchell continues to caution that “any attempt to distinguish

the abstract or ideal appearance of the state from its material reality, in taking for granted this distinction, will fail to understand it. The task of a theory of the state is not to clarify such distinctions but to historicize them” (1999: 77). Rather than separating the material presence of the state from its ideal appearance, the two should be seen in conjunction, as mutually reinforcing one another – the ideal would not be conveyed without the material basis of provided care, nor would the material be provided wholly without ideological import. To separate the two in analysis would only create a false perception that they could be separated in actuality. Mitchell’s subsequent conclusion – that we must historicize the relation between the material and the ideal – provided a sounder basis for my research. To historicize in an ethnographic register is precisely Mitchell’s intended form of analysis for the state in relation to its material practices.

In the work that follows, I argue that the provision of care is built upon narrative and steeped in ideology – most often in an ideology explicitly prescribing the nature of how governance ought to work in relation to the people, which I refer to in shorthand as a “care ideology.” Care is not only political in that it is grounded in circumstance and context, but also in that it lies at the center of modern political life. Care acts as recognition of the political subject, demonstrating meaningful inclusion in a community and materializing the relationship between a provider and a recipient. Provided care therefore mediates political relationships, both in its material and ideological dimensions. As Mitchell argues, welfare provision cannot simply be viewed as a “two-dimensional institution,” as it is state power that makes it appear to be a two-dimensional, direct relationship between the state apparatus and the population (1999: 89). Welfare, and by association, care, is not a simple provision and receipt. Instead, this work will map the provision of care onto a more fluid understanding

of the interrelations between the state and the subject. A state “cares” as a state in order to reproduce its own legitimacy as well as produce political subjects. This undertaking requires that the governing body engage with a discourse already occurring among the population as to an appropriate or acceptable form of governance. Provided care gives shape and weight to a political association of a state and its political subjects, but, given that the discourse of provided care exists between these two agents, care is complicated by the communication and contestation of the care ideology in communication between the two. Ideas of who can claim authority to rule – whether established in cultural markers, practices, or symbols – are continually reproduced and enacted through the daily governance of the state.

In creating the structure for the project as it nowstands, and in order to articulate this ideological communication between the provider and the recipient of care, I will use a hybrid of Abrams’ state-system and state-idea (1988) with Althusser’s ideological and repressive state apparatuses (1971). While Abrams uses “state apparatus” to denote the physical form of the bureaucratic, modern state, I will refer to the same bodies in the Peruvian and Sri Lankan cases as the “governing apparatus” to differentiate between the form of governance and the substantive ideological project behind it. Althusser’s “ideological state,” or “state idea,” references the means through which the state is understood conceptually as a legitimate, functional governing agent. For the sake of this analysis, the idea of the “ideological state” will function largely as a means for appeal to authority through the provision of care itself, either by the formal governing structure or the population. I will use the phrase “care ideology” to reference the constellation of ideas, symbols, and concepts that surround the provision of care and to denote its use by both the governing structure of the state and the population.

By referencing care ideology as partially constitutive of the ideological state, I do not mean to imply that the care ideology is any more closely related to the governing apparatus than the individual that inhabits the state. The ideological basis of care instead draws upon a set of values, beliefs, and abstractions that, although not explicitly articulated, maintain an implicit connection in the minds of those who are socialized within that discourse or political culture. As the case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate, the governing apparatus may appeal to the care ideology as a means to further reproduce its authority and claim to govern, or a certain segment of the population may choose to appeal to the same ideology in order to assert itself in the governing apparatus. The care ideology, as with the ideological state, can be appealed to, shaped, or interpreted by anyone sharing the same cultural context. It is simply a discourse to be used. Ostensibly, the political experience of an indigenous Peruvian would be different than that of a Lima urbanite, as would that of a Sri Lankan Tamil compared to a Sri Lankan Sinhalese. It is precisely within these different relationships to the governing state that the care ideology exists in a dynamic form – continually reproduced through its reinterpretation and through its invocation. This strengthens the claim that governance, as a form of authority derived from a shared culture, is co-produced by the governing and the governed alike. As this research seeks to articulate the ways in which authority is sought and granted, it is then necessary to consider both the governing apparatus and its population as actors with agency in the reproduction of care ideology. In order for either the governing apparatus or the population to relate to the other, their claim must be legitimized through the ideology that they share; therefore, it is well within the capacity of either the governing structures or the population to reinterpret, or claim, the state idea in order to assert their own position in this mutually constitutive triad.

I separate the governing state from those it governs in order to emphasize the relation between its formal structures and the population as a site generative of the means to claim authority; however, this is not an empirical demarcation. The relationship between the citizen and the governing state is greatly mediated by the ideology of care and other shared cultural conceptions of a legitimate claim to authority. It is through the provision of care that the state idea materializes in the lives of its citizens, it is through the articulation of a care ideology that the state idea is connected to the population that it includes in its care (and those it excludes), and, perhaps most importantly, it is through the form of that care that the governing apparatus is able to mold its population in reflection of the ideological state project as a whole. As Althusser notes,

In every case, the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary distortion, that the “ideas” of the human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions, and if that is not the case it lends him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform. This ideology talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into *practices*. And I shall point out that these practices are governed by the *rituals* in which these practices are inscribed, within the *material existence of an ideological apparatus*, be it only a small part of the apparatus: a small mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports club, a school day, a political party meeting, etc. (1971: 260, emphasis in original)

Althusser therefore emphasizes the everyday practices and materiality in constituting the individual as a political subject. The provision of care then exemplifies the juncture of everyday materiality and the transcendent ideological state. This establishes state power as a form of “structural power,” wherein the state idea projects itself through “shap[ing] the social

field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while making others less possible or impossible” (Wolf 1990). Specifically, the provision of care acts as the manifestation of the relation between the governing structures and the population. The state idea itself provides the means to connect ideology and practice that then becomes its own source of reproduction. The cases I will discuss here – postcolonial Peru and Sri Lanka – demonstrate the ability of both the governing apparatus and its political subjects to appeal to the state project. The state idea provides a narrative to inhabit as a member of that wider community. As an ideological project, dynamic and continuously interpreted, the nature of the state idea as comprehensive and elastic ensures its reproduction.

The capacity of the state idea to react to political circumstance and maintain hegemony can be seen in the dominant explanations for the violence that erupted in both Peru and Sri Lanka during the late twentieth century. The Peruvian state idea was forged in a colonial context, and continued to be hinged on the perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy even after independence in 1821. This hierarchy could be negotiated to a certain extent by the conformity to valued forms of the citizen and moral subject; however, narratives of inherent difference seated in ethnicized, if not racialized, rhetoric delimited the mobility of indigenous citizens. The continued progress of the economic and political elite was contrasted with the perceived stagnation of the indigenous peasantry, and further assertions of prescribed roles in society provided the basis for conflict seated in a Marxist register. Despite evident differences, the case of Sri Lanka can also help us think about how politics operates through care. In the Sri Lankan case, the postcolonial state (which took power after independence from England in 1948) is founded on a mythic national imaginary of the pre-modern irrigation civilization under the rule of Sinhalese kings in constant struggle with their Tamil

counterparts. The dominant academic interpretation of Sri Lanka's recent civil war is explained through a virulent ethnonationalism, using the origins of the nation as an arena for contesting claims as to the rightful inheritors of the land. The exclusion of the Tamil population by the Sinhalese state apparatus similarly relies upon this narrative in order to cast the minority as irreconcilable with the Sri Lankan state.

In both cases, we observe that care not only mediates political relationships, but also that these political relationships are constituted by and constitutive of relations of inclusion and exclusion. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, specific to each case, then provide an explanation for the existence of armed oppositional groups. Moreover, this politics of exclusion is elaborated in defining who is seen as capable of integration, and who is to be kept in continued exclusion. In the following case studies, I will demonstrate how the provision of care is one site in which the coercive state project integrates subjects increasingly under its aegis. For individuals capable of assuming an identity positioned in relation to the state, traversing this imagined distance through an appeal to the state idea is a demand of recognition in order to receive the benefits of that recognition – most notably, the material provision of care. The provision of care, and the discourse surrounding it, therefore becomes the terrain of a certain kind of politics of recognition that is central to postcolonial governance.

The intention of this comparative study is not to emphasize the similarities in postcolonial Sri Lanka and Peru. Instead, by drawing on these two cases, I seek to demonstrate, through their distinctive contexts and histories, the relevance of the provision of care to the nature of governance. Each case seeks to illustrate one of the more perceptible effects of the use of provided care. While the Peruvian state functioned on the increasing

penetration of its highland territories throughout the twentieth century, the Sri Lankan state operated primarily through the reproduction of symbols that ground the actions of the state historically. In focusing on the twentieth century for both postcolonial states, I will analyze state formation in reference to the use of care as a point of access to the population in the expansion of the capacity of the governing structures and in the weight of the state idea.

This movement through the recent past, in conjunction with a theoretical framework, is meant to provide a means to view the state as a project in and of itself – continual, dynamic, and prone to moments of rupture (such as the appearance of armed opposition groups). The further expression and accumulation of ideas surrounding the state moves towards, not only the realization of the imagined social body in a unitary, homogeneous population, but also in the further articulation of the legitimate means by which to govern that body. In Peru, the twentieth century was characterized by a progression of different forms of advocacy for the peasantry. The case study in this research traces the progression from the advocacy of indigenous citizens in intellectual circles, to the articulation of indigenous or peasant identity in relation to the moral ideals of the Peruvian state, and ultimately, to the formation of peasant federations in the demand for the political recognition from the indigenous highlanders. The Sri Lankan case draws upon a shorter time period, spanning 1948 to roughly the 1980s, as the Sinhalese governing apparatus affected a significant amount of state building in a few short decades. The case study follows the articulation and elaboration of the ideal Sri Lankan citizen in relation to religion, occupation, caste, and ultimately ethnicity.

Returning to the quote by Mitchell at the beginning of this chapter, the state project can be viewed more comprehensively through tracing the provision of care and historicizing

care within its own cultural context. These cases, with all their accompanying differences, do not speak past each other, but rather give a more comprehensive articulation of the use of the provision of care, demonstrating in their own way the manner in which the operation of the state is rendered neutral while in a trenchantly political terrain. Moving through these cases will then better articulate questions that arise following the assertion of care as a new strategy of governance. What exactly is this relationship between the provision of care and the reproduction of the state? What aspect of the state does it serve to maintain and how is its maintenance space for the further interaction of the formal apparatus and the population?

In the remainder of this chapter I provide an overview of the key theoretical terms and concepts that I will use in my analysis. I then turn to an extended discussion of the two cases, beginning first with an account of roads and education in highland Peru (Chapter 2) and then an account of national development initiatives and the extension of irrigation projects in Sri Lanka (Chapter 3). In both cases I use seemingly banal examples of civil infrastructure in order to demonstrate how the provision of care is framed as an act of inclusion and how these forms of care become central to the state project overall. Using care as a point of entry in discussing the state project, I argue that there are clear connections between the material experience of daily life, how that experience is then framed in discourse, and how that discourse works to reproduce the state idea. Specifically, in both Sri Lanka and Peru, there is an identifiable ideology of care that is articulated in the discourse surrounding welfare provision, a construction of the ideal citizen that is fostered through that welfare provision, and the consequent engineering of a population that is molded to match the state as an ideological project. A comparison of both cases will follow along with overall conclusions.

* * *

In focusing upon a set of practices and ideas as diffuse as the provision of care, it is important to articulate exactly what about these practices presents itself as an object of study. How are the ideological dimension and material effects of care related? How does the provision of care itself affect the alignment to certain political subjectivities? Why is care the most relevant strategy to observe in the formation of political subjects in these two cases? As noted by Clifford Geertz, the state has succeeded in a substantial project when the interests and actions of the state are reflected in its population: “For a state to do more than administer privilege and defend itself against its own population, its acts must seem continuous with the selves of those whose state it pretends it is, its citizens – to be, in some stepped-up, amplified sense, *their acts*” (1973: 317, emphasis in original). The provision of care, I argue, extends the state into the lives of its subjects in both an ideological and material capacity. The state is established first as the source of material wellbeing, facilitating dependency. The ideological dimension of care then provides meaningful inclusion for that subject within the state, encouraging a further relationship. It is then the form of that care, exactly what is provided by the state, that directs the life of the citizen, shaping the subject and positioning him or her in relation to the state project.

The theoretical framework of this project centers upon the state, not as a singular entity, but an amalgam of interrelated processes, projects, and systems working cooperatively to reproduce the state as the means to orient political subjects in relation to these processes. These processes, projects, and systems, in conjunction, then produce the image of a singular state as well as identifiable effects of the functioning of that entity. My own account of the state and governance is based in the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1980, 2007) and Antonio Gramsci (1992), particularly in light of the nature of state power that facilitates the

reproduction of the state through the population. While Foucault articulates a state power that works through the individual in order to manifest its power, Gramsci articulates an ideological power that works to replicate itself through the individual's alignment and consensus in civil society. In conjunction, the two mirror the material and ideological aspects of the provision of care. Through comparing the work of Foucault and Gramsci, the study of state power can be read as a gloss by which to refer to the many ways in which the state project is affected in order to reproduce itself.

This analysis of the state is reinforced by the work of Michel Rolph Trouillot (2003) and James Scott (1998) through the articulation of the methods and means of the formal state apparatus via state effects. Both theorists provide a theory of the state seated in the strategies and logic of the state rather than its form. Building on their insights, I suggest we think of care as a key strategy and effect of governance. Finally, I will conclude by drawing on anthropological work on citizenship in order to articulate an account of political subjectivity and the state project. This discussion will focus primarily on the dialectical relation between inclusion and exclusion that is reproduced by the selective provision of care. Elaborated particularly in reference to the postcolony, I will cite the work of James Holston (2008), Mahmood Mamdani (1996), and Deborah Poole (2004) in order to articulate the nature of meaningful inclusion in the post-colony and its relation to formal, juridical forms. In the remainder of this chapter I sketch out these three domains in more detail.

Consenting to be governed

As articulated by Michel Foucault, the modern state no longer only seeks control through the maintenance of territorial borders, but, more significantly, through the control of

its population. Moreover, sovereign power has been redirected from the explicit control over life and death to the ability to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1984: 261). This method of politics, or “biopolitics,” uses the physiological needs of the body (sexual, nutritional, or otherwise) as a means by which to control and shape the body, and metonymically, the entire population. The institutions that Foucault analyzes – penal institutions, hospitals, asylums – can be considered as disciplinary applications of force by the government, actively shaping political subjects. The provision of care can be comparably viewed as a gentler, but no less effective, means of shaping political subjects in relation to the state.

What is done materially through biopolitics is reflected in the capacity of the state idea to then engineer consent. Because sovereignty is not simply a claim made solely by merit of control of land or the use of force, the reproduction of the claim to authority must be analyzed not as a declarative norm, but as a constant reassertion, demanding recognition and acceptance. Read as a form of Gramscian hegemony, sovereignty functions through consent as well as coercion. It is not by the fact of sovereignty that the state governs, but through daily governing that the state produces sovereignty. According to Foucault (and in the European context), this reorientation of the state signaled the moment at which the individual life became the point of intervention for the state. Therefore, at the crux of such biopolitical regimes is the facilitation of a biological life for a particular population, especially as the need for assistance in sustaining that life becomes an entry point for the state apparatus in personal life. The extension of irrigation in Sri Lanka works to facilitate subsistence farming that also ensures that the population benefiting from that irrigation will be tied to the land through subsistence farming. The construction of roads in Peru establishes the routes

available to indigenous highlanders, and therefore determines the mobility of that population. The material dimension of provided care determines the shaping and positioning of a subject in relation to the state. When combined with the ideological weight of the state idea, the two strategies of governing authority work in conjunction to create a political subjectivity tailored to that state idea. I argue that it is specifically through the provision of care that these twin strategies work in conjunction most explicitly.

The provision of care, used loosely to refer to the provision of material benefits and services to a certain population, can therefore be used as a gloss to refer to the programs of assistance that the state uses to directly facilitate the life of its population, or in absence of the state, “expose” it (Foucault 1984: 258). Provided care is simultaneously a discourse and a practice – facilitating the continued wellbeing of a certain demarcated population as well as shaping the ways in which that form of life is articulated. In addition to the material implications of whether lives will be sustained in the relation to the state, a more comprehensive project is advanced by the state idea to arrive at a form of life commensurable with its own reproduction. The state therefore works to reproduce itself in establishing congruency in both the life lived within the state and the means by which that life is controlled as subject to the state. Therefore, it is the day-to-day monitoring and management of the population that becomes the new locus of sovereignty and the establishment of the claim or authority to govern. For the sake of this research, I will focus on the particular form of state power that materializes in its provision of care, and in doing so, is able to establish the state as the center and the source of life itself for its population.

The provision of care as a continuous process must then be recognized as a political strategy of the state, not as the antipolitical function of governance. From a theoretical

standpoint, a comprehensive understanding of the state must include the provision of care as fundamental to the political terrain of the modern state – all aspects of state activity must be considered in light of the need to reproduce legitimacy, not merely attain it. The provision of care, the literal opposite of the use of force, pushes the understanding of political strategy further to necessitate a reappraisal of the means available to legitimate governance. In disassociating provided care from its assumed role as the apolitical provision of neutral goods, and instead throwing it into the arena with other forms of political strategy, we can broaden our understanding of the state and governance.

The provision of care can then be considered a model of the “interventions and regulatory controls” that characterize biopolitics as a method of the state (Foucault 1984: 262). As a reinforcing and mutually constitutive pattern of relation, care constitutes an avenue by which the state affects its citizenry, and, as a result of this established relationship, the citizenry, in turn, can affect the state. The legitimacy produced by providing welfare to a certain, demarcated population remains dependent on the state’s continued, stable relationship with that population to the extent that the needs of the citizens and the ability of the state would progressively become coterminous. Building upon a Gramscian conception of civil society (1992) wherein the state’s ability to effect collective consensus is fundamental to its reproduction, Louis Althusser’s work helps develop an expanded account of politics that includes consent and coercion, or what he calls ideology and repression. Althusser’s (1971) disambiguation of ideological state apparatus and the repressive state apparatus reveals significant space to see the effect of the citizenry in appealing to the state idea in comparison to the effect of the formal governing apparatus appealing to the state idea. Drawing the issue of continuous reproduction from Althusser’s same essay, *Ideology and*

Ideological State Apparatuses, the ideological state should be seen as “not only what is at stake, but the site of struggle” itself (1971: 245). The production and the reproduction of the ideological state is then at the hands of both the state apparatus and its population, and the state idea is reproduced specifically during these exchanges of these two bodies, making welfare a particularly generative terrain for the articulation of the state as a dynamic and interpretive “third order object” (Abrams 1988: 76).

Reproducing consensus, reproducing the state

The ability of the state to derive legitimacy from its provision of care is contingent upon first, the demarcation of the specific population that is to be cared for, and second, the demonstration that the provided means of care is tailored to benefit that population uniquely. Often, then, it seems like the care provided is in response to the interests and needs of the population; however, it is through this assumed origin that legitimacy is established and reproduced. As noted by Geertz in the passage above, this is the result of subjects internalizing the state project as constitutive of their own identities. The nature of the provision of care uniquely enables the governing apparatus to construct a form or set standard of life for its citizens, and, in establishing that form as the valued or idealized object, draws its population into alignment. As will be argued in each case study, it is the form of provided care that advances the formation of certain subjects as a result of that care. For example, in Sri Lanka, the provision of water via irrigation systems enables a population that is both settled and settled within communal villages that seek support only from a centralized state apparatus. In Peru, where governance is predicated on the provision of education, the state is able to control government-funded schools as “citizenship factories,” therefore

actively constructing the form of citizenry for the indigenous population (García 2005: 12). The Peruvian state is therefore able to actively shape its citizens in reflection of the form of participation it wishes to include under its aegis. The care provided by the state therefore pulls the subject into a dependent relationship with the governing apparatus, establishing the state as the source of wellbeing.

This form of political subject projected by the state is comprehensive – if accepted, it dictates not only performed aspects of identity, but also personal valuations of the self. The ideal form is then presented in order to be internalized, routinized, and reproduced in every action of the individual in a substantial display of the state’s capillary power, effecting change not through the formal channels, but through the body of citizenry itself (Foucault 1980: 96). Although the individual is not determined by the overarching state idea alone, seeing the formation of subjectivity as a result of the state does serve to outline the way in which the ideological power of the state can be accessed by the governing apparatus and the individual alike. Like Wolf’s structural power, the discourses surrounding a deserving population and a legitimate government are delimited according to these terms. According to Althusser, it is the ideology of the state itself that “hails or interpellates individuals as subjects” (1971: 265). The state idea, when articulated as a project to associate with, calls subjects either to participate, or to be marked by their refusal. Therefore, the state idea is a form of interpellation, to which the subject must either comply or deny. As Corrigan and Sayer similarly articulate in the parallels they draw between the consolidation of state power and the establishment of a unified culture, it is through the establishment of a valued form, and the limitations on other forms, that the governing apparatus can engineer its desired population. As they note,

Out of a vast range of human social capabilities – possible ways in which social life could be lived – state activities more or less forcibly “encourage” some whilst suppressing, marginalizing, eroding, undermining others [...] Certain forms of activity are given the official seal of approval, others are situated beyond the pale. This has cumulative, and enormous, cultural consequences; consequences for how people identify (in many cases, *have to* identify) themselves and their “place” in the world. (1985: 4, emphasis in original)

These states then utilize the hegemonic power of the state idea to establish a consensus before a consensus is realized among the population itself. The cultural field of meaning that gives weight to authority and legitimacy is also a structural field that acts to define the boundaries of the same discourse, in many ways determining what is voiced by the population. It is not the collective interest of a population that appeals to the state for a certain means by which to be cared for, but it is the state that engineers both the form of care and subsequently the population itself.

Assuming the provision of care to be a benign function of governance is, in effect, a result of this. The consensus generated in aligning the needs of the subjects with those of the state obfuscates the process that first created that consensus. Instead of the state hailing its subjects, it appears that the subjects are hailing the state of their own volition. As Philip Abrams argues (1988), the state is a particular form of power that mystifies the form and function of its “real relations” by masking the operative connections between its ideological and material projects. Through this research I seek to demonstrate the unique form of state power that is able to obfuscate the functionality of the provision of care, and in doing so, protect it as a source of reproducing legitimacy. While, for instance, the provision of a stable

water supply throughout the dry season, or the guarantee of a primary education, may seem to fall short of the ideological significance necessary to reproduce the state, the manner in which welfare is used as a function of biopolitics demonstrates the significance of the everyday in relation to stability of the transcendent state idea.

The use of care as a strategy can then be seen to operate on two planes: that which is identifiable to the public, and that which is hidden by the nature of state power. The aim of this research is to interrogate the ways in which the provision of care has been used and to demonstrate the relation between the consolidation of state power and the reproduction of the state idea. In the following case studies, I will show that there are two ways in which care operates as a form of state power and governance. First, care reproduces symbolic legitimacy as an available method to reproduce governing legitimacy. The reproduction of symbolic legitimacy works through an increasingly established network of symbols and forms that, through relational meanings, form a foundation from which the state, as an ideological project, is built. By further intertwining culturally recognized symbols in its functioning, the state is able to further project itself as a locus of authority unique to its population. Regimes and leaders are therefore able to draw upon these various symbols in order to reproduce symbolically the legitimacy of the state in form and function readily identifiable by most citizens. Second, by providing or not providing care, the state can extend itself into territories and populations, or abandon those areas and people to the margins. This extension of the state then serves to expand “state effects,” as articulated by theorists such as Scott (1998) and Trouillot (2003), facilitating the increasing organization and homogenization of bodies to mimic a singular, collective body as idealized by the concept of a nation. State effects demonstrate the ability of states to shape reality in reflection of state structures. Through

making populations legible, discrete, and increasingly homogenized, the state project becomes easier to effect. The state's needs are then reflected in the spatial organization of populations, their assumed identities, and the manner in which they interact with the state.

In establishing a narrative of responsibility, the state seeks to link the population to the governing apparatus through an increasingly abstract relationship. By gradually deemphasizing the material, or real, dimension of care and relying upon the abstract and ideological, the state is able to solidify an affective relationship between its subjects and governing apparatus. Care for the included population is no longer a matter of material provision, but felt as a meaningful inclusion in the state as a result of having assumed the correct identity in relation to the state. Provided care is therefore an entry for the state to exist in its subjects' minds as an ideological real. Through distorting the relation between the state's function and its form, this strategy works "to elicit support for, or tolerance of, the insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves, namely, legitimate, disinterested domination" (Abrams 1988: 76). These intended aims of the use of care – the reproduction of authority and mechanisms of control – encourage the increasing interrelation of terms both in articulating legitimacy and identity. As a dimension of the hegemonic control of the state, forms of identity and legitimacy are increasingly articulated in relation to the state idea. This hegemony is manifest through the individual as there is benefit for individuals to position themselves in relation to the state both for meaningful inclusion and access to material benefits as provided by systems of care. These positional identities then become entrenched in both the symbolic and penetrative projects of the state, and ultimately internalized and reproduced by the population itself. The state then becomes a

locus of authoritative power exerting a coercive force much like gravitation that draws increasingly more forms of identity and legitimacy into its orbit.

Inclusion, exclusion, and the in between

A state's population – increasingly defined as a unitary, cohesive whole – cannot be defined by inclusion alone. In every act of inclusion, there is also an act of exclusion. Inclusion is made meaningful either through the use of culturally relevant systems of meaning, or as a structural relation that hails certain groups. In the latter, certain identity effects are created in order to turn performance of an identity into a meaningful inclusion. Inclusion will then derive additional meaning through its negation.

This presents a significant contradiction with Western norms of egalitarian citizenship. In what Foucault would refer to as “pastoral governance,” where the equality of each individual is reflected in his or her receipt of equal political and civil rights, the Western construct of citizenship is founded on indiscriminate inclusion of all within its borders (Foucault 2007: 125). However, this definition of citizenship is only superficial – all political inclusion is inherently hierarchical. While the status of citizenship is granted freely in reflection of recognized equality, the rights and privileges that attend it can be withheld. This gap in provision of rights has been referred to as the increasing separation between “formal citizenship” and “substantive citizenship” (Holston 2008). Political systems, notably postcolonial states, that previously functioned on networks of power and granting privileges and status according to those networks must then be reconciled with the norm of inclusive citizenship. As articulated by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), this pattern, particularly in the African postcolonial context, led to the bifurcation of the state and the distinction between

citizen and subject. Mamdani's account of postcolonial African states reflects my point that, in reconciling inclusive citizenship with a hierarchical politics, a new hierarchy must be established within citizen that still allows the state to position its subjects in relation to the governing apparatus. This positioning allows the state to maintain itself as the benefactor of all its subjects, and therefore the source of all rights and benefits that would be tied to citizenship. In separating the presumed rights of citizenship with the substantive protection that it connotes, the postcolonial state is able to maintain legitimacy from governing a specified, unitary population while superficially including all within its recognized territory.

This separation between assigned status and substantial benefit highlights a significant contradiction in the functioning of the state as an apparatus and the state as an ideological project: as the governing apparatus seeks control through homogenization, the state as an ideological project seeks instead to impose hierarchy that encourages the positioning of the individual in relation to the state. While the first prioritizes the legibility and uniformity of all citizens, the second hinges upon difference to demarcate its boundaries based on the performance of a certain identity and relation to the state itself. The ideological state seeks a negative image from which to articulate its present and future self. Most importantly, this functions as an internal demarcation, defining who is included and excluded within the territorial borders of the state, as well as a space of marginality – offering the potential of future inclusion. Giorgio Agamben (2005) has argued that the state is never truly absent; rather, when it seems to be, the state has exercised its prerogative to be absent and, therefore, demonstrates an even greater form of power. The margins are then to be recognized as where the state project is most coercive – where alignment to the state project is required in order to be included, but those who are excluded still necessarily remain in

relation to the state, maintaining the hegemonic nature of the state project by merit of their own distinction. This contradiction is uniquely productive in that it allows the state to operate in the continual arrangement and repositioning of its citizens in relation to the abstract and idealized state, sustaining substantial coercive force until the individual aligns to the state project.

As I will show in detail in the following chapters, the demarcation of a population according to the inclusion, and subsequent exclusion, of certain groups is explicit in both Peru and Sri Lanka, and the manner in which that differentiation serves to further the state project is deeply imbricated in the nature of each as separate ideological projects. Provided care can then be analyzed across this divide, between those who are cared for and those who are not, and the divide itself, the margins, where the inclusive and exclusive strategies of the state overlap. As the two cases show, these margins can be geographic or spatial realities, but it is the culturally determined division of ethnicized or racilized identities that constitutes the margins as a political strategy. In Sri Lanka, the state idea, and its accompanying symbolic import, was harnessed by the state apparatus in order to legitimize ordering the state in reflection of its Sinhalese majority. In Peru, the state idea was used as the basis of appeal by indigenous citizens in order to receive the benefits of the state apparatus and integrate themselves into the state as a whole. However, both the state apparatus in Sri Lanka and the indigenous movements of the Peruvian highlands used the provision of care as a basis from which to articulate the state's relation to the population. By comparing these cases we will see, whether state power is used on behalf of the formal governing structure or the population, it will serve to augment the state as an ideological project, which transcends both the function and the form of the state itself.

Chapter 2

Peru, the penetrative state

In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, James Scott ponders the efficacy of mapping the extent of social and economic exchange on a topographical map using what Scott refers to as the “friction of terrain” to determine a more accurate distance between points of interest (2009: 47). In a map in which “the unit of measurement is not distance, but the time of travel,” Scott reasserts the reality of the state over its imagined whole to properly address the evident difference between state boundaries and the actual reach of the state. Governance in Peru functions in largely the same capacity. While state boundaries encompass territory, in actuality, the land under state control is constrained by accessibility. The Peruvian state has therefore extended or receded its civil infrastructure, such as roads, as necessity (economic or otherwise) dictates. The means to access the state in other ways, such as an education, are similarly delimited according to these exigencies. The Peruvian state is, in short, a penetrative state, built upon the expansion and consolidation of civil infrastructure that conveys state power throughout its territory. The Peruvian Andes in particular, and the extent to which the state has chosen to be present there, is indicative of the state project overall.

Establishing the margins through the Peruvian state

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many Peruvian intellectuals have emphasized the difference between the “legal Peru” and the “real Peru” (Poole 1997: 155). Originally a distinction between the state and civil society, this binary was later ethnicized to emphasize the difference between the modern state and the Andean peasantry. The Andes itself was shorthand to denote the margins of the Peruvian state, particularly the southern

region, which some pejoratively call “the Indian stain” (*mancha india*). While the Andes, as a cultural and social region, extends beyond national borders, the departments of Cuzco, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Puno comprise the Peruvian region (Handelman 1975: 21). When political territorial borders are congruous with large geographic features, like a large mountain range, it is perhaps easier to imagine the nation as a unitary entity, despite the lack of substantive integration at its borders. However, it is a state that is defined by territorial borders, but a nation that defines itself by its population. To strengthen its claim to govern, the Peruvian governing apparatus united the governing claim of the state with the legitimacy of leading a nation. The Peruvian state is imagined and narrated as a nation of a certain people, commensurate with the ideological Peru – an urbanized, educated population in a rapidly industrializing state. Following independence in 1821, the Peruvian nation deliberately set itself on the path of modernization in order to revive its economy, leaving the heritage of the nation, and its indigenous population, behind (Klarén 2000: 139-140). Although the indigenous population of Peru is hardly dismissible,¹ this narrative has become crucial to the Peru national narrative.

This then led to the further disassociation of the indigenous from the Peruvian nation as the indigenous were considered irreconcilable with the imagined Peru. Political elites “produced a picture of Peru in which Indians were anchored to the Andes (the sierra) but were rhetorically absent from the coast, purportedly populated by mestizos and whites” (de la Cadena 2000: 45). As indicated by de la Cadena, identity in Peru is recognized first and foremost in relation to ethnicity, which has become increasingly racialized over the years.

¹ Estimates for the relevant time frame, roughly the first few decades of the twentieth century, vary between 60% (government census) and 80% (Mariategui’s famous assertion) (Coronado 2009: 10). However, since the indigenous populations are regionally concentrated, it is important to note that in the *mancha india*, the peasantry make up over 80% of the population (Handelman 1975: 40).

Identity is then determined by aligning to one of the primary identities – white or indigenous – or some combination of the two – such as *mestizo* – that indicates mixed lineage. The imagined difference of the two populations was then mapped back onto the geographic realities of the Peruvian state. As Mary Weismantel notes, the highland indigenous, or *serranos*, were considered to be “isolated autochthons rooted in their own communities” while the *limeños* were urban Peruvians, distinguished by the relationship to the capital, Lima (2001: xxii). This spatial separation was then read as a social and political distance between the highlands and the lowlands; shorthand by which “people were ranked according to their surroundings: the higher the geographical elevation, the lower the social status of its inhabitants” (de la Cadena 2000: 21). As the dominant narrative of indigeneity was similarly tied to conceptions of backwardness and reluctance to modernize, the Andean highlands were increasingly treated by political elites as the hinterlands, beyond the reach of state. This impression was then compounded by what Weismantel refers to as “the political geography of race” (Weismantel 2001: 5). The racialized difference between the two populations and their spatial separation then worked in tandem to conclusively separate the “legal” state from the “real” margins. The margins of Peru were then an internal exclusion, shaping the nation ideologically as well as geographically. Therefore, distance from the governing apparatus was not only felt as a spatial separation, but also in a lack meaningful inclusion in the nation, particularly the lack of provided care.

Framing the margins as a space apart from the state reinforces the coercive dimension of the construction of the margins. As the state chooses where to be absent, it simultaneously exerts pressure on the citizen to enter into a reciprocal relationship in order to attain meaningful inclusion. Therefore it is not the state that extends itself to the citizenry, but the

citizenry that must appeal to the state for their inclusion – often through offering their participation or other form of contribution; “the ‘periphery’ may reach toward the center to embrace the nation” (Nugent 1997: 322). This voluntary association demonstrates that where the state is absent, the state is able to exert its coercive force most directly. However, as David Nugent cautions, “to conceive of the nation-state as *only* coercive – to view its relations with society as strictly oppositional – is to privilege above all else one limited and contingent dimension of a relationship that is in reality much more dense and complex” (1997: 323, emphasis in original). The Peruvian state worked both in opposition and in conjunction with its citizens – particularly throughout the twentieth century – to define itself as a nation-state. The relationship between the Peruvian state and the highlanders is therefore dynamic, and the relative association of the highlanders with the state can then be read to reveal the efficacy of the Peruvian state project.

It is precisely this imagined distance between the highland Indian and the urban citizen that constituted the form of Peruvian governance in the twentieth century; “the dialectic relationship between indigenous peoples and national society, has (re)emerged in Peru as the basis for renegotiating identity politics and citizenship in the country” (García 2005: 158-159; Ramos 1998). José Carlos Mariátegui, a Peruvian intellectual of the early twentieth century, echoed this in his own theories of indigenous revolution in the Andes (1971). From Mariátegui’s communist perspective, the resulting synthesis of this dialectic would bring communism to the urban areas and modernization to the highlands. Without this synthesis, the confrontation of these mutually distinct entities would continue. However, it is this imagined dialectic that has further entrenched perceptions of the indigenous and the state as inherently contentious and unable to be reconciled. To characterize indigenous advocacy

as seeking only to contest the state is to misrecognize the significance of citizens appealing to the state in order to seek care through the provision of the governing apparatus. In identifying the ways in which this imagined divide could be crossed, new forms of indigenous advocacy and demands for inclusion are made apparent. This is anecdotally illustrated by the fact that, during many land seizures in the southern Andes in the 1960s, indigenous peasant federations would claim land by planting the Peruvian flag, “indicating that these seizures were merely securing their rights as Peruvian citizens” (Handelman 1975: 111). This claim demonstrates that the formal state was not wholly severed from the indigenous population. Instead, the Peruvian state was a national identity to be claimed by her people. While not seeking homogenization, indigenous communities have, to a significant extent, consistently sought inclusion in the Peruvian state.

The demand to be protected by the state was articulated primarily in the experience of what happened in the state’s absence. Following Peruvian independence in 1821, and continuing until the turn of the century, the highlands were ruled by the landed aristocracy – *castas*.² As de la Cadena notes, the highlands were “virtually a frontier zone [...] Land titles were scarce, even nonexistent; ‘justice’ and ‘law’ were euphemistic terms, and power depended on private armed forces” (2000: 97-98). The ruling aristocracy were considered to be “wholly distinct” from the Andean population, which served to further exploitation and abuse at the hands of the largely invulnerable *gamonales*³ (Nugent 1997: 30). Here, difference, particularly racial difference, conferred legitimacy to govern. Race was used as a

² The *casta española* were the elite families that, by merit of their claimed relation to colonial aristocracy, “controlled virtually all positions of public prominence – political, economic, religious, military, social, and educational” (Nugent 1997: 35).

³ While *hacendados* and *gamonales* are both terms that refer to landowning elites, *hacendados* were considered to be legitimately established through ancestral property ownership, while *gamonales* referred to those who had not only illegitimately obtained their property, but also exploited their workers (de la Cadena 2000: 82-83).

“weapon of the aristocracy” to legitimize rule (Stepputat 2005: 80). The Peruvian state largely considered *casta* rule as an intermediary rule that allowed the state access to the resources of the Andes without requiring the dedication of a large administrative apparatus. Beyond ensuring the supply of agricultural goods to urban centers, the state had little interest in extending itself into the highlands. The *castas* therefore “gained control over the local machinery of the state” in order to aggregate authority and perpetuate their autocratic and arbitrary rule (Nugent 1997: 39).

However, the ruling *casta* still had to maintain a façade by which its actions could be seen in comparison to egalitarian ideals of the newly independent republic. Therefore, “the ruling *casta* was forced to adopt the central state’s standards of representation in certain specific and limited domains” (Nugent 1997: 155). By enacting a discourse of egalitarian ideals to establish their own authority, the *castas* also opened the juridico-legal door for Andean citizens to make demands on their state as based in their rights as citizens, primarily through demanding access to the civil infrastructure of the state. *Serranos* sought recognition first and foremost by the governing apparatus, and the stability and predictability of the Peruvian legal system that accompanied that recognition. Economic exigency similarly provided motivation for the Andean citizen to gain recognition, since the average *serrano* was so disconnected from the national market that even the economic bonanza that swept Peru in the first decade of the twentieth century did not reach them. The highlanders therefore also sought access to the governing apparatus in material terms, through the provision of civil infrastructure. Through roads and education, the indigenous citizen attempted to negotiate integration into the Peruvian state without submitting to the homogenizing state project. Provision, or access to provided care, became key to determining

meaningful inclusion in the Peruvian state. A claim to citizenship was equivalent to a claim to access.

During the same period in the early twentieth century, the political elites of Peru looked to its indigenous inhabitants to construct a symbolic locus of authority. It was during the “rediscovery of the Indians” in the later nineteenth century that indigenous citizens became alternately sources for authentic tradition and objects for modernization for the industrializing Peruvian state (Klarén 2000: 245-247). The *indigenismo* movement of the 1920s then further developed this idea, at least symbolically equating the invocation of indigenous roots with a legitimate claim to political authority.⁴ The *indigenismo* movement was propelled by intellectuals and politicians alike, who saw political utility in the provision for, and limited inclusion of, the indigenous population. However, without allowing space for self-representation, these policies foreshadowed the paternalism that would later become characteristic of welfare policies in the Andes. The movement did not seek to empower the indigenous population, but instead used a caricature of the indigenous subject to further the agenda of political elites: “As they [Peruvian political elites and intellectuals] mounted their titular defense of the *indios*, they also created an image or figure that could represent, and do so amply” (Coronado 2009: 14). In representing indigenous communities as static and historicized relics of Peruvian culture, the movement perpetuated the idea of that the Peruvian indigenous population was incapable of being entrusted as true citizens of the republic. As Thurner notes, “Creole liberals would continue to blame the Spanish for having

⁴ Notable intellectuals and works of the indigenista school of the early twentieth century included novels such as Clorinda Matto de Turner’s *Aves sin nido* (1889) and Enrique López Albújar’s *Cuentos Andinos* (1920) and *Matalache* (1928) as well as political works such as José Uriel García’s *El nuevo Indio* (1930) and Luis Eduardo Vacárcel’s *Tempestad en los Andes* (1927). Political journals were also relevant, such as *Amauta* (1926-1930) published by José Carlos Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre, and *La Sierra*, (1927-1930) published by Valcárcel, José Uriel García, and others (Klarén 2000:245-7).

‘frozen’ the Indians in a kind of primordial stupor which, they now rationalized, in effect rendered them incapable of assuming the responsibilities and privileges of full citizenship in the Peruvian republic” (1997: 11). This reconciles the apparent contradiction in reverence for the Incan civilization and the lack of established trust in its descendants. As Mariátegui notes, there was a stark distinction between seeking the economic emancipation of the indigenes and providing for their wellbeing as framed by a “liberal, humanitarian, enlightened nineteenth century attitude” (1971: 25). In casting the indigenous as recipients of care instead of citizens with a right to that care, the Peruvian state found a new reconciliation of the two Peruvian identities through governance in a paternalist register.

The reforms made by Augusto B. Leguía’s government in the 1920s recognized the political significance of the growing indigenista movement, yet did little to alter the division between the indigenous and the true Peruvian citizenry. Leguía referred to his second term (1919-1930) as “*La Patria Nueva*” in recognition of his openly pro-indigenista, and inherently paternalistic, policies. Also referred to as the *Oncenio*, the eleven-year period of Leguía’s second term was characterized by increased foreign investment and massive migration from the highlands to urban centers (Coronado 2009: 9). Lima itself doubled from 200,000 in 1919 to 375,000 by the late 1920s as Andean highlanders moved to urban areas in hopes of becoming integrated in the new economy, and from 1920 to 1921, the number of roads in Peru nearly doubled through a conscripted work law. (Coronado 2009: 29). Official, legal recognition of Indian communities was subsequently granted under Leguía in the 1920 constitution. While both these efforts sought to grant indigenous citizens nominal access to the state, they did little in actuality to aid in the substantive integration of *serranos*. Through the implementation of these reforms, the status of the indigenous as a secondary, or marked,

citizen was only further emphasized. The *Ley de Conscripción Vial*, the corvée labor act, intended to expand the reach of the state through road systems, utilized the same groups that had always been exploited for manual labor across Peru, the poor and the indigenous, through forced and unpaid labor. As Coronado notes, “Perverted from the ideals of a liberatory *indigenismo*, this law meant to free up indigenous labor by removing it from the land and channeling it toward modernizing projects” (2009: 9). Through conscripted labor and official recognition as a marked citizen, the Leguán reforms sent a clear message to the indigenous highlanders. As expressed by García, “the state has given you these programs; participate or lose access to these resources that have been generously offered to your people” (2005: 10). Access therefore came at the cost of aligning indigenous identity to a form of service to the state. The “good republican” was an identity offered and articulated through these reforms in which “contribución” to the state, through both labor and tax, was the performance of a positional identity that would convey a limited form of inclusion (Turner 1997: 34).

Crafting the ideal citizen and *el pueblo*

The liberal state project would not itself be complete until the indigenous would identify first and foremost as Peruvian citizens. Notably, there was a significant disjuncture between the acceptance of the *serranos* as contributing members of the Peruvian state, and the inclusion of *serranos* as equal members of Peruvian society. While the governing apparatus sought the further homogenization of its population through its own control and access to the Andes, Peruvian society itself was still very much dependent upon a racial hierarchy present since its Spanish conquest. Regardless of the contradictory forms of

inclusion that were provided to the *serranos* through policy reform, meaningful inclusion in Peruvian society was still delimited by race. However, as García notes, “When racial oppression has threatened citizenship, the liberal response has been to attempt to eliminate the legal structures that enforce that oppression so that race can again be taken out of the mix of politics; citizenship once again becomes color-blind” (2005: 165). The interests of the governing elite, and moreover the ability of the governing apparatus to access the highlanders, superseded the interests of the Peruvian national narrative. Instead, the state remained focused on the integration of the indigenous population through gradual assimilation (García 2005: 67). Here, it is clear that the perceived solution for the so-called indigenous problem was the racial assimilation of the highlanders in the long term, and their education in the short-term. While race was the essentialized locus of difference, only mutable through “eugenic schemes” or miscegenation, education was seen as a form of moral improvement that could be performed by the individual (de la Cadena 2000: 17). The concept of “Peruvian decency” was constructed through Peruvian society as a moral regulation of the individual, providing inclusion through behavioral alignment to what was considered to be the social norms of the urban elite. It was therefore the molding of indigenous identity, both through race and the performance of race, that would provide the idealized unitary Peruvian identity. The governing apparatus therefore predicated inclusion in the erasure of indigenous identity.

Both strategies resulted in the creation of “hybrids” – individuals not only seeking to traverse the margins, but also wholly defined by their existence in the margins. The “decent *indigena*” described by de la Cadena (2000) was still only a hybrid – an individual marked as a racial Other, yet one able, to a certain extent, to perform the identity of the included. While the embodiment of decency was meant to supersede racial markers, it in many ways further

emphasized difference that was considered to be a product of race. *Mestizos*, or individuals of both indigenous and white heritage, were still stigmatized for their inability to transcend race through the performance of a learned identity. As de la Cadena notes, “*mestizos* were cultural/moral hybrids rather than biological hybrids,” and lacking meaningful inclusion despite performing Peruvian decency (2000: 65). The moral regulation did not serve to transcend their race, but instead served to only reinforce the inability to wholly achieve meaningful inclusion.

How then could an indigenous *serrano*, as such, transverse the margin to be included under the aegis of the state? One could propose that the only avenue left available to the indigenous was that of open contention with the state; however, this too worked against the interests of the indigenous as “all the rebellions [of the nineteenth century] did was to reinforce the specific, dominant image of Indians as illiterate and pre-rational [... and] certified the idea of Indians as irrational rebels, unprepared for citizenship” (de la Cadena 2000: 128). The method of advocacy chosen by the indigenous was seen as a reflection of their character, and therefore had to work through what was determined to be a legitimate or “true” form of advocacy – namely, one that was already articulated in the Peruvian state idea. Open contention with the state only led to the further dismissal of the highlanders as unable to control their rage, further articulating difference with the refined and controlled nature of the “civilized and decent” *limeños*. In appealing to Peruvian decency, indigenous communities only partially bridged the imagined distance between the urban and the highlands; however, it did allow individuals to articulate their own performed identity in relation to the state. Building upon the moral regulation and education of the individual,

indigenous advocacy was reclaimed by the indigenous to represent their own form of citizenship.

A “new *indigenismo*” began in the highlands itself, largely in opposition to this conception of an Andean peasant as a fetishized *indigena*. Men like Ricardo Feijóo Reina organized regional associations and published newsletters like *Amazonas*⁵ (Nugent 1997: 179). The origin of the socialist party, the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*,⁶ is also associated with this new movement. Party organizers such as Victor Santillán Gutierrez, Carlos A. Mestanza Chota, and others reached out to indigenous communities as citizens of the republic rather than wards of the state (Nugent 1997: 232-255). This new *indigenismo* was to be used “in the service of a truly democratic vision for the nation” in which all members were seen to “embody/ metonymically represent what is essential about the nation as a whole”; thereby articulating not only a demand for egalitarianism, but also recognition as contributing members of the larger Peruvian nation (Weismantel 2001: 32, Nugent 1997: 10). In doing so, the Andean highlanders were able to maintain their primary identity, by demonstrating that identity as uniquely constitutive of the national narrative, and therefore the Peruvian state, while simultaneously adopting citizenship as a means to benefit from the provision of the formal governing apparatus. In this way, the reproduction of the state idea was undertaken by the “*fringes* of the territorial state” as a mode of politics demonstrably similar to the use of identity by the governing elites themselves (Nugent 1997: 308, emphasis

⁵ The regional newspaper began publication in 1926 and continued to the early 30s. In later years it was referred to as *La Voz del Pueblo* (Nugent 1997: 179).

⁶ The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*, or APRA, was organized by Haya de la Torre as a populist party that sought support in both the working and middle class. The party was progressive in seeking reform, but in later decades was considered to collaborate with the government and leave its founding interests behind (Klarén 2000: 273-5).

in original). The new *indigenismo* was, in effect, a bid to integrate the indigenous figure back into the state idea as a political agent.

Take for example the *el pueblo* (literally “the people”) movement of the Chachapoyas region, as studied by David Nugent (1997), which emphasizes the intersection of race, education, and public movements in the appeal to the governing apparatus by Andean citizenry. Nugent’s analysis of the *el pueblo* movement describes a nationhood built from the community, and collective citizenry, up. Naming *el pueblo* effectively worked to harness the people in view of a common goal; most importantly, this happened to be a goal in common with the interest of the state (Nugent 1997: 150). Much like the demands of the *indigenismo* movement, *el pueblo* demanded access through civil infrastructure – namely, the construction of roads and the implementation of effective systems of education. Moreover, this “new *indigenismo*” was based in the assertion that the people of the highlands could be understood expansively as *el pueblo*. In uniting communities of varying ethnic and class identifications into a singular, pan-Andean entity, *el pueblo* served as a shift from “vernacular social relations” to an identity legible to the state (Scott 2009: 257). This can similarly be read as Trouillot’s identification effect, “a realignment of the atomized subjectivities along collective lines within which individuals recognize themselves as the same” (2003: 81). This collective identity, in particular, served to transverse the imagined margins to align to an identity positioned in relation to the state. As Trouillot asserts, this is not so much an imagined community as conceived by Benedict Anderson, but instead, an imagined community “projected against politics” (2003: 88). The unity of *el pueblo* was specifically imagined within the context of the state, seeking recognition for the collective just as one would seek recognition for his or her own identity.

Encouraged by the efforts made under Leguía's *La Patria Nueva*, *el pueblo* continued to make gains until, by 1930, it was recognized as a "political force that could no longer be ignored", the "core constituency for the region's new power holders" (Nugent 1997: 266). *El pueblo*'s impact was demonstrated in the construction of a unitary group that the state recognized as representative of the Peruvian indigenous population. *El pueblo* had, significantly, returned agency to indigenous communities to the extent that indigenous leaders were then referred to as power holders. The success of the movement did not go unrecognized within the region; the efficacy of the movement and its methods were reflected in other similar political movements of the era. As James Scott notes, "once invented [...] a unit created as a political structure of rule became the idiom of political contestation and competitive self-assertion" (2009: 259). Peasant federations formed throughout the twentieth century (though primarily in either the 20s or the 60s) worked to establish not only connection from the indigenous peasant to the state, but also amongst the *comuneros* so that their collective interest would be recognized by the state at least by merit of their numbers (Handelman 1975: 46, 128). *El pueblo*'s methods were also used by the burgeoning *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*⁷ particularly in relation to the use of education. The party was well known for their construction of schools as a means to enter into a community, a tactic later used by the Shining Path in the 1960s. This emerging pattern in the twentieth century indicates the success of movements such as *el pueblo* to imbricate their own interests into the state idea, forming a method of advocacy identifiable and legitimized by nature of its continued reproduction through the century. This appeal through the ideological state to the formal governing state illustrates the reciprocity needed to reproduce the state idea. Although

⁷ The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*, or APRA, was organized by Haya de la Torre as a populist party that sought support in both the working and middle class (Klarén 2000: 273-5).

the indigenous had challenged their exclusion from the formal state, they found “a new social and political space had opened up for them in the early 1930s. They found that they were “empowered by the central government just as they sought alliance with the central government in order to be empowered” (Nugent 1997: 255). This empowerment was made clear in the recognition of *el pueblo* as a representative of the indigenous community.

It was largely through marked contradiction to the racialized discourse, which separated the indigenous from Peruvian citizenry, that the discourse of “new *indigenismo*” rose to prominence. Race had been “perfected as a normalizing technology” that served to delineate who was included in the Peruvian national identity and who was excluded (Poole 1997: 16). Race was consequently constitutive of the discourse surrounding citizenship for, although citizenship was not denied on the basis of race, meaningful inclusion in the Peruvian nation was itself delimited by race. Race had acted as the singular reason that full citizenship could not be extended to the indigenous; however, it also worked as a relatively consistent means by which to navigate Peruvian society if the correct “racialized” markers were adopted. As de la Cadena notes,

The taxonomy deriving from a definition of race that subordinated phenotype was particularly ductile, as it included both the perception of rigid hierarchies and an unequivocal fluidity to position individuals within it. Thus, although the ranking of racial groups was consensually accepted and class-related, the definition of what label adhered to which person left room for negotiation. (de la Cadena 2000: 9)

Race in Peru was no longer a set of biological markers. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it had come to represent a broad set of performed characteristics as indicated by a few markers such as place of residence and skin tone.

The ways in which *el pueblo* articulated its fitness for citizenship necessarily deemphasized essentialized race in order to emphasize the performance of race as formative of a new, notably political, subjectivity: “You too are Peruvian, that is to say Indian. You are only different from me in your dress and education” (de la Cadena 2000: 308, interview with Miguel Quispe in 1922). The new *indigenismo* was constituted on this shift in discourse from assumed inherent difference to merely cultural difference. Moreover, this claim was strengthened by the inherent legitimacy of indigenous culture as the pre-colonial past of the nation. Cultural difference could be regulated, disciplined, and governed through the state; most importantly, it could be shaped and adapted through the provision of care. Reorienting the racial division of Peru to a cultural division allowed substantial leverage in establishing the means to transverse this division. This method of articulating difference specifically within a field chosen by the movement allowed the participants of *el pueblo* to address precisely what social markers differentiated them from the rest of Peruvian society. The objective of *el pueblo* was therefore just as much a moral project as it was a political appeal to the state. By demanding recognition as a certain kind of political subject, indigenous citizens were also claiming the right to be cared for as a political subject included in the state. Because the very idea of citizenship was imbricated in the moral and rational character of the individual, the indigenous individual then had to address the social performance of his or her own morality and rationality in order to be recognized as a citizen and therefore assert the indigenous citizen as a new form of political subjectivity. Therefore the new *indigenismo* set forth “a single set of moral and ethical principles” in order

to guide the behavior of all individuals regardless of race or caste. Adherence to these ethical principles of honesty, fair play, and mutual respect was to be a new

means of achieving social recognition and respect open to all – one based on individual merit rather than inherited social position. (Nugent 1997: 196)

These principles were then disseminated through publications and became part of public discourse in moral regulation of the self. As de la Cadena illustrates, even funeral rituals became the site for the performance and education “about the qualities of decency: the generosity to serve the collectivity ‘beyond personal interests’, the honesty to do so, and the sense of justice necessary to guard the precepts of society” (de la Cadena 2000: 56). These principles continued to be circulated by more diffuse routes as indigenous communities internalized the discourse. Members of the movement claimed that these articulations of modern or urbane decency were in fact a reflection of the traditional Incan moral code, “*Ama sua, Ama kella, Ama lulla*” – do not steal, do not lie, do not be lazy (Coronado 2009: 47). These principles continued to be naturalized and integrated into all aspects of life in the community. Ideas of national participation and contribution entered the home freely, as the principles outlined by the movement placed increasing emphasis on child rearing and the role of the mother in shaping future citizens (Nugent 228-31: 1997). The state idea was therefore reflected back through the individual, as meaningful inclusion became entry into discourse and national narrative.

However, education was, by far, the principal means by which the indigenous citizen sought his own empowerment. “The central arena for the construction of this new kind of citizenship, in the view of activists, is the schoolhouse, the place long recognized as a kind of ‘citizenship factory’” (García 2005: 12). Education became a term equally as expansive as race, seen to connote not only intelligence, but also the ability to further improve or better oneself. Education was then paralleled with the increasing modernization and progress of the

industrializing Peruvian state. Comparatively, the inability to obtain an education or the lack of material means to do so was synonymous with the plight of the rural indigenous trapped in circumstance without personal agency. Race was therefore linked to education, as education level was seen to be culturally determined; however, education also proved to be the means by which to remove this racial distinction (de la Cadena 2000: 10-11). In the words of Valcárcel, a Peruvian intellectual of the early twentieth century, "Receiving a professional degree is a dignity that erases the stigmas of origin" (de la Cadena 2000: 44, quoting Valcárcel 1914). Therefore an individual's education was a means to self-empowerment. Education became the tool for the indigenous to address their political as well as social positioning – education was a "cover term used in Amazonas to refer to the range of disciplinary processes and practices that had to be undertaken in order to make autonomous, independent, rational subjects out of the region's unformed and pre-rational Indians and children" (Nugent 1997: 205). The education of youth then came to the fore as the only available means for individuals to gain access to both the Peruvian nation and state apparatus, particularly in reference to the ability of future generations to reach the ideal life in the city.

Largely because of its association with ideas of modernity, education was similarly considered a political project by the political elites. Education was gradually drawn from the domestic or community-bounded sphere into the broader public interest of the state. Like road systems and other forms of civil infrastructure, the Peruvian state had a history of extending educational systems as a means to open a reciprocal relationship with highlanders, tapping into the cultural significance of an offered education as a means of inclusion. The educational system was first extended to the "un-integrated Indian masses" in the late nineteenth century under Pardo, and again by Leguía in the early twentieth century (Klarén

2000: 180). During the time of Leguía's *Oncenio* alone, the number of students in the nation rose 62%, from 195,000 in 1920 to 313,000 in 1930 (Klarén 2000: 242). Once the significance of education as a public good was recognized, the state asserted itself as the source and provider of that good. Education was then a point of entry for the state to materialize in the daily life of its citizenry. Education was also recognized for its value to the state apparatus as a form of penetrative tool that allowed the mechanisms of the state into the community. It was through the schoolhouses that the state was able to craft its citizens and shape its nation; "politicians championed the twin ideologies of liberalism and progress, education occupied center stage as a nation building and racial homogenizing tool" (de la Cadena 2000: 16). The Peruvian state had identified a key mechanism by which it could turn policy into the active shaping of its population – even a population as far removed as the Andean highlanders. The shaping of its citizens was not performed in the management of curriculum for indoctrination alone, but in the perpetuation of a discourse that saw education as the means by which to be included in the state. This discourse shifted the onus of inclusion from the state to the individual, and in doing so, ensured that the state would no longer have to extend itself to the Andes; instead, the highlanders would increasingly come to the state, already molded by the specifications of citizen as transmitted through these schools.

The new relationship between the indigenous and the state

Through the demand for state recognition, the *serranos* were able to define their own conception of the state and how it should be integrated into their lives – namely as a rational governing authority that provided access to both economic prosperity. Through defining the parameters of the relation between the citizen and the state, the new *indigenismo* articulated a

new form of political agency for the Andean highlanders. The narrative of *el pueblo* hinged upon the acknowledgment of the region's isolation and lack of ability to control its own position in relation to both the state apparatus and the national market. Emphasizing in particular the arbitrary and largely exploitative relation between the highlanders and the *casta* system, *el pueblo* sought to place themselves under the aegis of the Peruvian state in order for the state apparatus to extend stability through rational-legal authority. The resulting demands were therefore voiced in terms of access and care as a result of meaningful inclusion in the Peruvian nation. *El pueblo* sought a closer relationship to the formal governing apparatus as allegiance to the state was equated to emancipatory power that was sure to "release the latent potentialities of the region and its populace, and would result in a veritable explosion of creative energy – commerce would grow, industries would develop, and prosperity would come to all" (Nugent 1997: 194). As Holston notes, "Empowerment happens when a citizen's sense of an objective source of right in citizenship entails a corresponding sense of subjective power – power to change existing arrangements (legal and other), exact compliance, compel behavior" (2008: 16). The *el pueblo* movement, and others like it, effectively expanded the concept of Peruvian citizenship to make space for an indigenous citizen, similarly imbricated in the national narrative. The recognition and care provided by the state was therefore made substantive and meaningful through the new political subjectivity of the indigenous citizens.

The movement, although successful, was notably one-sided. While the highlanders increasingly made themselves available to the state and legible to its processes, the governing apparatus did little to alter its own structures in return. While the indigenous were appealing through the ideological state on the basis of their "inherently Peruvian" identity, historicized

though it may be, the state apparatus still worked largely upon the logic of internal hierarchy. This conception of an internal hierarchy had infiltrated the state idea as both the formal state and the citizenry determined that citizenship was to be deserved through the performance of certain actions and practices. This articulation of mediated inclusion, predicated upon certain moral and intellectual markers, then served the formal state apparatus as continually reproducing the means to affect alignment to the state. In terms of the state, this was a homogenizing project; for the citizens, it was an increasingly delimited passage to inclusion that required the abandonment of culturally relevant forms of their own identity. State sovereignty, particularly in the Peruvian context, is then much in line with Agamben's assertion that sovereignty is the power to order and distinguish life (2005: 33). The indigenous subject was therefore not assimilated, but held apart as a separate form of political subjectivity.

The process of shaping the ideal citizen and receiving recognition could then be interpreted as effected in the ideological sphere alone. As the margins did become a site for the alignment of the excluded, it should not be interpreted solely as the result of a coercive state apparatus, but as the result of a consensual state ideological project that was embodied in the *serranos* just as much as within the *limeños*, and therefore resulted in voluntary alignment. This ideal form of citizen was generated specifically in the interest of indigenous communities and bound by the extent of the relationship they required from the state. In appealing to the state idea built upon conceptions of modernity, decency, and continual moral progress, the new *indigenismo* did not erase indigenous identity in order to fit within the governing apparatus, but instead appealed to the overall Peruvian state idea in order to demand inclusion.

Chapter 3

Sri Lanka, the symbolic state

The Sri Lankan state project can be considered through three main sources of symbolic legitimacy: Buddhism, agriculture, and the state provision of care for those who participate in these two aspects of Sri Lankan life. Legitimacy and the claim to authority in Sri Lanka operate on the relationship among these cultural concepts in a constellation of symbols. Through decades of national narrative and the further elaboration of these symbols through lived experience, all three can be seen to mutually reinforce each other in the further reproduction of the state idea as a whole. However, the Sri Lankan state is notably not a unified whole. The Sinhalese majority constitutes 70% of the island as well as the governing elite, and the ethnic politics that have dominated the nation since independence have left a significant portion of the population excluded from not only the benefits from the state, but also from the ideological project in which the state operates. The Tamil minority,⁸ approximately 11% of the Sri Lankan population, represents the clearest opposition to a unilateral Sinhalese claim to the state (Gunasekera 1994: 9). The Sinhalese nationalist project has sought to assert the reign of the ancient Sinhalese kings as the paradigm of governance in Sri Lanka, and thereby smuggled in a host of ethnicized assumptions about the nature of the state. The provision of care specifically has increasingly unified Sinhalese interest with the interests of the governing apparatus, depicting Sri Lanka as a state of and for its Sinhalese majority. As Moore notes, “The use of state power for the benefit of the ordinary Sinhalese

⁸ The Tamil minority itself is divided among the Jaffna Tamils and Estate Tamils, differentiated by their initial arrival (in the 2nd century BCE and the mid-nineteenth century respectively) and in their form of labor (business and trade in comparison to plantation work). Although the experiences of these two groups are notably different, following the narrative of ethnic bifurcation, they are widely regarded as representative of the same population.

has been, and remains, the primary legitimation, implicit or explicit, of all governments elected since 1956 at least, and arguably, since 1931” (1985: 29).

Establishing narrative through the Sri Lankan state

Although claims to political legitimacy in Sri Lanka are established through history, no groups vying for the authority to govern the island claim to be its original inhabitants. The two most sizeable populations, the Sinhalese and the Tamil, both construct their historical narratives upon their respective arrivals on the island. While the Tamil population has been established in the north and east of the island since the 2nd century BCE, the Sinhalese trace their origin back further to the mythicized union of Vangan⁹ princess and lion. The exile of their descendants to Lanka is contiguous with the historically accepted arrival of the Sinhalese to the island in the 5th century BCE (Sørensen 1996: 70). During roughly the 3rd century BCE, an extensive irrigation civilization was erected that effectively consolidated power through the provision of water from a centralized source.¹⁰ Sinhalese historical memory of this period is largely constructed on the repeated invocation of texts like the *Mahavamsa*, chronicling the lives of fabled Buddhist kings that constitute the foundation of symbolic legitimacy in Sri Lanka. In this mythicized past, Tamil and Sinhalese populations remained more or less separate in their own kingdoms. This separation has remained, in large part, to the present day. The first population of Tamils, now referred to as the Jaffna Tamils, occupy primarily the northeast and the Sinhalese occupy the coastal southwest and central portions of the island. These regions are divided by a band of land referred to as the “Dry

⁹ The kingdom of Vanga was situated in modern-day Bangladesh.

¹⁰ This fits the Marxist category of an “Asiatic society” wherein the control of water is equated with control over the towns and people. Edmund Leach further delineated Ceylon as a “hydraulic society” as “the technique of agriculture does not rely on bringing in water from elsewhere but is based on the local storage of local rain water for use throughout the year” (1959: 3-8).

Zone,” which, though not uninhabitable, has been sparsely populated as the cultivation of that land requires the extension of irrigation systems.

Under the British colonial administration (1815-1947), the island, then known as Ceylon, was utilized primarily as an economic resource. Consequently, colonial rule in Ceylon was characterized by British disinterest and the intermediary administrators were used in the absence of direct rule.¹¹ Under the British Raj, a plantation economy was established in the central region in order to further the economic efficiency of the island. Ethnic tension was exacerbated during a massive immigration of Tamils from India’s Tamil Nadu for bonded labor in the nineteenth century on the new plantations of the central highlands. The division between Sinhalese and Jaffna Tamils was extended to include the new population of Tamils, increasing dimensions of the ethnic divide to run along class and labor lines as well.

Following independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was increasingly divided. As the Jaffna Tamil elite had used the infrastructure of the colonial state to establish themselves as the leaders of business and trade, the Sinhalese established themselves through the bureaucracy of the state apparatus. Driven by the idea that Jaffna Tamils controlled the wealth of the state, the Sinhalese elite sought what Stanley Tambiah refers to as a “leveling” of opportunity and capacity (1996). Throughout the post-independence era, the Sinhalese used education and language requirements as leverage by which to turn the civil service from predominantly Jaffna Tamils to the Sinhalese.¹² It was not until the post-independence period that the chronicles of ancient history were interpreted to support the ethnic bifurcation of the state.

¹¹ These intermediaries were known as *rate mahatmaya*, selected from the Sinhalese aristocracy (Brow 1996: 42).

¹² The Sinhala Only Act (formally, the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956) established Sinhala as the official language of state and therefore the language necessary to enter the civil service.

The *Mahavamsa* was, in fact, extended in 1978 to include the twentieth century in the grand arc of Sinhalese civilization by the Mahavamsa Compilation Board under the leadership of Prime Minister JR Jayewardene (Kemper 1991: 181). In order to further ethnic opposition, the Tamils and Sinhalese were increasingly represented as twin antagonists in these additions, struggling for dominance throughout recorded history. As conflict was emphasized over shared history, differences such as religion and occupation were increasingly essentialized. The Buddhist Sinhalese, primarily paddy farmers, came to be seen as fundamentally different than the Tamil Hindus and Christians who worked in trade. A false binary was established that served to pull all other ethnic groups into a similar categorization. Sri Lankan Muslims and the Burgher descendants of the Portuguese colonization (from the fifteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries) were associated with the Tamils, while the *Veddas*, the indigenous inhabitants of the island, were considered to be not yet Sinhalese.¹³

The symbolic alignment of the contemporary Sri Lankan state with that of the ancient Sinhalese irrigation civilization established not only a claim to authority, but also a means by which to enter into the discourse surrounding the right to provide for a certain demarcated population. As the state apparatus sought entry into the everyday lives of its citizens, the state first had to articulate itself in terms recognizable as a claim to govern in a Sri Lankan context. The Sinhalese *savaka sangha* (ideal social order), as illustrated by the *Mahavamsa*, is predicated upon the state's encouragement of Theravada Buddhism. As these texts are "more normative than descriptive," little is explicitly outlined, but is instead interpreted broadly from the texts in order to structure the sense and meaning of particular institutions rather than

¹³ This is asserted primarily through the shared ancestry of Vedda and the Sinhalese. The Vedda are said to be the descendants of Prince Vijaya, the first king of Sri Lanka, and the indigenous demon princess, Kuveni (Brow 1996: 47).

their concrete form (Smith 1972: 31). Most commonly referred to as the Asokan model,¹⁴ Sri Lankan sovereignty is established upon a relationship of caregiving. Kingship, or leadership in general, was seen as a service to the people – a man tasked with the wellbeing and prosperity of his people while they would pursue a “life ruled by *Dhamma*,”¹⁵ unconcerned with their own material wellbeing. The belief that material wellbeing was essential to this idealized life was seated in “the very pragmatic realization that the pursuit of *Nibbana*¹⁶ necessitates leisured meditation and that this requires both economic sufficiency and a stable socio-political order” (Smith 1972: 47). Interpreted by the Sinhalese elite, *savaka sangha* became a method through which the characteristics of an ideal ruler and deserving population were articulated in the past and therefore, used to shape an ideal state apparatus in the twentieth century.

Development discourse and the performance of provision conflated sacred duty and secular responsibility. Development became the new means by which the state interacted with its citizens. The provision of care by the state apparatus then became one of the great legitimizing actions of the state. The *savaka sangha* connotes both a guarantee of service to the population and, in return, a guarantee that the population will seek that service solely from the state. This relationship was furthered in the “process of ‘naturalizing’ or ‘mythifying’ development”; Serena Tennekoon notes the efficacy of “development ritual” that served to “sacralize the secular and traditionalize the modern” (1988: 302). In combining Buddhist ethics of care with the duty of the state to care for its citizens, the governing apparatus was able to articulate the responsibility of the state specifically in respect to the

¹⁴ Asoka the Great was an emperor on the Indian subcontinent in the 3rd century BCE recognized for his philanthropic or paternal style of rule.

¹⁵ Dhamma in Pali, or more commonly Dharma, refers to the path of righteousness or living correctly.

¹⁶ *Nibbana* in Pali, or more commonly Nirvana, is the aim of Theravada Buddhism – an enlightened state of being that is achieved following the path of Buddhist practice.

population that it sought to govern and in a cultural tenor that further legitimized its actions. This relation between the righteous king and his subjects, established in historical precedent, then set a pattern for later regimes to emulate. This can similarly be interpreted as the legitimization of paternalistic policies based upon the standard established by past kings.

By asserting the moral responsibility to care for a demarcated population, the governing apparatus had also contributed to the further realization of that population, most manifestly in the structure of development projects done expressly for peasant populations. Agricultural development became, in short, “a ‘nationalist enterprise’ for the further establishment of the central state in the lives of rural peasants” (Tennekoon 1988: 297). The peasant held a position unique in the Sri Lankan caste system. As a group that was necessary to the agricultural capacity of the state, the peasants were both politically recognized and venerated as those who had the clearest reciprocal relation to the Sri Lankan state. It was in the late stage of colonization, when colonial administration was in the hands of Sri Lankans,¹⁷ that the state apparatus first interpreted peasants as a unitary population: “Instead of conceiving of farmers as simply producers of food, or part of a population problem, or the majority of Sri Lanka’s people, they [the Sinhalese elite] began to conceive of ‘peasants’ as a social institution that needed to be protected” (Kemper 1991:140). Following independence, Sri Lanka chose to become a nation of peasants (Moore 21-22: 1985). By establishing connection to a population that would benefit from a welfare system, the Sri Lankan state initiated a reciprocal relationship with its peasants through the provision of care. Therefore, the development program and any further state building was situated in the further assembly of peasants and the elaboration of their role in relation to the state.

¹⁷ Between 1931 and independence in 1947 in British Ceylon, authority to govern was granted to a Sri Lankan administrative body, the State Council of Ceylon.

The peasantry first became a moral project of the state in this post-independence period, as “the ‘peasantry’ were believed to have fallen into vicious ways due to the impact on rural society of colonialism and capitalism” and “in their own best interests ‘peasants’ were expected to submit to public programmes to uplift their morals” (Moore 1985: 198, 3). These “vicious ways” were shorthand for the introduction of wage labor and the breakdown of the traditional community following the British plantation system. The physical and moral wellbeing of the rural peasantry was understood to metonymically represent the health and stability of the nation as a whole and therefore, “Today, the credo of the Sinhalese majority is largely that of a collectivity that is experiencing the eroding of the traditional organic structure that stabilized it” (Tambiah 1986: 60). Paternalist concern was soon extended to the construction of the Sri Lankan welfare state¹⁸ as the governing apparatus sought to further establish its authority to care for the peasantry. Among the peasants it was the paddy farmers that held legitimacy as those who maintained a traditional, virtuous Buddhist lifestyle; identification as a paddy farmer “indicates a social status rather than a simple occupation [... and] connotes ‘honorable citizens’ or the ‘good people’, i.e. those unencumbered with onerous menial service obligations, and thus left free to pursue agriculture” (Moore 1985: 172). Often cast in comparison to plantation farmers, who were relatively more productive, it was the symbolic import of a subsistence farmer, greatly reliant upon community, that defined paddy farmers as an ideal-type citizen for the Buddhist state. Drawing upon a mythicized past, paddy farmers were culturally interpreted as the symbolic continuation of

¹⁸ By 1948, the year of Sri Lankan independence, state expenditure on social services took up over 56% of the state’s overall revenue (Moore 1985: 226). As Brow explains, “A vast array of government programs, ranging from the improvement of village irrigation works and the provision of credit, fertilizer, insecticide, and new strains of seed, on the one hand, to the grant of food rations and the construction of rural schools, hospitals, and dispensaries on the other, were either introduced or expanded in the period after independence” (1996: 73).

the ancient irrigation civilization, and therefore for the ideal citizen of the modern Sinhalese state.

In articulating this glorified past as a lost glory, and combined with the Buddhist conception of reawakening, the newly independent state established an evocative national narrative centered upon the reestablishment of paddy farming as the way of life in Sri Lanka (Woost 1993: 507). This narrative had a significant amount of influence as it drew the small-holder farmers, to which it was addressed, increasingly into the national narrative, and therefore into the state project. E.V. Daniel emphasizes that this was not only building upon the past in order to return to a previous condition, but also creating a “fusion in horizons” wherein the past and present become one in order to produce a valued future (Daniel 1996: 52). The Sinhalese nationalist identity had appealed to a historical grounding and therefore was increasingly shaped as primordial. It is balanced by the “participatoriness” of the mythic that creates a means by which to be Sinhala, namely, to imbricate oneself directly into this narrative by becoming a paddy farmer (Daniel 1996: 52). The introduction of the plantations under the colonial economy was then determined to be a corruption of the traditional form of life, and paddy agriculture retained symbolic legitimacy as the return of subsistence farming was considered a form of Buddhist virtue. It was specifically the concretization of a mythicized historical past that provided the basis upon which subsequent governments built their authority to author the future. The discourse of development lent itself particularly to this nationalist enterprise. By identifying the recipient of such schemes as peasants and the intended result as the facilitation of a righteous Buddhist lifestyle, the state was able to establish itself as the source of this idealized life.

Appealing to the ideal citizen and the *goyigama* caste

The state further articulated the ideal citizen, which it intended to rule, in the implementation of development projects. Through the provision of care, the interests of the newly unified group were aligned with the interests of the governing apparatus. A continuous loop was established between the state and the aligned individual as the Sinhalese farmers could more “readily situate themselves in the symbolic flow of development discourse by making their own activities in the past resonate with one of its [the state’s] central themes” (Woost 1993: 511). This conscious quest for the establishment of a consensual hegemony played a significant role in the form and function of the government in the daily life of rural Sinhalese. As Prime Minister DS Senanayake writes, “The function of our Government Department is to guide and educate, not to compel. Its ultimate goal is its own extinction when the people have been so thoroughly imbued with the co-operative idea that its value need no longer be taught” (1935: 79).

The formation of a Sri Lankan ideal citizen not only benefited the elites who sought to augment their authority through the symbolic capital of the state, it also served to reproduce the state itself. The fabricated institutional identity was so fully imbricated in the history and culture of Sri Lanka that it became a constitutive aspect of the state as a whole. In line with Eric Hobsbawm’s argument (1990), the nation did not precede the state, but rather the state preceded the nation. There was not a cohesive Sri Lankan nation that preceded the post-colonial establishment of the Sri Lankan state; instead, the establishment of the state’s borders predated the increasing homogenization of its citizenry. This distinction lies in the assumed legitimacy of a nation as a naturally unified, cohesive body, while a state exists as a juridical-legal container. As demonstrated by the work of Trouillot (2003) and Scott (1998),

the development of a cohesive population, or nation, is a continuous project of the state – not merely recognized in the articulation of borders, but actively constructed through those borders and the state apparatus that controls them.

The Sinhalese government also sought to form an increasingly homogeneous population akin to the mythicized Buddhist rural population of pre-colonial times in order to preserve this claim to authority. If the righteous rule of Sinhalese kings was in conjunction with a virtuous peasant population, engineering a similarly homogeneous peasant population would legitimate the continued rule of the Sinhalese elite. The state was not only intent upon the establishment of control over territory, but moreover sought to establish itself upon the continual shaping and control of its population. The provision of care worked as an avenue by which this relationship was established. As a result, cultural ideas of the ideal citizen and the performance of citizenry have filtered through these symbolic discourses to determine the merit of the individual in regards to their claim over resources distributed by the state. Consequently, Sri Lanka has been called “the most politicized society in Asia,” “a society where employment, education, housing, and access to consumer goods have all been tied at various points in the past two decades to political loyalty” (Kemper 1991: 190). As Moore argues, this is characteristic of the way governance functions in the Sri Lankan state; “Sri Lankan politics is ultimately oriented mainly to the question of who shall enjoy privileged access to services distributed by the state” (1985: 224). In tracing the formation of this relationship – through the establishment of an idealized population, the articulation of the role of that population, and the elaboration of that population’s performed identity – the significance of the state as an ideological project is made clear. This case study then lends

itself as a perspective from which to address the Sri Lankan governing apparatus as an operative of the reproduction of a broader and much more abstract state.

The Sinhalese identity itself is posited upon an increasing internal unity as nationalist and state projects continually seek the progressive homogenization within that identity; “antagonisms of class, caste, and region are displaced and obscured by an insistent emphasis on the common interests that unite all who belong within the nation” (Brow 1990: 9). By asserting itself as the means by which to continue a higher quality of life, the national narrative exerted a significant coercive force on its relatively heterogeneous population. The state therefore “became instrumental for the social advancement of the subordinate groups within the Sinhalese class alliance” or rather, asserted itself as the sole means by which to prosper within the hegemonic norm of the Sinhalese state (Stokke 1998: 98). The average Sri Lankan must demonstrate his acceptance of the Sinhalese identity in order to position himself to continue receiving the benefits of the state. Although seeking inclusion in the state project was not too difficult for the average Sinhalese, regardless of their occupation, this did problematize the relation of the state to its other citizens, most significantly the Tamil population. Tamils, as such, cannot contribute to the legitimacy of the Sinhalese state apparatus except through their exclusion. It is only through the exclusion of the Other that the reciprocal relationship between the Sinhalese and the governing elites can function as a unique assurance of wellbeing provided only to those included in the symbolic extent of the nation. Since independence, Sri Lanka, and particularly its governing apparatus, has overseen a “continuing and largely successful campaign of ‘Sinhaleseisation’ of the state in both symbolic and material terms” (Moore 1985: 196). The construction of an ideal-type through which the Sri Lankan state was to govern is a constitutive moment for the state project as a whole. The

formation of an ideal-type citizen in general can be considered a concrete abstraction that, while never perfectly manifest in any individual, exists in identifiable characteristics that can be drawn upon by both the average citizen and the governing apparatus itself. Similarly, in Agamben's description of the "example," he notes that "the example is thus excluded from the normal case not because it doesn't belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own belonging to it" (2005: 22). The Tamils, as the "exception," are "included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong" and "non-belonging can be shown only at the center" (2005: 22). Through Agamben's example and exception, the cohesion of the Sri Lankan state is articulated in reference to both the Sinhalese and the Tamil, and strengthened by this internal exclusion.

Caste in particular demonstrates the extent to which a Gramscian consent is more operative in the formation of this ideal citizen than is coerced alignment to the state project. Unlike the Indian caste system, the Sinhalese caste system does not articulate difference along the lines of intrinsic purity/impurity in the categorization of individuals; rather, caste functions to articulate the individual's positionality in relation to the state (Scott 2009: 244). Most importantly, caste establishes a claimed identity that demonstrates not only the relation of the subjects to the system in which they live, but also their relative status among those around them. An individual's caste determines the amount of "social honor and prestige" that others must demonstrate in recognition of that status (Gunasekera 1994: 7). Caste is not understood to be a concrete or essentialized identity, but a fluid relation that hinges upon the recognition of others. Therefore, the use of one's caste is operative in terms of how an individual is perceived by his or her community, and how one wishes to be perceived.

Following this recognition of paddy farmers as representative of national identity, a group of elite families (the Senanayake, Silva, and Attygalle) chose to ascribe to the *goyigama* caste near the end of the nineteenth century. As families that had established themselves in mining, plantation agriculture, and arrack renting under the British Raj, their new money from their capitalist enterprises needed to be authenticated through this Sinhalese narrative (Jayawardena 2002: 192). These families therefore reinforced their claim to land and wealth they had amassed through the consistent affirmation of their status as paddy farmers by birth, regardless of their actual proximity to a paddy field. The assertion of cultural legitimacy was further augmented by their increasing economic wealth until these families, and others like them, became established as the new aristocratic elite on the island, superseding the old money *Mudaliyars*.¹⁹ Through the further consolidation of their economic and social status, the elite chose to articulate their relation to the colonial state in symbolic terms by asserting their caste as *goyigama*. As *goyigama* itself is literally translated as paddy farmer or a cultivator, the caste became an index from which the average Sinhalese could simultaneously claim a position in the ruling aristocracy while also rooting authority in a mythicized past. The value in ascribing to this caste was deeply established given that nearly fifty percent of the Sinhalese population self-identified with the *goyigama* caste during the latter part of the colonial period (KM de Silva 1986: 20). Identity was therefore not a matter of essentialized or ascribed categorization, but the voluntary identification with the in-group. While this conception of caste was seated in the pre-colonial relationship between the feudal king and his serfs – by articulating the manner in which they would serve him – it was also encouraged under the British Raj.

¹⁹ The Tamil *Mudaliyars* were established as the ruling elite under Portuguese colonial rule, roughly the 16th to the mid 17th century. Comparatively, their legitimacy was established through wealth and status, and they did not enact their caste as a form of governing legitimacy as did the new *goyigama* families.

Goyigama accordingly became the hegemonic index according to which some Sinhalese ascribed in order to be seen as a citizen of the state. When universal suffrage was established by the British in 1931,²⁰ the *goyigama* identity immediately became the only electoral identification capable of transferring authority en masse to an individual candidate. Prime ministers like JR Jayewardene and DS Senanayake were noted for their continual use of the *goyigama* identity in order to establish themselves in the political sphere. The caste soon became synonymous with the electoral base of the United National Party (UNP), “popularly regarded as the party of the aristocracy” (Gunasekera 1994: 109). Moreover, the *goyigama* caste was no longer utilized solely in reference to the present, but was extended backwards to map the *goyigama* identity onto the fabled Sinhalese kings like Parakramabahu.²¹ The internal hierarchy of the *goyigama* caste was established through relating the paddy farmer with the king who provided the means by which paddy farming was enabled (namely, irrigation). This hierarchy allowed high-ranking political elites to identify with subsistence farmers, therefore concretizing the relationship between the politician and his constituency on the basis of shared identity and, similarly, participation in the same symbolic system. The positionality of the *goyigama* identity therefore deepened the authority of politicians to situate themselves historically in a royal lineage rife with symbols from which to continually draw and reproduce their authority. It was the governing elite who contributed to reproduction of symbols that reproduced their own legitimacy while also reproducing the state idea.

By the end of the nineteenth century, “the *goyigama* [...] closed ranks to defend their long accepted status as the most ‘honorable’ of the castes – just as paddy cultivation was the

²⁰ Via the Donoughmore Constitution, in effect from 1931 until 1947

²¹ Parakramabahu reigned from 1164–1197 and is credited with the construction of 1470 new tanks (Leach 1959: 10).

most ‘honorable’ vocation – and their position at the apex of the caste structure” (KM de Silva 1986: 43). What was initially a form of identity that derived legitimacy through its representation of the Sinhalese national narrative, and therefore creating an inclusive identity, then began to turn outward, defining itself in opposition to other identities. The use of exclusion can then be interpreted as a further elaboration of the *goyigama* identity itself – a means by which to fully establish the character and form of a member of the *goyigama* in relation to an Other. As Brow notes, the *goyigama* identity was further elaborated in its opposition to the *Veddas*, the “jungle-dwelling hunters and gatherers,” that were seen to be racially distinct from the Sinhalese population (Brow 1996: 45). As paddy agriculture was tied to the mythic Sinhalese irrigation civilization, the use of irrigation was subsequently valorized as the imposition of civilization over nature. Comparatively, the hunting and gathering methods maintained by the *Veddas* were seen as a lack of ability to shape the world around them. As Scott argues, “The idea of civilization was in large measure an agro-ecological code” upon which ideas of society were correlated with the manner in which they shaped their land; “the civilized change the world; the barbarians live in the world without changing it” (2009: 101, 104). Neither identity was strictly delineated by discernible racial markers, but was used instead as shorthand to denote the perceived presence or lack of civility; a *Vedda* therefore represented “those among them who lack the cultural attributes that collectively define a civilized and distinctly Sinhala identity” (Brow 1996: 5).

In this way, relation to the state – namely, either as a productive member or one who refuses integration – was evoked symbolically to critique or condemn individuals on the basis of their character. As with the concept of Peruvian decency, performance of an identity could, to a certain extent, supersede essentialized identity. Any individual of any caste could

be referred to as *Vedda* for the smallest infraction of social norms, especially in relation to their civility and ability to contribute to the community (Brow 1996: 45). This constructed binary of civility/incivility was then extended to assert a claim to authority in ruling Sri Lanka. In comparison to the *Vedda*, the *goyigama* represented a caste identity that was largely predisposed to the state system – especially in being characterized by an occupation that necessitated state intervention (irrigation) and the consistent reaffirmation of the symbolic value of civilization. Whether this was a result of the caste being established largely under colonial rule, or the natural expression of an identity, the result was a cultural claim to the authority to lead the nation and thus to control the governing apparatus. As the decades passed, the *goyigama* identity had increasingly little to do with the actual profession of the individual, but instead became an avenue through which the average individual could opt-in to the state project, particularly with the entry of the *goyigama* caste into the civil service and legal profession (Jayawardena 2002: 197). The *goyigama* caste then became synonymous with the Sinhalese elite that controlled the Sri Lankan state apparatus, even while under the British Raj. The *goyigama* were themselves the idealized Sri Lankan population through which the Sinhalese state apparatus governed and therefore the image of citizenship.

The new relationship between the Sinhalese and the state

The performance of the *goyigama* caste was no longer only in recognition of what the state sought from its population, but in what the population sought from the state. Those who aligned to the ideal identity had the basis to demand the benefits of the state simply by virtue of that identity. While caste can be considered as a social and symbolic means of performing

identity (as it requires not only the relation to others, but the recognition of others), in terms of the state and access to provided care, identity could no longer only be enacted symbolically, but also must be legally recognized through inclusion in the governing apparatus. Ethnicity, then, became the means by which the symbolic nation could be translated into the language of the governing apparatus. It was through the recognition of Sinhalese ethnicity that individuals sought their relation to the state; an “effective hegemony that successfully articulates the interests of the peasants to the project of their rulers also demands that rhetorical concessions [...] be accompanied by the distribution of real, material benefits” (Brow 1990: 9-10).

It could then be argued that the Sinhalese are exclusively entitled to the provision of care from the state by nature of their ethnicity. While the paddy farmer claims his right of access to the means of subsistence as based upon the nature of his relation to the state apparatus that established itself on the protection of that right, so too do the Sinhalese demand provision from the state merely for their presence as Sinhalese on Sinhalese land. This form of demand upon the state is encapsulated in what Tambiah refers to as “group entitlements,” which denote not only demands for welfare, but also demands for recognition of social capital through positions of status as granted by the state (Tambiah 1996: 337). What results is the perpetuation of the same; reciprocity serves to underpin the rationale for governance:

The instrumental efficacy of ethnicity in making claims on the resources of the modern state inevitably in turn reinforces and maintains ethnic political machinery – patron/client networks, bossism, and patronage structures. (Tambiah 1996: 335)

The state itself is therefore circumscribed by merit of its assumed Sinhalese identity and its accompanying corpus of symbols. Although the autocratic rule of the twentieth century has greatly augmented the authority of the governing apparatus, it could not change the source of its authority. The Sinhalese governing apparatus remained constrained by its state idea as long as it was also reliant on the “constellation of symbols” that underpinned it.

The value in the provision of care is as necessary to the legitimacy of modern day politicians as it was to the kings before them. Therefore, the development projects of the Sri Lankan state were seated first and foremost in the past through “stressing continuities and connections between former virtues, present policies, and future aspirations” (Brow 1990: 9). As Daniel emphasizes, Sinhalese legitimacy is rooted in an “objectivist history” wherein “signs of the Sinhala past [...] are seen as actualized events” and therefore “burdened with the need to concretize” (Daniel 1996:27-28).

Through the literal reconstruction of past triumphs, contemporary Sinhalese politicians such as DS Senanayake and JR Jayewardene have established their own legitimacy on the shoulders of mythicized monarchs. DS Senanayake was the first prime minister to identify himself as the heir apparent to the ancient irrigation civilization, particularly in his claimed blood relation to King Parakramabahu (Kemper 1991: 161). His accomplishments were similarly made to emphasize the continuity between the fabled reign of such kings to his own administration from 1947 to 1952. As Moore noted, “more than anyone else, DS Senanayake was responsible for infusing Sinhalese nationalism with the vision that the colonization of the Dry Zone was a return to the heartland of the ancient irrigation civilization of the Sinhalese” (1985: 45).²² Moreover, Senanayake’s skillful

²² The “colonization of the Dry Zone” refers to “the creation of agricultural settlements in the undeveloped interior of the island, or colonization” and “is associated primarily with the UNP” (Peebles 1990: 30). Through

utilization of symbol and ritual set a precedent for later politicians to align themselves with. A subsequent prime minister, JR Jayewardene (1977-1989²³), worked to extend the symbolic beyond the justification for political strategy and further aggregated power to the office of the executive. Jayewardene's time in office was replete with public work projects and demonstrations of the symbolic strength of the state. This can be seen as an almost direct result of his neoliberal economic policies, in an attempt to assuage the effects of policies that "had adverse impacts on those groups that were particularly more dependent on general state protection and welfare transfers i.e. peasants" (Stokke 1998: 103). Jayewardene and his party, the United National Party, addressed grievances against the state through the combination of liberalization schemes and large-scale public sector investments (Stokke 1998: 104). Broader infrastructural development projects were supplemented by purely symbolic projects such as the planting of bo tree saplings in each of the nine administrative capitals on the island.²⁴ Jayewardene's example therefore clearly established the primacy of ritual and symbol in executive rule on the island.

In one project illustrative of this point, the Mahaweli Scheme (formulated in 1958, but undertaken in the late 1960s), governing apparatus had the opportunity to devise its ideal society quite literally from the ground up. In roughly 5 years, 150,000 to 200,000 predominantly Sinhalese families were to be resettled in the Dry Zone, newly made habitable by the diversion of the Mahaweli River (Sørensen 1996: 7-8, 78). These new villages then

government irrigation projects, primarily Sinhalese communities were encouraged to move to areas made newly inhabitable by the constant supply of water. Notably, the land on which most Sinhalese were resettled was what was previously considered to be the buffer zone between Sinhalese and Tamil populations (Moore 1985: 196-7).

²³ JR Jayewardene was technically only prime minister until 1978 when he introduced the executive presidency, which established the president as both the head of state and the head of government. Jayewardene was then president until 1989.

²⁴ The bo tree (bo being the Sinhalese translation of *Bodhi*, or enlightenment) of Sri Lanka was itself a sapling taken from the original *Bodhi* tree in India under which the Buddha gained enlightenment. The daughter of one of the Sinhalese kings, King Asoka, took the sapling with her to plant in the ancient capital of Anuradhapura, which today is in central Sri Lanka.

became a social engineering project of the state. These villages, or “centralized block of houses”, meant to replicate the structure of an idealized Buddhist community,²⁵ were then used to represent the state as a whole, declaring the “Sinhalese nation as a nation of villages,” just as the wellbeing of the peasant had previously been used to metonymically represent the health of the nation (Brow 1988: 311, Woost 1994: 90). However, in the use of an artificial village to represent the nation, the state apparatus was also artificially constructing the image of the state. By drawing symbolic legitimacy from a racially, religiously, and economically homogeneous unit, the state was able to articulate a vision of the island as equally homogeneous – importantly obfuscating sites of difference that have caused an impediment to the further aggregation of power by the Sinhalese elite. As Brow emphasizes, these projects and their accompanying rituals were “not produced solely for the edification of the villagers” (Brow 1990: 7); rather it was through these rituals and projects that the state materialized and therefore also formed the site of state reproduction.

The most potent historical symbols of the ancient irrigation civilization centered upon the tank (*vāva*), Buddhist temple (*dāgāba*), and paddy field (*yāya*) “as metonyms for material prosperity and spiritual wellbeing [...] Together, they constitute an iconographic code for the *dharmistha samajaya* (righteous society) slogan espoused by the UNP government” (Tennekoon 1988: 297). The three also represent the shape of the idealized Buddhist village: autonomous in production, yet internally dependent upon members of the community as well as in their singular line to the state – the irrigation tank. Renovation of these irrigation tanks,

²⁵ As Brow notes, the method of agriculture and the surrounding environment have “imposed a uniformity” on the structure of traditional villages: “Each village normally contains a tank, the paddy fields it irrigates, a collection of wattle and daub houses clustered close to the tank bund, and a square mile or so of surrounding scrub jungle that separates itself from its nearest neighbors” (1996: 35).

left in ruins by the passage of time, has constituted the majority of irrigation projects through the twentieth century.

The implementation of irrigation schemes works largely in the same capacity as it did a couple thousand years ago. Welfare sits at a unique juncture of both the mythicized and material realities of the Sri Lankan state; the symbols that are used copiously throughout such projects also serve the same ends as the penetrative, controlling state apparatus:

In Sri Lanka, development is not only a set of discourses implicated in the placement of the island's economy within the world economic system, in local contexts it is also a means through which to carry out the moral regulation and surveillance of the formation of the nation state. (Woost 1994: 81)

The result of the Mahaweli Project is the most illustrative of this point. Rather than recreating the idealized villages of the mythicized past, the state has extended itself in order to maintain control. The state did not work to create a system of autonomous villages, nor did it work to empower its citizens as individuals through a self-sufficient lifestyle; rather, it sought to further economic and political ties that ensured further the dependence of the village on the centralized state apparatus. By expanding into the "uninhabitable" Dry Zone, the state has ensured that its monopoly on the provision of water has effectively established the state as the sole provider of any political or economic good. As Moore elaborates this relationship in terms of Andre Gunder Franks' core-periphery model, the villages became increasingly less connected among themselves while growing increasingly reliant on their connection to the state core (Moore 1985: 131).

While the initial logic of irrigation in a pre-colonial state ostensibly rested in productive capacity and the established settlement of delineated territory, the method became

even more valuable for a modern nation-state. In the reconstruction of ancient irrigation systems, the Sinhalese state reasserted its previous territorial claim on the island, using the irrigation of land as a rationale to resettle thousands of Sinhalese to the previously uninhabitable Dry Zone. Playing upon the significant binary of civility/incivility, the extension of irrigation and paddies indicated “the truly pivotal act in converting jungle into a civilized community” (Woost 1993: 511). Moreover, this extension of civility was considered to be the benevolent gift of the state in the offering of the means by which to continue subsistence paddy agriculture, which either environment or the economy might otherwise prohibit, and therefore played directly into a pattern of paternalist governance.

In this way, the care provided by the Sri Lankan governing apparatus functions on the relationship established by that care, namely, a hierarchical or paternalistic care for the Sinhalese peasants by their Sinhalese political elites. It was precisely the form and content of provided care – the provision of irrigation to paddy fields – that determined the model of life for Sri Lankan villagers. As in Peru, the appeal to the state idea offered a means to align to the state project through a particular form of political subjectivity that was established within the circulating discourse of the state idea. However, in the Sri Lankan case, this still excluded Sri Lankan citizens who were interpreted to be historically excluded from the state idea as well – the Tamil. In regards to Sri Lanka, the boundaries of the state idea and the territorial borders of the state are not congruous. Rather, the state idea, active in reproducing ethnic exclusion, was constitutive in defining the Sinhalese identity. Therefore, through strengthening the claims made to ethnic division, the state idea was reproduced through provision of care predicated on that ethnic division.

Chapter 4

Concluding remarks

The purpose of the comparative study is to emphasize the correspondence between two distinct cases in order to express the provision of care as a strategy of governing – specifically a strategy of claiming authority to govern from the state idea. As previously defined, the state idea references the ways in which the state is understood conceptually as a legitimate, functional governing agent, which is then established and reproduced through cultural markers, practices, or symbols that are enacted in the daily governance of the state. The forms articulated through these case studies – the ideal citizen, engineered consent, and positional identities – serve to demonstrate the manifestations of this form of power. Moreover, the comparison of two such diverse cases illustrates the value of this approach in further analyzing the state idea, not only a form of affective power, but also as a discourse to be drawn upon by governing elites and marginalized populations alike. It is not only, as Althusser argues (1971), the “repressive state apparatus” that benefits from the reproduction of the state idea, but any individual or group that is considered under the aegis of that ideology. The state idea exists through interpretation; as it is reproduced, it is also produced anew. The form of the state idea is not reliant upon an explicit articulation of a claim to authority to maintain its hegemony; rather, by existing as a constellation of ideas, implicitly connected and reproduced through daily governance, the state idea is a fertile terrain for both the governing apparatus and population to work through, rather than against.

Through both case studies, the provision of care has been referred to as a point of access, both for the governing apparatus into the lives of its citizens as in the Sri Lankan case, and for Peruvian indigenous citizens to access their governing apparatus. As articulated in the

theoretical framework for this project, I argue that the provision of care is also a point of entry for the state idea to enter into, and continue to shape, the form and logic of the governing apparatus and the population itself. It is through this mediation by the state idea that the state as a conception of legitimate governance exists between the population and governing apparatus, not solely defined by either. It is the expression of a form of governance, first articulated in the state idea and reflected in the relationship between the governing apparatus and the population, that confers legitimacy upon a governing body. It is through everyday governance that authority to govern is established, but more importantly, it is through everyday governance that the means to legitimate that authority is also reproduced.

As I noted in the Peru case, indigenous Peruvians increasingly established their relation to the state in terms of the access they were given to the governing apparatus. In providing roads and education, the governing state was able to control and position the indigenous population in relation to the state through the means of access granted to them. In terms of education in particular, the ideal citizen was formed through the provided means of care as schoolhouses were considered “citizenship factories” (García 2005: 12). Through their demand to be included in the state, and the provision of care that was established in response, indigenous citizens were increasingly shaped through the moral and political project of the state, resulting in the new subjectivity of the indigenous citizen. This new subjectivity was established through the state idea, as the claim to citizenship and the provision of care considered suitable for that citizen were both mediated by the discourses that determine the role of the state in the lives of its citizens.

In the Sri Lanka case, the idea of a nation of peasants was reflected in the form of care the state chose to provide, and who that care was provided to. Through irrigation, the

governing apparatus actively facilitated a certain form of life – namely the subsistence paddy farmer – to create a cohesive population in reflection of the mythicized past of the Sinhalese irrigation civilization. The constellation of symbols and practices that were invoked in the provision of irrigation then served to establish a legitimate form of governance, reworked through the state idea to articulate a new form of legitimacy for the modern governing state. The idealized paddy farmer was then reflected in the Sinhalese caste system, through the articulation of the *goyigama* caste, and then through politics, as the *goyigama* caste became the dominant electorate. The Sri Lankan governing apparatus then succeeded in tying an ideal form of subjectivity to meaningful inclusion in the nation. This expression of the state idea, in the increasing alignment of citizens to a subjectivity constructed by the governing apparatus, demonstrates the capacity of care as a strategy to work in conjunction with the state's intent to create a cohesive, unitary nation, where the life of the population legitimates the nature of its governing body.

In regard to the individual, the receipt of care from a governing body itself should be considered interpellation. Once provision of care is established, political subjects necessarily enter into an ideologically mediated relation with their present form of governance. It is precisely through this entry into a relationship with a governing apparatus that individuals become citizens, subjects, and beneficiaries of the state. The creation of such subjectivities, particularly positional identities, is necessarily of fundamental interest to the state. The resulting proliferation of ideas and concepts that mediate the individual and the state as the state idea grows is neither a deliberate, conscious form of power aggregation, nor is it merely the passive result of this interaction. Instead, as I have argued through these case studies, it is directly a result of the agency and decisions of both the governing apparatus and the

population working in consonance or in opposition. It is between the governing apparatus and its population that a discursive terrain is formed as a means to communicate legitimacy between the two.

The state, as an ongoing project, is not invested in the establishment of positional identities, nor the articulation of an ideal citizen, nor the facilitation of an increasingly homogeneous, cohesive population alone. Rather it is interested in what is made possible through all these forms. The engineering of consent that is arrived at through these forms further facilitates the means by which the ideological state continues to function. When the state operates in consensus as well as coercion a new field of possibilities is opened for the state, particularly in the interrelation of these forms. Therefore, the ideological state should be considered, as noted by Mitchell, as a “machinery of intentions” that, though “usually termed rule making, decision making, or policymaking” such as the institutionalization of the provision of care, in terms of effect the “state essentially becomes a subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas” (1999: 82).

While the process of provision and receipt of care masquerades as banal, its effects are anything but. These cases demonstrate that the way in which populations are positioned in relation to their governing apparatus is fundamental to the provision of care. In Peru, the provision of roads and schools gave indigenous communities a concrete point of access to meaningful inclusion within the nation as modern citizens. In Sri Lanka, the extension of irrigation projects encouraged rural villagers to become subsistence paddy farmers, reliant on the provision of water by the state. Both cases then demonstrate the means by which material care provided by the governing apparatus affects the subjectivity of its recipients. The capability of these positional identities to then shape the form and substance of governance in

these two states demonstrates the significance care provision to the reproduction of the state. As I argued in the introduction of this paper, the provision of care as a strategy of governance is capable of far more than how it is perceived as a “mundane practice” of governance.

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